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INTRODUCTION

The telecommunications industry, more than any other part of our
everyday lives, has been transformed in recent years-technically, legally, and
culturally. The changes brought about by chips, transistors, microwaves, and
satellites now provide a vast aray of new services, including e-mail, paging,
andportable phones. Abusiness once characterizedby poles every 100 feet and
overhead copper wires now shoots messages and data through underground
fiber-optic cable or bounces them off satellites high in the sky. People
throughout the world talk with one another as if they were next door.'
There is little sign that the pace of technological change that has swept the
telecommunications industry will slacken anytime soon. For example, today's
circuit-switched telephone network, known as the Public Switched Telephone
Network (PSTN), may soon be partly replaced by a new technology known as
Voice Over Internet Protocol (VOIP). In a VOIP system, the voice signal is
converted into packets of data which are then sent over a network.' The new
networks will be capable of handling two million bits per second-40 times
faster than the fastest computer modems today. The new phones will transmit
and receive video images and high quality music, and will also provide Internet
access.3 Video phones and voice dialing can easily be added to an Internet
telephone system. Marketing has also begun of "smart" phones, which are
mobile phones that let you talk, surf the net, and pick up stock prices. These
smart phones act as a bridge between communications and computing
technologies, incorporating digital wireless communications as well as the data
and storage functions of a personal computer.

1. No matter where in the world the caller hails from. The Global Satellite System,
available since November of 1998, enables a person in the middle of the Gobi desert to place a
call on his satellite phone to anywhere in the world. The history of the satellite communications
industry has been a troubled one, marked by high start-up costs, rocket failures, and national
security controversies. Two companies, Iridium and ICO, have filed forprotection from creditors
under Chapter 11. A third company, Globalstar, backed by Loral Space and Communications,
began service in September of 1999. Iridium spent $5 billion to place 72 satellites in low earth
orbit to provide service anywhere in the world. The rapid advance of telecommunications
technology, while making the satellite network feasible, also dramatically drove down the cost
of terrestrial communications, putting the satellite system at a large cost disadvantage. Fiber
optics have driven the true cost of long distance and transatlantic calls down to levels
approaching zero. See David Barboza, PlanetEarth CallingIridium, Can the Satellite Phone
Service Achieve a Soft Landing?,N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 1999, at Cl.
2. See Geoffrey Nairn, Complex Industry Structure is Beginning to Emerge, FIN.
TIMES, Oct. 8, 1999, at 13.
3. See Catherine Greenman, Too Many Phones, Too Little Service, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug.
19, 1999, at G8. In just a few years, the Internet has become a powerful worldwide medium for
the exchange of information and trading. The new generation of digital phones can support both
limited web access and e-mail. Within four years, use of mobile Internet devices is expected to
be "enormously popular" as Internet and mobile phone technologies merge into a new generation
of portable devices. Roger Taylor, Phone.com Makes Wireless Purchase,FIN TIMEs, Oct. 12,
1999, at 26.
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Clearly the telephone industry, born on the night of March 10, 1876 when
Alexander Graham Bell spoke into his laboratory telephone "Mr.
Watson--come here-I want to see you,"4 has come a long way. The law in the
late nineteenth century developed quickly to encourage the widespread use of
this new technology.5 Today the industry's legal framework is a mixture of late
nineteenth-century law and recent federal legislation and judicial construction.
The nineteenth-century laws were designed to accommodate the original
technology, which required the use of land rights-of-way to place telephone
poles and run telephone lines. States granted franchises over public and private
lands to construct and operate telephone businesses.' The statewide franchises
were perpetual as long as the company used the rights-of-way for telephone
purposes. After the grant of the statewide franchises, local governments could
not exclude a telephone company, but they could enforce normal police power
regulation over the industry.7 Because the companies that used city streets had
a substantial local presence, they developed a custom of making substantial
contributions of services and money to the local governments!
As communications technology has less and less physical connection with
the city, however, there seems to remain little justification for any special
contribution to local government beyond what other businesses pay.
Nonetheless, in almost all cases in South Carolina, the local exchange
telephone company is the city's highest personal property taxpayer and its
highest business license taxpayer. In addition, these utilities often pay a
"franchise fee" of 3% of their gross revenues to municipal governments.9
Moreover, today's local exchanges face competition for certain services from
long distance carriers that maybe able to avoid most local taxes. State and local
governments should work to establish a level playing field. Unfortunately, the
South Carolina legislature has addressed-but not resolved-this issue.
The recent South Carolina Supreme Court decision in BellSouth
Telecommunications, Inc. v. City of Orangeburg"° has only exacerbated the
problem. In Orangeburg,the court ratified the power of city governments to
erode the competitiveness of local telephone companies through the imposition
of excessive business taxes disguised as "franchise fees."" As this Article will
show, the Orangeburgdecision is wholly at odds with (1) the franchise rights
4. See JOHN BROOKS, TELEPHONE: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS 49 (1975); HARRY B.
MACMEAL, THE STORY OF INDEPENDENT TELEPHONY 15 (1934).
5. KENNETHLIPARTITO, THEBELLSYsTEMANDREGIONALBUSINESs: THETELEPHONE

IN THE SouTH, 1877-1920, 176 (1989); J. WARREN STEHMAN, THE FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE
AMERICAN TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY 120-21 (1967).

6. See LIPARTITO, supra note 5, at 180.

7. STIEHMAN, supranote 5, at 239.
8. Id. at 120.

9. The "franchise fee" rates were negotiated after the South Carolina Supreme Court
struck down existing business license tax ordinances on constitutional grounds. See Southern
Bell Tel. &Tel. Co. v. City of Spartanburg, 285 S.C. 495, 331 S.E.2d 333 (1985).
10. No. 25009, 1999 WL 1037160 (S.C. Nov. 8, 1999).
11. Id. at *4.
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol51/iss2/5
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of local telephone companies, (2) the national trend towards striking down
confiscatory franchise fees, and (3) federal law.
The federal law implicated by the Orangeburg decision is the
Telecommunications Act of 1996.12 In passing the Telecommunications Act,
Congress removed many of the barriers surviving from the old regulated
monopoly days that were designed to prevent competition across local and long
distance phone service. The new law opened the door for telecommunications
companies to compete for each other's business. Consequently, the Act set off
a period of telecommunications mergers and acquisitions comparable in scale
to the deals of J.P. Morgan and John P. Rockefeller at the turn of the last
century. For example, 1998 and 1999 saw the following merger negotiations:
Companies

Approximate Amount

AT&T-MediaOne

$58 billion 3

AT&T-Tele-Communications Inc.

$45 billion 14

Bell Atlantic--GTE

$52.9 billion"

Bell Atlantic-Nynex

$22 billion 6

British Telecom AT&T (joint
venture)

$10 billion 7

MCI WorldCom-Sprint

$108 billion 8

Qwest CommunicationsU.S. West

$48.5 billion 9

12. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996)
(codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-1021 (Supp. m11997)).
13. FCC to Scrutinize AT&T-MediaOne Deal,L.A. TIMES, May 8, 1999, at C2.
14. Michael E. Kanell, WorldCom Dealwith MCI OK'd, ATLANTA CONST., July 16,
1998, at Fl.
15. Seth Schiesel, GTEHolders Give Thumbs Up to Merger With BellAtlantic, N.Y.
TIMES, May 19, 1999, at C9.
16. Jube Shiver, Jr., Telecom Talk: Baby Bell Mergers Provoke Debate on 1996
Telecom Act, L.A. TIMES, May 18, 1998, at D7.
17. Stephanie Stoughton, A Telecom Maestro: Reston 's Concert Communications is
ModelforAT&T-BTDeal, WAsH. PosT, July 28, 1998, at El.
18. William Lewis & Richard Waters, MCI WorldCom Confirms $115 Billion Sprint
Takeover, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1999, at 1.MCI is the number two long distance carrier; Sprint is
number three. Together, MCI WorldCom and Sprint will control 35% of the United States long
distance market, whereas AT&T controls 45%. See Laura M. Holson & Seth Schiesel, MCI to
Buy Sprintin Swap ofStockfor $108 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1999, at Al.
19. Steve LohrBehemothsin aJack-Be-NimbleEconomy,FIN. TIMES, Sept. 12,1999,
§ 4, at 1.
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$72 billion 0

Ameritech Corp.
WorldCom-MCI

$49 billion2 '

Additionally, two Baby-Bells-Nynex and Bell Atlantic-merged in
1997. 2 On June 29, 1999 federal officials announced the approval of the

merger of two more-SBC Communications and Ameritech. 3 In sum, "[s]ince
1996, the seven original Baby Bells have agreed to become four."' 4
Telecommunications companies across the nation continue to test the
boundaries of the 1996 Act by attempting to gain access to markets that were
formerly off-limits following the 1984 breakup of the American Telephone and
Telegraph Company (AT&T). In particular, the Baby-Bells, which had been
precluded from the long distance telephone service market, are now knocking
at the long distance door. However, the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) has three times turned down BellSouth's applications to enter the long
distance market?5 AT&T has likewise recently begun taking advantage of the
industry's deregulation by attempting to reenter local phone markets through
the acquisition of large cable companies.26
The proponents of deregulation argue that expanded competition will
generate savings that may benefit consumers through lower prices and better
products. Others argue that any savings may be drained off by heavy national,
state, and local taxes, as well as the return of monopoly profits. Indeed,
AT&T's recent purchase of cable companies will allow it to return in the local

20. Stephen Labaton, $72 Billion Deal of Phone Giants ClearsBig Hurdle, N.Y.
TIMES, June 30, 1999, atAl.
21. Kanell, supra note 14, at Fl.
22. BellAtlantic, Nynex MergerOK'd, Cmt. TRM., Aug. 15, 1997, § 3, at 3.
23. Jon Van & Frank James, FCCPutsConditionson PhoneMerger,CH. TRiB., June
30, 1999, at Al.
24. MCI BellSouth Make Playsfor Sprint,OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Oct. 4, 1999, at
16.
25. Schiesel, supranote 15, at C13.
26. See AT&T Chief Hits Restrictions to Local Phone Competition, CHi. DAILY
HERALD, May 22, 1999, at Bus. 1;Bandingofthe Giants,FIN. TIMES, May 7, 1999, at 17. AT&T,
after its $58 billion acquisition of MediaOne, will reach into 57% of American homes, according
to consumer groups. AT&T disputes the 57% figure but concedes it is over 50%. Stephen
Labaton,AT&TPlannedMediaOneDealPosesTestfor U.S. CablePolicy,N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18,
1999, at Cl. AT&T's General Counsel James W. Cicconi said "It's an extreme stretch to suggest
that there's any antitrust issue here.., the whole purpose is to provide local competition." Id.
The 1996 Telecommunications Act requires local phone companies, but not cable operators like
AT&T, to make their lines accessible to competitors. America Online and GTE have mounted
a nationwide campaign on the state and local level to force AT&T to open its cable lines.
Stephen Labaton, Fightfor Internet Access Creates Unusual Alliances, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13,
1999, atAl; Seth Schiesel, The Outlookfor CableAccess, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 1999, at Bus. 1.
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phone market, but without the regulation that governed it until 1984.27 The
wires now used only for cable television can easily become conduits for highspeed Internet access and both local and long distance telephone services.
Because telecommunications companies in South Carolina are
currently attempting to open and expand the competitive market, South
Carolina cities have sought to assure themselves a continuation of high
telecommunications revenues in the face of the coming industry free-for-all.
Cities have attempted to tax telecommunications companies on 3% of their
gross receipts, with the City of Orangeburg actually succeeding in imposing a
5% of gross receipts tax on BellSouth, a tax Orangeburg calls a "franchise
fee."2' The most discussed recent piece of legislation involves the extent to
which South Carolina cities can charge telecommunications firms for business
license taxes and franchise fees. 9 The Senate and House versions of this
legislation outlaw city efforts to impose heavy new charges on
telecommunications firms, while not raising the rate for other businesses.
Mayors opposed the bill on the ground that it would cut the cities' expected
future revenues from the telephone business. 0 However, the bill was signed
into law on June 30, 1999.31
The efforts by local governments to exact heavy taxes from the
telecommunications industry runs counter to the historical right of the industry
to freely use public rights-of-way for the provision of telephone service.
Unfortunately, the Orangeburgdecision signals the South Carolina Supreme
Court's misunderstanding of this first principle. Because the history of the
industry's relationship to the State of South Carolina can aid courts and
lawmakers in charting its future course, this Article traces the history of the
telecommunications industry in South Carolina from its early days.32 In broad
terms the industry has gone through four periods since 1876:
1. Monopoly--Bell Patents (1876 to 1893 and 1894): The
original Bell patents provided the company a legal patent
monopoly for seventeen years, ending in 1893 and

27. Competition, of course, implicitly requires competitors and some diversity of
ownership. Otherwise, the result is an unregulated monopoly. The recent mergers and financial
consolidations raise the question of whether the competitive period will prove short-lived.
28. See BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. City of Orangeburg, No. 25009, 1999 WL
1037160, at *4 (S.C. Nov. 8, 1999) (upholding the fee).
29. H.R. 3276, 113th Leg., 2d Sess. (S.C. 1999); S.329, 113th Leg. (S.C. 1999).
30. Dave L'Heureux, Cities Want Telecom Tax Bill Delayed,THE STATE (Columbia,
S.C.), April 24, 1999, at B6.
31. See infra Part IV.D.
32. This Article does not address 47 U.S.C. § 332 (governing wireless telephone
service) or its recent interpretations. See, e.g., Town ofAmherst v. Omnipoint Comms., 173 F.3d
9, 14 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding that the town's denial of requested permits for building wireless
communications facilities was not an effective ban on personal wireless services and was not a
violation of§ 332).
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1894. 3
2. Competition1(1893-1910): As the Bell patents expired,
many independent competitors entered the field.34 In
1899 South Carolina law offered a statewide right-ofway to "any telegraph ortelephone company. 3 By 1907
the Bell system had just slightly more phones in service
(3,132,063) than competing companies (2,420,886).36
3. RegulatedMonopoly-The Public Service Corporation
(1910-1970s): In 1910 federal law was amended to
include the telephone within the definition of "common
carriers" due to its interstate traffic. 37 This classification
created an obligation to provide service on a
nondiscriminatory basis38 and to charge just and
reasonable rates. The federal government regulated long
distance rates, but the states regulated intrastate rates.
South Carolina regulated intrastate business and
residential rates first through the Railroad Commission in
1904, and since 1951 through the Public Service
Commission (PSC).39 During this period, the industry
became a rich revenue source for state and local
government. State and local governments singled-out the
telephone business for special gross revenue, franchise
and property taxes. These revenue devices were
particularly attractive to governments because the general
public was unaware it was being taxed when it paid its
phone bill, and also because the phone company did not
vote. Business expenses-including heavy local fees and
taxes-became part of the rate base that could be passed
on to the phone customer. In effect, the phone company
acted as a tax collector. Universal service-the social and
political goal that the cost of local calling should be low
enough that all citizens could afford telephone
service-was funded by a cross-subsidy that moved
"excess" revenues from long distance and business
services to finance below-cost local service.'

33. STERHMAN, supra note 5,at 20-50.
34. Id. at 51-76.
35. Act of Feb. 23, 1899, No. 40, 1899 S.C. Acts 61 (codified as amended at S.C.
CODE ANN. § 58-9-2020 (Law. Co-op. 1976)).
36. STEHMAN, supra note 5,at 77.
37. Id. at 167.
38. Id. at 250.
39. See S.C. CODEANN. § 58-9-710 to -2550 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1999); see
also LIPARTITO, supra note 5, at 186; STEHMAN, supranote 5, at 119 n.4.
40. See LIPARTrTO, supra note 5,at 161-65.
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4. CompetitionH/(1970s to the present): In the early 1970s
federal policy turned against the concept of the tightlyregulated natural monopoly of telephone utilities and
actively began to encourage competitors to Bell. Driven
by the industry's desire to cut expenses, federal policy
encouraged MCI to enter the long distance market, where
it could offer much lower prices than Bell because it had
no universal service obligation-a process Bell called
"cream-skimming."' The government later brought
antitrust charges against AT&T,42 which led to its
breakup in 1984.' 3 AT&T settled the suit by divesting the
22 local Bell operating companies, such as Southern Bell
Telephone & Telegraph Company. However, AT&T was
able to retain its lucrative Long Lines Division,4 its
manufacturing arm (Western Electric), and most of the
Bell Laboratories. Moreover, AT&T was now free to
enter any line of business. The local Bell companies
organized into seven regional holding companies4 5 to
provide intrastate local exchange service, limited
intrastate long distance services, and local access to long
distance service.' The regional companies were required
to provide equal access to all interexchange carriers and
were prohibited from offering long distance service.
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 changes the
judicial system established in 1984, mandating
competition at both local and long distance levels. The
Act outlaws discriminatory state and local taxes aimed at
a class of carriers or at the industry as a whole. Such
discriminatory taxes could impact competition among
carriers and would, in all cases, increase the cost to
consumers. The funding for universal service and other
social and political goals, which could be hidden in the
rate base under the old system, now require express
taxes-taxes that have already led to controversy.47
Part II ofthis Article discusses the early history of the telecommunications

41. STEVE COLL, THE DEAL OF THE CENTURY: THE BREAKUP OF AT&T 19 (1986).

42. Id. at 76.
43. Id. at 362.
44. BROOKS, supra note 4, at 17.
45. COLL, supranote 41, at 362.
46. Christopher Byron, BellRinger: More Telephone Turmoil?, NEw YoRK, Dec. 18,
1989, at 22.
47. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 561, 110 Stat. 56, 142
(1996).
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industry on a national level, including early attempts at regulation by the
federal and state governments. Part III specifically focuses on the development
of regulatory tactics in South Carolina. Part IV addresses several important
events that have shaped the industry both in South Carolina and the nation as
a whole. The section begins with a discussion of the 1980s South Carolina
litigation regarding business license taxes imposedby some municipalities, and
moves on to address the 1984 breakup of AT&T. The Telecommunications Act
of 1996 is then examined in detail with respect to both its national impact and
its effect on the powers of South Carolina municipalities. The 1999 South
Carolina legislation limiting the fees that cities may impose on
telecommunications providers is next briefly discussed. Finally, the Article
examines the South Carolina gross receipts tax and its disparate effects on local
and long distance carriers.
II. EARLY HISTORY OF THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY

A. Patents,Competition, and the Rise ofthe PublicService Corporation
(1876-1920)
The public took to the telephone as soon as commercial service was offered
in 1877.48 The Bell Telephone Company was formed in July of 1877.' 9 By June
of 1878 there were 10,755 Bell telephones in service; by 1881 there were
132,692.50 The basic Bell System was established in the 1880s as a network of
substantially owned licensees."s The parent company supervised the licensees
and emphasized theoretical and practical research. 2
Within 35 years the telephone network developed from alocal convenience
to a necessity for regional, national, and international communications. In that
short time, it became possible for anyone in the United States to speak to
anyone else in the populated world. The first long distance line for public use
opened in 1881 between Boston and Providence, Rhode Island.s3 Long distance
was "almost immediately profitable" and has remained so, even though
competition has driven rates to only pennies a minute.5 4 Bell strategy called for
the development of an extensive long distance system to be in place when the
Bell patents ran out in 1893 and 1894. s In February of 1885 Bell formed a
New York subsidiary named the American Telephone and Telegraph Company
(AT&T) to build and operate these long distance lines. 6 The first

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

BROOKs, supra note 4, at 59.
Id. at 55.
Id. at 69, 73.
STEHMAN, supra note 5, at 21-29.
Id.
BRooKs, supra note 4, at 89.
Id.
STEHMAN, supra note 5, at 32-36.
BROoKs, supra note 4, at 90, 91.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol51/iss2/5

10

Quirk and Walters: A Constitutional and Statutory History of the Telephone Business
Vol. 51: 290
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

transcontinental line stretched from New York to San Francisco and was
opened in 1915. 57 The Atlantic Ocean was next conquered, first by radio in
1919, and then by a 2,000 mile transatlantic cable laid from 1955 to 1956 and
stretching from Clarenville, Newfoundland to Oban, Scotland.58
Intense competition followed the expiration of the Bell patents. 9 Indeed,
by 1903 the independent companies had substantially more customers
(2,000,000) than Bell (1,278,000). 60 Because the systems were not connected,
a subscriber to both services had to have two phones. AT&T, which owned
practically all the long distance lines, refused to interconnect with the
independents. State laws requiring Bell to interconnect were struck down as
takings of private property. Despite its new competitors, therefore, Bell
continued to be profitable.6
By 1907 Bell had regained a slight lead in subscribers-3,132,000 to
2,987,000.62 Moreover, Bell had established a vigorous policy of acquiring the
independents. 63 In 1911 AT&T acquired the telegraph giant, Western Union. 64
The Attorney General at this point advised the company that he believed its
acquisitions raised serious Sherman Act questions.65 In 1913, after substantial
negotiation, AT&T responded with a letter that later became known as the
Kingsbury Commitment." In this letter AT&T agreed (1) to give up Western
Union; (2) to purchase independents only with Interstate Commerce
Commission (ICC) approval; and (3) to make "arrangements... promptly
under which all other telephone companies may secure for their subscribers toll
service over the lines of the companies in the Bell system."'67 Thus AT&T,
through the Kingsbury Commitment, allowed its long distance lines to be used
by others. 8

57. Id. at 139.
58. Id. at 246-47.
59. STEHMAN, supra note 5, at 132.
60. BROOKS, supra note 4, at 111.
61. STEHMAN, supra note 5, at 65.
62. BROOKS, supranote 4, at 127.
63. Id. at 133.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 135.
66. Id. at 136.
67. Id.
68. Government pressure or mandates that require one company to construct lines or
facilities to be used by others is an unusual feature of the telecommunications industry that
continues to the present. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 requires local companies to make
its facilities available to anyone. There is no express provision imposing a similar duty on long
distance cable or mobile phones. However, a court has permitted the City of Portland to require
AT&T to allow others to use its cable lines. AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 43 F. Supp. 2d
1146 (D. Or. 1999). Likewise, mobile phone companies in the United Kingdom have lost their
challenge to government decisions to force four existing license holders to allow new entrants
to "roam" across their network. The license holders argued they "were not against new entrants
roaming on their networks but had been unable to reach agreement with the government about
the prices they would be charged." John Mason, Mobile Phone Operators' Court Victory is
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By this time Bell had developed a unique theory which defined the
company's culture for almost a century.69 Traditionally, markets rely on
competition to check an abuse ofpower. But telephone service, as a technical
matter, was most efficiently provided without competition-otherwise multiple
phone systems and multiple wires to every house and business would be
required. Therefore, in the public interest, Bell asserted the business should be
operated as a monopoly." The privilege, however, imposed a corresponding
obligation to cooperate with federal and state regulation to assure the public
interest was served.7 In a 1915 speech in San Francisco, Theodore N. Vail,
then president of AT&T, outlined the theory of the natural monopoly and the
public service corporation:
"Society has never allowed that which is necessary to
existence to be controlledbyprivateinterest.... Ifthere were
no Bell system, only disassociated individual companies or
groups of companies, no line over a few hundred miles long
would have been built, or if built it could not be
operated.., satisfactorily ..... Regulatory bodies, state and
federal, should be thought of and should think of themselves
as juries charged with "protecting the individual member of
the public against corporate aggression or extortion, and the
corporate member of the community against public extortion
and aggression." They should see it as their duty "to restrain
and suppress ... certain evils that have been ingrained in our
commercial practices," and also "to restrain an indignant and
excited public." [R]egulators should be men of the highest
standard, appointed for life;.., and "their decisions, even if
not entirely satisfactory, should not be subjected to captious
criticism or objection." '
Over time, however, some technical justifications for this theory have
changed, inviting competition in the industry. For example, technologies such
as fiber-optic lines and satellite transmissions have obviated the need for
service providers to supply separate phone systems and wires to each
subscriber. Nonetheless, the enormous capital investment required to construct
entirely new, competing networks has allowed the system to retain some
characteristics of the natural monopoly. During the oral argument of AT&T

Reversed, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1999, at 10.
69. BROOKS, supranote 4, at 143.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 144 (emphasis added) (quoting and paraphrasing Vail's 1915 San Francisco
speech before the National Association of Railway Commissioners).
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Corp. v. Iowa UtilitiesBoard,' Justice Breyer touched on this point when he
asked: "Do you think that's what-do you think that's what Congress meant
by-by competition? We're going to have-just one single network, but we're
going to have competing salesmen?"'74 The lawyer's reply, of course, was no,
Congress "wanted new entrants to build facilities."75 Justice Breyer's question
correctly foretold that most new entrants would choose to resell services from
existing local exchange facilities rather than spend the large amounts ofcapital
needed to build competing local networks.
B. Early Regulation of the Industry
1. The ConstitutionalBackground
The country's constitutional principles have played a major part in the
development of the telephone business in both the United States and in South
Carolina. The Commerce Clause76 served as the constitutional authority for the
first federal regulation of telephones, the 1910 Mann-Elkins Act.77 The
Commerce Clause is also the source of numerous Supreme Court opinions
limiting the states' power to interfere with the industry. Indeed, until Complete
Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady,7 decided in 1977, states were prohibited from
imposing any tax on interstate commerce. 7 9 Two other federal protections
include (1) the Contracts Clause of the United States Constitution, which
provides that "No State shall.., pass any... Law impairing the Obligation of
Contracts"; 80 and (2) the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, adopted in 1868, whichprovides, "nor shall any State deprive any
81
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
In Fletcherv. Peck Chief Justice Marshall held that while any law can be
repealed, a grant by a legislature is protected from impairment by the Contracts
73. 525 U.S. 366 (1999).
74. Oral Argument at 82, AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999) (No.
97-826) (located at 1998 WL 729541).
75. Id.
76. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
77. Mann-Elkins Act of 1910, Publ. L. No. 106-55, ch. 309,36 Stat. 539 (1910).
78. 430 U.S. 274,288-89 (1977) ("[M]e nowreject the rule ofSpectorMotorService,
Inc. v. O'Connor[340 U.S. 602 (1951)], that a state tax on 'the privilege of doing business isper
se unconstitutional when it is applied to interstate commerce, and that case is overruled.").
79. Today states may tax interstate telephone calls in accordance with Goldberg v.
Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 261 (1989) (holding that in order to be held "fairly apportioned," a tax
must be "internally and externally consistent," i.e., "structured so that if every State were to
impose an identical tax, no multiple taxation would result.").
80. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10; see also S.C. CONST. art. I, § 4 ("No. .. law impairing
the obligation of contracts ... shall be passed.").
81. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also S.C. CONST. art. I, § 3 ("The privileges and
immunities of citizens of this State and of the United States under this Constitution shall not be
abridged, nor shall any person be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law....").
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Clause." In Dartmouth College v. Woodward Justice Marshall held that the
New Hampshire legislature could not amend the charter of the corporation of
Dartmouth College because the charter was a contract between the
incorporators and the state and, therefore, was protected against impairment. 3
In his concurring opinion Justice Story found that a legislature that takes away
any powers or franchises vested by a charter it granted unconditionally violates
the obligation of that charter. 84 Justice Story concluded that "[i]fthe legislature
mean [sic] to claim such an authority, it must be reserved in the grant.""5
After the DartmouthCollege decision, many states adopted constitutional
provisions reserving the right to amend, alter, and repeal corporate charters.
New York's 1846 Constitution, for example, provides that "[a]ll general laws
and special Acts passed pursuant to this section may be altered from time to
time or repealed."86 Similarly, California adopted a version of an antiDartmouth College provision in 1879: "Privileges or immunities granted by
the Legislature may be altered or revoked.""7 However, even the retained
legislative power to alter, amend, or repeal the corporate charter does not
include the power to destroy vested property rights or force their escheat to the
state. Therefore, courts have distinguished between the franchises and
privileges that a corporation derives from its charter and the property and
contract rights that accrue to the corporation in the course of its existence.88
In 1910 the New York Court of Appeals determined that "[i]n exercising
the reserved power to amend corporate charters, the Legislature may not
deprive a corporation of property already acquired, or the proceeds of lawful
contracts previously made, or destroy or substantially impair the purposes of
' Similarly,
the grant or rights which are vested in the corporation thereunder."89
in Bank of Augusta v. Earle the United States Supreme Court held that
fianchises are special privileges conferredby government uponparties that "do
not belong to the citizens of the country, generally, of common right."9 The
Court defined a franchise as "a grant from the sovereign authority, and in this
country no franchise canbe held which is not derived from a law of the state." 91
A telephone company in the United States cannot occupy or use public
streets or highways without national or state legislative authority; it must
secure, by government grant, a right-of-way over state roads and city streets to

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 131 (1810).
17 U.S. (4 Wheaton) 518, 636 (1819).
Id. at 712 (Story, J., concurring).
Id.
N.Y. CoNsT. of 1846, art. VIII, § 1, amended and replacedby N.Y. CoNsr. art.

X,§l.
87. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 21, amended and replaced by CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7(b).
88. See, e.g., In re Armed Forces Coop. Insuring Ass'n., 625 P.2d 11 (Kan. Ct. App.
1981).
89. New York Cent. & H.R.R. Co. v. Williams, 92 N.E. 404,407 (N.Y. 1910).
90. 38 U.S. (13 Peters) 519, 595 (1839).
91. Id.
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conduct its telephone business. Rights-of-way are property interests. Franchises
such as those to lay tracks and run cars in a city have been "uniformly regarded
as indestructible by legislative authority, and as constituting property in the
highest sense of the term. '92 In 1909 the New York Court of Appeals defined
a franchise as
the right, granted by the public, to use public property for a
public use, but with private profit, such as the right to build
and operate a railroad in the streets of a city. Such a franchise,
when acted upon, becomes property and cannot be repealed,
unless power to do so is reserved in the grant, although it may
be condemned upon making compensation.93
In sum, a telephone franchise includes the right to use public property; when
the franchise is acted upon, the right to use public property becomes property
of the grantee. The franchise cannot be repealed unless the legislature reserves
that power in the grant. Inits 1899 statewide franchise contracts with telephone
companies, South Carolina, like other states, did not reserve any power to alter
or amend the contracts. Constitutional guarantees should therefore protect any
telephone utility that secured franchise rights. Unfortunately, the South
Carolina Supreme Court's recent decision in BellSouth Telecommunications,
Inc. v. City of Orangeburg contradicts this well-established principle.94
Orangeburg notwithstanding, the universal rule has historically been that
franchise rights could not lawfully be diminished without compensation.
Current federal law, however, prohibits a state or municipality from interfering
with a franchise even if compensation is paid.95
2. The Post Road Act of 1866: The National Franchisefor the
TelegraphSystem
The legal framework for the American telephone system was built on the
country's experience with developing other internal improvements, such as
canals, turnpikes, railroads, and, particularly, the national telegraph system.
Familiarity with the history of the telegraph experience is necessary to
understand what followed with the telephone industry.
At the close of the Civil War Congress acted to encourage competition in
the national telegraph system, which had been operating under individual

92. People v. O'Brien, 18 N.E. 692, 699 (N.Y. 1888).
93. Lord v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 87 N.E. 443,447 (N.Y. 1909).
94. No. 25009, 1999 WL 1037160, at *6(S.C. Nov. 8, 1999) (upholding a yearly 5%
of gross receipts franchise fee by denying that the 1899 franchise constituted a contract). But see
infra notes 215-218 and accompanying text (discussing cases from other jurisdictions
recognizing the contractual nature of such a franchise).
95. See infra Part IV.B.
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federal charters for about 20 years. The Post Road Act of 1866, approved July
24, 1866, was entitled: "An Act to aid in the Construction of Telegraph Lines,
and to secure to the Government the Use of the same for postal, military and
other Purposes. 96 Senator John Sherman of Ohio, a proponent of the bill,
explained that since 1846 Congress had made several acts "granting [special]
powers to different telegraph companies, all of which are now absorbed in this
one company."97 Senator Sherman said the purpose of his bill was "to enable
new companies that may be organized by any of the States or by the United
States to enter into a fair competition with one existing monopoly which now
controls the telegraphing in the United States."98 He added:
The bill, as proposed to be amended by the Senator from
Iowa, will give to all telegraph companies organized under
any State law the right to cross navigable rivers, to go
wherever the United States has exclusive jurisdiction, to cross
over the public lands, and to build telegraph lines along the
postal routes of the United States. Now, there is not, as I said
the other day-and I have looked at the legislation since-a
single privilege conferred by this bill that has not been
99
already conferred upon existing telegraph companies ....
Section 1 of the bill provided:
That any telegraph company now organized, or which may
hereafter be organized under the laws of any State in this
Union, shall have the right to construct, maintain and operate
lines of telegraph through and over any portion of the public
domain of the United States, over and along any of the
military or post roads of the United States which have been
or may hereafter be declared such by act of Congress, and
over, under, or across the navigable streams or waters of the
United States: Provided,That such lines oftelegraph shall be
so constructed and maintained as not to obstruct the
navigation of such streams and waters, or interfere with the
ordinary travel on such military or post roads. And any of
said companies shall have the right to take and use from such
public lands the necessary stone, timber, and other materials
for its posts, piers, stations, and other needful uses in the
construction, maintenance, and operation of said lines of
telegraph, and may pre-empt and use such portion of the

96. 14 Stat 221, ch. 230 (1866).
97. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3481, 3482 (1866).

98. Id. at 3481.
99. Id. at 3481.
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unoccupied public lands subject to pre-emption through
which its said lines of telegraph may be located as may be
necessary for its stations, not exceeding forty acres for each
station; but such stations shall not be within fifteen miles of
each other. 0
Consequently, any telegraph company that accepted the offer was authorized
to conduct its business through and over the national domain and, critically,
along the "post roads" that ran wherever the mail was delivered-in other
words, accepting companies received a national fianchise. When Massachusetts
imposed an apportioned tax on its capital stock, Western Union argued that the
tax was impermissible because its franchise was derived from the United States
by virtue of the Post Road Act. However, the United States Supreme Court
found that the Act was merely "permissive" and did not carry "with it any
exemption from the ordinary burdens of taxation.''. Nonetheless, the Court
held that states could not prevent the company from constructing its lines and
operating over post roads within state borders1" even if the company failed to
pay taxes owed, noting that:
While the State could not interfere by any specific statute to
prevent a corporation from placing its lines along these postroads, or stop the use of them after they were placed there,
nevertheless the company receiving the benefit of the laws of
the State for the protection of its property and its rights is
liable to be taxed upon its real or personal property as any
other person would be. 3
States or cities could impose reasonable regulation for the use of the streets," °4
and the company's "'property in the State is subject to taxation the same as
other property, and it may undoubtedly be taxed in a proper way on account of
its occupation and its business. ' " A city could charge a reasonable rental for
the use of its streets, but the federal courts would determine what was

100. 14 Stat. 221, ch. 230, § 1 (1866).
101. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Massachusetts, 125 U.S. 530, 548 (1888).
102. Id. at 547 (holding that a state statute authorizing an injunction against
companies whose taxes were in arrears from operating was void as applied to a telegraph
company that had accepted the provisions of the Post Road Act).
103. Id. at 548. See also Western Union v. Alabama, 132 U.S. 472 (1889), where an
Alabama tax on gross receipts from messages carried into the state, or sent from the state-i.e.,
interstate commerce-was struck down. The company could be taxed only on intrastate income,
which the Court described as "receipts arising from commerce wholly within the State." Id. at
477.
104. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Richmond, 224 U.S. 160, 171 (1912).
105. Massachusetts, 125 U.S. at 549 (quoting Telegraph Co. v. Texas, 105 U.S. 460,
464-65).
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reasonable."°
After passage of the Post Road Act of 1866, Florida conferred upon a
single corporation the exclusive right of transmitting intelligence by telegraph
over a certain portion of its territory. The Supreme Court struck down the
Florida law, holding that the Post Road Act "in effect, amounts to a prohibition
of all State monopolies.' 01 7 The Court found that the Post Road Act
substantially declares, in the interest of commerce and the
convenient transmission of intelligence from place to
place.., that the erection of telegraph lines shall, so far as
State interference is concerned, be free to all who will submit
to the conditions imposed by Congress, and that corporations
shall not be excluded... if they accept the terms proposed by
the national government for this national privilege.' 5
Against the will of the states, the Court consequently upheld the Post Road Act
as a valid exercise of Congress's commerce power. The Court found:
The powers thus granted are not confined to the
instrumentalities of commerce, or the postal service known or
in use when the Constitution was adopted, but they keep pace
with the progress of the country, and adapt themselves to the
new developments of time and circumstances. They extend
from the horse with its rider to the stage-coach, from the
sailing-vessel to the steamboat, from the coach and the
steamboat to the railroad, and from the railroad to the
telegraph, as these new agencies are successively brought into
use to meet the demands of increasing population and wealth.
They were intended for the government of the business to
which they relate, at all times and under all circumstances. As
they were intrusted to the general government for the good of
the nation, it is not only the right, but the duty, of Congress to
see to it that intercourse among the States and the
transmission of intelligence are not obstructed or
unnecessarily encumbered by State legislation."0 9
In City of Richmond v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co.,
Southern Bell argued that telephones were intended to be included within the

106. St. Louis v. Western Union Tel. Co., 148 U.S. 92, 97-98 (1893), on remand, 63
Fed. 68, 73 (E.D. Mo. 1894) (rejecting as unreasonable a city ordinance charging $5 a pole).
107. Pensacola Tel. Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 96 U.S. 1, 11 (1877).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 9.
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term "telegraph" under the Post Road Act of 1866.110 Had Southern Bell
succeeded, the telephone industry would have been authorized by federal law
to do business anywhere. However, the Supreme Court held that the Post Road
Act provisions did not apply because Congress did not intend for the term
"telegraph companies" to include telephone companies.11 ' The Court favored
states' prerogatives and was unwilling to extend the Act by implication,
"particularly if that construction might tend to narrow the full control always
exercised by the local authorities of the States over streets and alleys within
their respective jurisdictions."' " 2 A ruling in favor of Southern Bell would
"subject to national control the use and occupancy of the streets of cities and
towns by telephone companies, subject only to the reasonable exercise of the
police powers of the State."' "
Because of Richmond telephone companies were obliged to secure their
authority to do business from state corporation law and the state franchise
contracts. With the Telecommunications Act of 1996, however, Congress
accomplished what Southern Bell sought to do through litigation in 1899. The
telephone industry is now franchised by federal law to do business anywhere
in the country, subject only to the reasonable exercise of the police powers of
the states." 4 The Act denies states and cities the power to exclude
telecommunications providers. Telecommunications providers, like telegraph
companies under the Post Road Act, are not exempt "from the ordinary burdens
of taxation,"' but"no state may prohibit... the ability of' any
entity to provide
16
any interstate or intrastate telecommunications service.""
The Post Road Act of 1866 was the model for the state franchise statutes
of the 1880s and 1890s that were designed to aid the construction of statewide
telephone systems. The state franchise laws, like South Carolina's, follow the
language and form of the Post Road Act. They are all offers for unilateral
contracts. An offer for a unilateral contract is accepted by the company's
performance. The state franchise laws, like the Post Road Act, grant the right
to any company to construct, maintain, and operate lines along and over public
highways, streets, lands, and waters without compensation. The state franchise
laws, however, grant telephone companies far broader rights than the federal
model granted to telegraph companies. For example, unlike the federal model,
state laws authorize telephone companies to construct their lines over private

110. 174 U.S. 761,765-66 (1899).
II1. Id. at 777.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 253, 110 Stat. 56,
70-71 (1996).
115. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Massachusetts, 125 U.S. 530, 548 (1888).
116. 47 U.S.C. § 253(a) (Supp. 1111997). This is not to say that telephone utilities'
intrastate services are exempt from scrutiny by the state's regulatory agencies, like the Public
Service Commission (PSC). The impact of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 on the powers
of the South Carolina PSC is beyond the scope of this Article.
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as well as public lands and waters." 7 State laws create a special procedure to
compensate private property owners."' Further, companies can transfer the
contract and property rights secured under the laws. Also, state laws do not
reserve a power in the states similar to the federal government's power to buy
out the companies after five years at an appraised price." 9 State laws are
designed to provide the security necessary to induce the private investment
required to develop a state wide telephone network as expeditiously as
possible. A company's rights continue as long as it uses the property for
telephone purposes.
All the states passed similar laws in and around the 1890s recognizing that
provision of a telephone system was a state, not a local, issue. The South
Carolina state franchise law, 120 like the federal model, is in the form of a
statutory offer 2' that authorizes any person or corporation to construct,
maintain, and operate a statewide telephone network and grants the company
the necessary right-of-way."
3. Early Federaland State Regulatory Statutes: 1934 and 1950
Companies offering telephone service are subject to a complex and
comprehensive federal regulatory scheme that began with the 1910 Mann117. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 58-9-2020 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
118. The statutes deemed telephone service to be a public purpose and delegated the
condemnation power to telephone companies. See id.
119. Indeed, in the recent case ofBellSouth Telecomins., Inc. v. City ofCoralSprings,
42 F. Supp. 2d 1304, 1311 (S.D. Fla. 1999) the court, relying on the 1996 Act and state law,
refused to allow the city to enforce a "buy out provision" contained in the city ordinance that
granted the utility's franchise.
120. S.C. CODE ANN. § 58-9-2020 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
121. Despite the substance of the South Carolina franchise law, the South Carolina
Supreme Court recently held it did not constitute a contract. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. City
of Orangeburg, No. 25009, 1999 WL 1037160, at *6 (S.C. Nov. 8, 1999); see also supranote
94 and accompanying text.
122. A right-of-way is the way over which the company has the right to pass in the
operation of its business. A right-of-way, in property law terms, is usually an easement or
incorporeal hereditament. See City of Louisville v. Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co., 224 U.S. 649,
661 (1912). Alternatively, as Justice Frankfurter wrote in his dissent in UnitedStates v. Union
Pacific RR., 353 U.S. 112, 129-32 (1957), a right-of-way could be a fee simple determinable
(sometimes called a limited fee subject only to an implied condition of reverter), in which case
the land would revert to the grantor only in the event the company ceases to use the right-of-way
for the designated purpose.
Currently the scope of railroad rights-of-way is at issue in class actions brought on
behalfofthe owners of the underlying land. The landowners assert the rights-of-way can be used
only for railway purposes and seek damages because the railroads have licensed AT&T to lay
fiber-optic lines in the rights-of-way. AT&Thas settled one case where its fiber-optic lines were
laid near abandoned tracks. But, with respect "to the 9,000 miles of fiber-optic lines that AT&T
has laid on active track," an AT&T attorney stated: "It's our position that the railroad owns the
property in fee simple. Or if they own something less than fee simple, they had a right to license
us to be in those corridors." Elizabeth Amon, Working on the RPs, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 16, 1999,
atA12.
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Elkins Act. This Act established the telephone business as a common carrier
and made interstate rates subject to federal regulation by the Interstate
Commerce Commission." Despite the Mann-Elkins Act, however, the federal
government made no serious effort to regulate interstate rates until the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) was created by the Communications Act
of 1934 (1934 Act). In creating the FCC, Congress established a specialized
agency to enforce a more detailed statute. The 1934 Act both continued and
elaborated upon the Mann-Elkins Act's provisions.
The 1934 Act was promulgated "[fjor the purpose of regulating interstate
and foreign commerce in communication by wire and radio so as to make
available, so far as possible, to all the people of the United States... a rapid,
efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio communication service
with adequate facilities at reasonable charges."' 24 The 1934 Act provides that
"[i]t shall be the duty of every common carrier . . . to furnish such

communication service upon reasonable request therefor"'" and that "[a]ll
charges... shall be just andreasonable."'2 6 The 1934 Act also requires a filing
with the FCC showing all interstate and foreign charges,'27 provides for
hearings on new charges,' and authorizes the FCC, after a hearing, to
prescribe a "just and reasonable charge.' 2 9
Under the 1934 Act a carrier cannot construct a new telephone line unless
it obtains a certificate from the Commission verifying that "the present or
future public convenience and necessity require or will require" the service.'
Likewise, a company cannot discontinue service unless it first receives from the
FCC a certificate that the public convenience will not be adversely affected.'
The 1934 Act expressly permits the states to regulate practices and
intrastaterates.' 3 ' Thus in 1950 South Carolina created the state Public Service
Commission (PSC) to assume power over intrastate regulation. 3 3 The Act
creating the state PSC was entitled "AN ACT Regulating Persons, Firms And
Corporations Engaged In Business As A Telephone Utility, Prescribing The
Duties Of The Public Service Commission In Relation Thereto, And

123. Mann-ElldnsAct, ch. 309,36 Stat. 539 (1910), repealedbyCommunications Act
of 1934,48 Stat. 1064 (1934).
124. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (Supp. 1111997).
125. Id. § 201(a).
126. Id. § 201(b).
127. Id. § 203(a).
128. Id. § 204(a)(1).
129. Id. § 205(a).
130. Id. § 214(a).
131. Id.
132. See id. § 152(b) (Supp. 1111997).
133. Act of June 16, 1950, No. 1026, 1950 S.C. Acts 2466 (codified as amended at
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 58-9-10 to -2320 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1999)). South Carolina had,
in fact, granted this authority to the Railroad Commission thirty years before the state PSC was
established.
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Prescribing Penalties For Violation Of The Provisions Thereof."' 34 The law
specifically provided that it was not to be construed to apply to interstate
commerce "except insofar as the same may be permitted under
the provisions
35
of the Constitution of the United States" and federal law.'
The current South Carolina Code provides that the 1950 PSC Act does not
preempt the cities from enforcing reasonable police regulations that are "in the
interest of public safety, morals, convenience, health and good order.' 36 The
Code also provides that the PSC Act must not be construed to impair the cities'
municipal rights or powers.' 37 Furthermore, the Code requires that rates shall
be just and reasonable, 33 and that telephone companies must file with the PSC
tariffs showing all rates, rules, and regulations. 139 The PSC determines if any
rate or service is "unjust, unreasonable, insufficient, [or] unreasonably
discriminatory"'' and may order a telephone company "to provide reasonable,
adequate and efficient service.",' 41 South Carolina's 1899 state franchise law is

incorporated in the Code at Section 58-9-2020.142
The 1950 South Carolina Act also requires companies to "provide and
maintain facilities and equipment to furnish reasonably adequate and efficient
telephone service to its customers in this State,""'4 and no company can begin
construction or operation "without first obtaining... a certificate that public
convenience and necessity" are required or will be required. 144 In addition to
its restrictions on commencing service, South Carolina's 1950 Act also
prohibits utilities from abandoning service. 45
State regulatory statutes such as South Carolina's 1950 Act thus combined
with the federal structure to complete the traditional legal framework for the
telephone system in America. Under this regulatory scheme, Bell met the
universal service goal by pricing long distance rates above cost in order to

134. Id. at 2466.
135. Id. § 7(c), at2485 (codified as amended at S.C. CODEANN. § 58-9-50 (Law. Coop. 1976)).
136. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 58-9-40 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
137. Id. § 58-9-30.
138. Id. § 58-9-210.
139. Id. § 58-9-220.
140. Id. § 58-9-510.
141. Id. § 58-9-710.
142. Id. § 58-9-2020. The 1950 drafters carefully limited the new law's applicability
to ensure that it would not interfere with existing or future state franchise contracts by expressly
providing that state regulation will prevail over local rules. See id. § 58-9-40.
143. Id. § 58-9-260.
144. Id. § 58-9-280. Companies in existence before passage of the Act were
grandfathered in any municipalities of districts in which they had lawfully commenced
operations. Id.
145. Id. § 58-9-300 ("No telephone utility shall abandon all or any portion of its
service to the public, except for ordinary discontinuance of service for nonpayment of a lawful
charge or for violation of rules and regulations approved by the Commission, unless written
application is first made to the Commission for the issuance of a certificate authorizing such
abandonment, nor until the Commission in its discretion issues such certificate.").
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defray the cost of connecting customers to the local company's switching
centers." This pricing system was possible because the Bell System was a
monopoly. Businesses and other large users of long distance service subsidized
the small and rural users. This was accomplished through the Bell System's
nationwide system of pooling, which redistributed long distance revenue to
local companies based on each company's costs. Of course, the monopoly had
to be maintained for the system to work. When the federal government began
eroding the monopoly by allowing competition in long distance, the
competitors had a large advantage over the Bell companies and other "local"
telephone companies because they did not need to price long distance to
include a subsidy to the local system. Even the regulatory concepts of access
charges for the use of the local network and the establishment of "universal
service funds" failed to shift the subsidy burden to all entrants in the
competitive market. 47
Before the breakup of the Bell system in 1984, an intrastate long distance
call (e.g., Greenville to Charleston) was accomplished solely by Southern Bell,
which was then a wholly owned subsidiary ofAT&T. Southern Bell carried the
call from its beginning in Greenville to its end in Charleston. An interstate long
distance call (e.g., Columbia to Chicago) was carried jointly by Southern Bell,
AT&T's Long Lines Division, and Illinois Bell. Southern Bell carried the call
from its beginning to the Long Lines system of AT&T, which carried it to
Chicago. Once in Chicago, Illinois Bell took the call to its end. The three
carriers divided the revenue pro rata according to the Bell System Division of
Revenue Agreement."' Unfortunately, the fairly simple manner in which long
distance calls were handled before the breakup of the Bell System has changed
dramatically, and the revenue that was easily provided to support universal
service now requires a separate tax. Indeed, new controversies arise as the FCC
expands the traditional understanding of universal service to include, for
example, the cost of wiring the nation's schools for the Internet.'49
I. LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF THE TELEPHONE BUSINESS IN SOUTH CAROLINA

The telephone business has been subject to different stages of legal control
as the country has sought to derive the greatest public benefit from the
remarkable invention of Alexander Graham Bell. As this Article has
mentioned, the governing law includes the Telecommunications Act of 1996 50
as well as principles that originated in the nineteenth century. Legal control of
146. Bell System Division of Revenue Agreement (on file with authors).
147. JEREMY TUNSTALL, COMMUNICATIONS DEREGULATION: THE UNLEASHING OF

AMERICA'S COMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY 95 (1986).

148. BellSouth Division of Revenue Agreement (on file with authors).
149. Donna N. Lampert et al., Overview oflnternetLegal andRegulatorylssues, 16
ANN. INST. ON TELECOMMS. POL'Y AND REG. 179, 186-87 (1998).
150. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 1, 110 Stat. 56 (1996);
see also infra Part IV.B.
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the telephone business over the past 100 years has evolved in stages from the
local level to the state level to the national level. The following sections
describe these three major historical periods with respect to South Carolina.
A. Levels ofJurisdiction
1. LocalJurisdiction
The South Carolina General Assembly originally created cities as an
administrative convenience to better regulate the use of streets in developed
areas. The legislative delegation of the power to regulate the streets included
the power to franchise, which is the power to grant a special privilege to use
public property for a public purpose, but with private profit. Franchises were
well established for water companies, electric companies, and street
transportation when Bell invented the telephone in 1876. Consequently, as the
telephone came into commercial use in the late 1870s, a municipality could
include or exclude a telephone company through its legal power to control its
rights-of-way. These franchises still exist in a number of cities (e.g., Aiken,
Orangeburg, and Seneca). To induce the required investment, early franchises
granted the company the right to use the streets as long as they were used for
the telephone business. In addition to constructing the telephone system, the
company usually provided other consideration to the city, including free phone
service, the use of space on the cross-bar and later in the underground conduit,
and police and fire department wires.'
However, such city-by-city
negotiations discouraged the development of a statewide telephone network.
2. State Jurisdiction
During the 1880s and 1890s the states recognized the inefficiency of cityby-city negotiations and consequently withdrew from their cities the power to
franchise telephone companies. After 1899 South Carolina cities continued to
franchise water, electric, and transportation systems, but could no longer
negotiate telephone company franchises. By legislative grant, the state
authorized any telephone company to do business anywhere in the state and lay
their lines over any public or private lands" 2 for that purpose. The United
States Supreme Court found that state franchise contracts like South Carolina's
were protected from impairment by the United States Constitution. s The

151. See supranote 9 and accompanying text.
152. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 58-9-2020 (Law. Co-op. 1976). To that end, telephone
utilities have condemnation powers equal to those of government.
153. See infra notes 214-18 and accompanying text. But see BellSouth Telecomns.,
Inc. v. City of Orangeburg, No. 25009, 1999 WL 1037160, at*6 (S.C. Nov. 8,1999) (upholding
a yearly 5% of gross receipts franchise fee by denying that the 1899 franchise constituted a
contract); see also supra note 94 and accompanying text.
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Court's holding formed a suitable legal foundation to support the financing and
construction of the telephone network in South Carolina and elsewhere.
3. NationalJurisdiction
As noted above, in 1910 Congress amended the Interstate Commerce Act
of 1887 to classify telephone companies as common carriers, which were
required to provide nondiscriminatory service and to charge just and reasonable
interstate rates. 54 Congress granted the Interstate Commerce Commission
jurisdiction over interstate rates,' 5 reasoning that the significance of the
telephone as an instrumentality of interstate commerce and military defense
necessitated national control. Also, early on, the phone company was expected
to fund other social and political objectives, such as universal service.'
The Federal Communications Act of 1934 provided more detailed
regulation,157 including a formal requirement of universal service. The language
of section 151 of the Act creating Federal Communications Commission
expressed the importance of federal regulation:
For the purpose ofregulating interstate and foreign commerce
in communication by wire and radio so as to make available,
so far as possible, to all the people of the United States... a
rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio
communication service with adequate facilities at reasonable
charges, for the purpose of the national defense, for the
purpose of promoting safety of life and property through the
use of wire and radio communications, and for the purpose of
securing a more effective execution of this policy by
centralizing authority heretofore granted by law to several
agencies and by granting additional authority with respect to
interstate and foreign commerce in wire and radio
communication, there is created a commission to be known
as the "Federal Communications Commission' ..... 5'
The 1934 Act left the regulation of intrastate rates and services to the states." 9
In LouisianaPublicService Commission v. FCC6 " the United States Supreme
Court held that the 1934 Act did not preempt state efforts to set depreciation
rates for telephone plant and equipment. 16' The Court noted that the act
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

LIPARTITo, supra note 5, at 161-65.
47 U.S.C. § 601 (1994).
See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.B.3.
47 U.S.C. § 151 (Supp. M 1997).

159. Id. § 152(b).
160. 476 U.S. 355 (1986).
161. Id. at 371.
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purported "to define a national goal of the creation of a rapid and efficient
phone service, and to enact a dual regulatory system to achieve that goal. ' 62
The telephone industry is the epitome of interstate commerce, state
regulation of which can be preempted by the federal government. The federal
courts, in the Divestiture Decision of 1982, broke up AT&T intending to create
a more competitive phone system. Congress went much further with the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, which sets forth the national objective of a
competitive local and interstate system and expressly preempts state
constitutions or state or local laws that might act as barriers.'63 Finally, the
recent Supreme Court decision inAT&T Corp.v. Iowa UtilitiesBoard'" limits
and clarifies the remaining state statutory jurisdiction after the
Telecommunications Act of 1996.
4. Summary
A telephone company's legal relations to South Carolina's state and local
governments may be summarized as follows.
a. PolicePower
A telephone company is subject to the state's police power like any other
citizen. Usually the state has delegated some of this power to its cities.
b. PropertyTax
The state has delegated the power to its cities to impose a general property
or "ad valorem" tax on a telephone company, like any other taxpayer.
However, a municipality cannot single out a telephone company for a special
high tax any more than it can do so for any other taxpayer.
c. License Tax
The state has delegated the power to its cities to impose a license tax on a
telephone company subject to two important limitations. First, cities may not
single out a company by imposing grossly disproportionate rates. Second, cities
may not impose an extraterritorial tax on income earned outside the city.
d. Other Taxes
The state has delegated no other taxing power to its cities, as expressly

162. Id. at 370.
163. Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 253, 110 Stat. at 70.
164. 525 U.S. 366 (1999).
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provided in the South Carolina Code.'6
e. MunicipalConsent
According to the South Carolina Supreme Court's construction of article
VIII, section 15 of the South Carolina Constitution, a city may demand that a
new telephone company pay a fee as a condition to the grant of municipal
consent for the construction of its telephone lines.' The Telecommunications
Act of 1996, however, prohibits any state or local law-including state
constitutional law-from burdening the entry of a telecommunications
provider. 67 Consequently, any of our state courts' future constructions of the
local consent power must conform to the federal law. Although federal law
may permit a city to require an administrative fee to cover the costs of
registration, other burdens--such as uniform license taxes-violate the 1996
federal law.
f

State FranchiseContract

In 1899 the South Carolina legislature had plenary control over all the
highways and streets of the state. To encourage the growth of telephone
service, the South Carolina General Assembly passed Act No. 40 of 1899,
which authorized telephone companies to run their lines anywhere in the
state-over any streets, lands, or waters, public or private. As now codified,
Act No. 40 provides:
Any telegraph or telephone company incorporated under the
laws of this State... may construct, maintain and operate its
line through, upon, over and under any of the public lands of
this State, under, over, along and upon any of the highways
or public roads of the State, over, through or under any of the
waters of this State, on, over and under the lands of any
person in this State and along, upon and over the right of way
of any railroad or railway company in this State.... 6 8'

In essence, Act No. 40 was a statutory offer to any telephone company to

165. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 6-1-300 to -330 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1999).
166. City of Cayce v. AT&T Comms., 326 S.C. 237,243,486 S.E.2d 92,95 (1997).

The court exempted from its decision incumbent telephone companies that had constructed their
lines long ago. Id. at 243, 486 S.E.2d at 95 ("We are not asked, and therefore do not answer, the
[question of] whether Cayce ... can impose a fee five years after the cable was installed."). This
question was later answered in BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. City of Orangeburg,No. 25009,
1999 WL 1037160 (S.C. Nov. 8, 1999) (upholding such a fee).
167. The provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 were not advanced by
either party in argument before the court in Cayce.
168. S.C. CODE ANN. § 58-9-2020 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
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construct and operate its business in the rights-of-way of all highways and
streets, as well as over and under all state lands and waters, for the purpose of
providing the state's citizens with telephone service. 69 Act No. 40 also
authorizes a telephone company to run its lines over any private lands or
railroad right-of-way with the concomitant duty to pay compensation pursuant
to special summary condemnation procedures. 7 ' There is generally no
requirement in Act No. 40 for any form of municipal consent, because the
purpose of the statute was to withdraw existing authority from the cities.'
Telephone companies such as BellSouth clearly manifested their acceptance of
and reliance on Act No. 40's statutory offer through their performance,
construction, operation, and maintenance of telephone lines after 1899 and
through the continued construction, expansion, and extension of the telephone
system.
g. The Telecommunications Act of 1996
Congress enacted The Telecommunications Act of 1996 to remove and
prohibit all state and local barriers to the entry of telecommunications providers
to all aspects of the telecommunications market. ' The Act outlaws any state
or local constitution, statute, regulation, or other legal requirement that
prohibits or may have the effect of prohibiting any entity's ability to provide
interstate or intrastate telecommunications service.' 73 Thus, a state or local law
that discriminates against telecommunications providers must be struck down
because it will interfere with the ability to provide services. 1 74 The United
States Constitution requires that the laws of the United States, including the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, "shall be the supreme law ofthe land'17 and
followed in the states' courts.
B. The TraditionalNineteenth-CenturyLocal FranchisePower
As previously discussed, prior to 1899 cities in South Carolina were
authorized to enter into franchise agreements with telephone companies.'7 6 In
169. See 1899 S.C. Acts 23 at 61.
170. Id. at 61-62.
171. Article VIII, section 15 ofthe South Carolina Constitution allows municipalities
to demand a fee from new telephone companies as a condition to the grant ofmunicipal consent
for the construction of telephone lines. However, such a requirement is inapplicable to
established telephone companies that long ago constructed their lines. See supra note 166.
172. 47 U.S.C. § 253 (Supp. M 1997).
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
176. See Act of Dec. 16, 1797, 1797 Act No. 1678, reprintedin 5 THE STATUTES AT
LARGEOF SOUTHCAROLINA 315 (Thomas Coopered., 1839); Act ofDec. 21,1798,1798 Act No.
1701, reprinted in 5 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 332 (Thomas Cooper ed.,
1839); Pope v. Commissioners, 46 S.C.L. (12 Rich.) 407, 418 (1860) (O'Neall, C.J.).
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City of Richmond v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. the United
States Supreme Court found that streets and highways are the public property
of the state, and that for purposes of travel and common use, they are open to
the citizens of every state.'77 However, when an appropriation or exclusive use
is sought, the state, if it chooses, may require telephone companies to pay a fee
to the general public for depriving them of common use.'78 For example, an
1894 franchise agreementbetween the City of Aiken and Southern Bell granted
the telephone utility a franchise to use the city streets and rights-of-way. In
exchange for this franchise, Southern Bell agreed to provide telephone service
to the residents ofAiken and to provide to the City of Aiken certain concession
telephone service.'"
South Carolina's goal of a statewide telephone system was slow in
developing because the necessity of city-by-city negotiations discouraged the
needed investment in a statewide telephone network. Local control, while
satisfactory for independent local systems like water, electric, and
transportation utilities, was not appropriate where the local activities were part
of a state and national network. Consequently, in 1899 South Carolina
withdrew from the cities the delegated franchise power over telephone
companies in order to encourage construction of a statewide integrated
system.'80 Local government, of course, retained the power to police the streets,
but could not do so in a way that hindered a company licensed to do business
by state law-and later by federal law-from performing a public purpose.
In sum, after 1899 a South Carolina city could not exclude a telephone
company from the use of its streets, because state law expressly authorized that
use. Though state law did not exact compensation for this use, cities could
make regulations for the use incident to a proper exercise of the police power
and could impose taxes that applied to all.
C. The 1895 South CarolinaConstitution
The 1895 South Carolina Constitution provided:
No law shall be passed by the General Assembly granting the
right to construct and operate a street or other railway,
telegraph, telephone or electric plant . . . without first
obtaining the consent of the local authorities in control of the
streets or public places proposed to be occupied for any such

177. 174 U.S. 761, 772-73 (1899).
178. Id.
179. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Aiken, 279 S.C. 269, 306 S.E.2d 220
(1983), transcript of record at 3.
180. Act of Feb. 23, 1899, No. 40, § 1, 1899 S.C. Acts 61 (codified as amended at
S.C. CODE ANN. § 58-9-2020 (Law. Co-op. 1976)).
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or like purposes.'"

In 1997 the South Carolina Supreme Court construed the current version of this
provision not as a limitation on the General Assembly, but as a grant ofpower
to municipal govemingbodies.' 2 Though the holding in City ofCayce v. AT&T
Communicationsdid not fully define the nature and extent of the local power,
the court did make clear that its ruling was not intended to disturb the authority
of telephone companies that had constructed their lines long ago and had been
operating for many years-namely, Bell and the independents.'
Once given, local consent cannot be revoked. In City of Louisville v.
Cumberland Telephone & Telegraph Co. the city had been granted the
statutory power to consent to the laying of lines.' The United States Supreme
Court found that the
provisions of the charter gave the municipality ample
authority to deal with the subject, and by virtue of this
statutory power it could have imposed terms, which the
company might have been unable or unwilling to accept-in
which event the franchise granted by the State would have
been nugatory. But, when the assent was given the condition
precedent had been performed, the franchise was perfected
and could not thereafter be abrogated by municipal action.
For, while the city was given the authority to consent, the
statute did not confer upon it the power to withdraw that
consent ....

Those charter franchises had become fully

operative when the city's consent was given, and thereafter
the company occupied the streets and conducted its business,
not under a license from the city of Louisville, but by virtue
of a grant from the State of Kentucky.'
Because the Louisville Court did not define the municipality's "consent"
power, new telephone companies operating in South Carolina face substantial
uncertainty until a case can be brought to clarify Cayce. South Carolina's
municipalities have indicated their belief that Cayce restores their unlimited
nineteenth-century franchise powers under the name of a "consent

181. S.C. CONST. art. VIII, § 4, amended and replacedby S.C.CONsT. art. VIII, § 15
(containing virtually equivalent language).
182. City of Cayce v. AT&T Comms., Inc., 326 S.C. 237,241-42,486 S.E.2d 92,94
(1997).
183. Id. at 243,486 S.E.2d at 95 ("We are not asked, and therefore do not answer, the
[question of] whether Cayce... can impose a fee five years after the cable was installed."); see
supra note 166 and accompanying text.
184. 224 U.S. 649 (1912).
185. Id. at 658-59.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol51/iss2/5

30

Quirk and Walters: A Constitutional and Statutory History of the Telephone Business
SouTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

Vol. 51: 290

agreement."' 86 That is, the cities believe whatever a city could have done in the
1880s or 1890s under a franchise agreement it may now impose as a "consent
agreement." However, the Louisville Court was hardly suggesting a return to
the costly and balkanized system that existed in the nineteenth century.
Moreover, since 1996 section 253 of the Telecommunications Act has
denied both states and municipalities the power to exclude telecommunications
providers or impose discriminatory costs upon them.' 87 However, the South
Carolina Supreme Court's recent decision in BellSouth Telecommunications,
Inc. v. City of Orangeburg declined to construe Article VIII of the state
constitution in conformity with the new federal telecommunications law. In
Orangeburgthe court inexplicably upheld a discriminatory tax imposed by the
city despite the limitations established by the Telecommunications Act.'88
D. South Carolina Act No. 40 of the Laws of 1899: The Statewide
Franchisefor Telephones
As previously discussed, Act 40 of the Laws of 1899 gave telephone
companies broad authority to freely use public rights of way for the purpose of
providing telephone service. Despite this broad authorization, the South
Carolina Supreme Court has allowed the City of Orangeburg to impose a hefty
fee for such use of its rights-of-way.8 9 Other courts have interpreted
comparable language quite differently. In TCG Detroitv. City ofDearborn a
federal district court held that Dearborn could not impose a franchise
agreement upon the incumbent local carrier, Ameritech Michigan.'9 The court
found that Ameritech "has vested state franchise rights" dating from the 1883
statute underwhich itwas organized.' 9 The 1883 Michigan law is substantially
similar to South Carolina's 1899 law." Likewise, in City ofHawarden v. U.S.
West Communications, Inc. the Iowa Supreme Court recently interpreted a
statewide franchise statute like South Carolina's to strike down an ordinance
that sought to impose a "franchise fee" analogous to that currently imposed by
Orangeburg. 93 In that case, the City of Hawarden required U.S. West, its
existing provider, to pay a "user fee" of 3% of gross revenues to continue
operations. The city conceded that "the franchise fee will generate revenue over
and above any expense incident to the city's administrative or regulatory

186. Reply Brief for Appellant at 8, BellSouth Telecomns., Inc. v. City of
Orangeburg, No. 25009, 1999 WL 1037160 (S.C. Nov. 8, 1999) (No. 93-CP-38-430).
187. 47 U.S.C. § 253 (Supp. 1111997).
188. No. 25009, 1999 WL 1037160, at *4 (S.C. Nov. 8, 1999).
189. See BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. City of Orangeburg, No. 25009, 1999 WL
1037160 (S.C. Nov. 8, 1999).
190. 16 F. Supp. 2d 785, 796-97 (E.D. Mich. 1998).
191. Id. at 797.
192. See Act of May 31, 1883, No. 129, § 4, 1883 Mich. Pub. Acts 131.
193. 590 N.W.2d 504, 509 (Iowa 1999).
Published by Scholar Commons, 2000

31

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 51, Iss. 2 [2000], Art. 5
2000] HISTORY OF THE TELEPHONE BUSINESS IN SOUTH CAROLINA

321

costs." '94 The lower court found that the fee was an unauthorized tax. On
appeal the city argued that what the lower court had described as a tax was "in
195
fact, rent, legitimately charged for the commercial use of public property.
The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the lower court:
[T]he record reveals the city's proposed fee is related, not to
the expense of regulation or any special benefit conferred on
the utility, but to gross revenues generated by the utility.
Viewed in this light, the district court held, the fee is actually
a revenue generating measure, i.e., a tax.96
The court rejected the city's "rental" argument, finding it "identical to one
this court rejected over eighty years ago."1 97 The earlier decision, based on the
Iowa statute similar to South Carolina Act No. 40 of 1899, upheld the
telephone company's "statutory authorization to occupy the city's streets and
alleys, free of charge, subject to the city's police power to regulate the
installation and maintenance ofthe facilities."' 98 In view of the legislative grant,
"'under no theory is the city entitled to recover from the telephone company the
199
rental value of its streets used by said company with its poles and wires.'
The Iowa court further held that the Hawarden ordinance conflicted with
Iowa law and the Telecommunications Act of 1996.200 The court found the

194. Id. at 506.
195. Id. at507.
196. Id.; accordCity of Chattanooga v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., No. E199901573-COA-R3-CV, slip op. at 6-7 (Tenn. Ct. App. filed Jan. 26,2000). The Chattanoogacourt
struck down a 5% gross receipts fee similar to Orangeburg's, finding the fee was in fact atax that
was invalid because it did "not necessarily bear any relation to the cost to the city of the
franchises' use of the City's rights-of-way." Id., slip op. at 6. The court continued:
The City chose a fee of 5% of gross revenue, based
upon what some other cities charge
telecommunication providers for the use ofrights-ofway, which the Trial Judge referred to as a "me too"
rationale. The mere fact that other cities charge
similar rates, is not conclusive as to the
reasonableness of the fee.
Id., slip op. at 7.
197. Id. (citing City of Des Moines v. Iowa Tel. Co., 162 N.W. 323 (Iowa 1917)).
198. Id.
199. Id. (quoting Des Moines, 162 N.W. at 331); see also City of Englewood v.
Mountain States Tel. and Tel. Co., 431 P.2d 40 (Colo. 1967) (en banc) (holding that franchise
rights granted by the state to the telephone company precluded the city from requiring the
company to renew the expired city franchise for continued operation); U.S. West Comns., Inc.
v. City and County of Denver, No. 98CV691 (Dist. Ct. Colo., Mar. 5, 1999) (finding that a city
ordinance imposing a franchise fee was a tax and was void because it conflicted with a state
statute granting a franchise right).
200. Hawarden,590 N.W.2d at 508 ("To the extent that Hawarden's ordinance 549
purports to require a revenue-based 'user fee' as a prerequisite to providing telephone service
in Hawarden, it conflicts with Iowa Code sections 476.29(6), 477.1 and .3, as well as the
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city's case was weakenedby reliance on cases construingmunicipal powers "in
connection with the distinctly different statutory schemes governing utilities
other than telephone systems" such as cable and electric.2"' The Iowa court
found two recent decisions to be more pertinent 2 : American Telephone &
Telegraph Co. v. Village ofArlington Heights 3 and Diginet,Inc. v. Western
Union ATS, Inc.2" Arlington Heights sought to impose a franchise agreement
on AT&T's right to lay fiber-optic cable. The Illinois Supreme Court held that
"public streets are held in trust for public use and a city's regulatory powers
over them do not include the authority to charge rent for their use." ' 5 The court
found that to permit local governmental units to exact tolls for conduits
installed over and under city streets "would amount to legalized extortion and
a crippling of communication and commerce as we know it. '
Diginet dealt with the City of Chicago's imposition of a percentage-ofrevenue user fee for the telephone utility's right to operate a fiber-optic network
under sixteen miles of Chicago's streets. The city "made no pretense that the
fee was other than a revenue-generating measure; indeed, the court could find
no proof of costs imposed on the city by installation of the fiber optic
network., 20 7 The Diginet court held the city could not circumvent limitations
on its taxing authority "by calling a tax something else, such as a 'franchise
fee."' 20 8 The court continued:
The test is functional. If the fee is a reasonable estimate ofthe
cost imposed by the person required to pay the fee, then it is
a user fee and is within the municipality's regulatory power.
If it is calculated not just to recover a cost imposed on the
municipality or its residents but to generate revenues that the
municipality can use to offset unrelated costs or confer
unrelated benefits, it is a tax, whatever its nominal
designation.0 9

Telecommunications Act of 1996.").
201. Id. (emphasis added).
202. See id. at 508-09.
203. 620 N.E.2d 1040 (Ill. 1993).
204. 958 F.2d 1388 (7th Cir. 1992) (Posner, J.).
205. Arlington Heights,620 N.E.2d at 1044.
206. Id.
207. Harwarden, 590 N.W.2d at 508-09 (citing Diginet, 958 F.2d at 1392).
208. Diginet,958 F.2d at 1399.
209. Id.; accord City of Chattanooga v. BellSouth Teleconims., Inc., No. E199901573-COA-R3-CV, slip op. at4-8 (Tenn. Ct. App. filed Jan. 26, 2000). The Chattanoogacourt
struck the city's 5% of gross receipts fee, noting:
The fee varies based upon the provider's gross
revenue, and is therefore measured by the provider's
earnings and not to the burdens assumed by the city
in regulating the particular provider. This is
particularly true because a telecommunications
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The essential question, the Diginet court found, was whether a modem
telecommunications system can withstand such local ordinances:
If municipalities such as Chicago can use their control over
the public ways to extract fees unrelated to costs from
telephone and other right ofway companies, the provision of
telephone and other utility-type services maybe disrupted. To
run a cable across the state a telephone company might have
to cross a hundred municipal boundaries, and at each one...
it could be held up for a monopoly toll, as if Illinois's
municipalities were so many little medieval German
principalities.21
The Iowa Supreme Court in Hawardennoted that Arlington Heights and
Diginetreflect the same policy as its City ofDes Moines decision decided 82
years earlier.211 The Des Moines court noted:
The writer well remembers the advent of the telephone, and
has watched its growth. First it was purely a local affair, then
short lines connected some of the towns, and finally it spread
over the entire country, so that it is now possible for one in
New York to talk with another in San Francisco. In the early
days every town wanted an exchange; next it wanted toll lines
connecting its exchange with other exchanges in neighboring
towns. Every one wanted a phone. At this stage the
Legislature was appealed to, and no one thought at that time
of charging for the use of poles or wires upon either public
highways or streets. The main thing was to secure them and
to get capital wherewith to procure them. No one it seems
could foresee the tremendous development of this industry,
and so the Legislature passed the act giving to telephone
companies the right to construct their poles and wires over
and along every highway and street in the state in order to
encourage their development. Capital was invested on this
basis, and the business has become very large. Now it appears
that these grants and franchises were valuable, and the use of
the streets and public highways is thought to be worth
something.

provider must pay 5% of its gross receipts, regardless
of the extent to which the provider uses the City's
rights-of-way.
Id., slip op. at 6-7.
210. Diginet,958 F.2d at 1400.
211. Hawarden, 590 N.W.2d at 508.
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In this situation attempt is being made to collect rentals
for the use thereof. It is a clear case of hindsight and not
foresight; but courts are confined to a definition of rights
under the original grants, save as these may be modified
under the reserved power of the state." 2
A telephone company accepts the statutory offer by constructing,
maintaining, and operating its lines.213 Once the contract is made and the rightof-way established, and as long as the right-of-way is used for telephone
purposes, neither the state nor its cities can require additional consideration.
The company's contract with the state is protected by both state and federal
constitutional provisions against impairment of contractual obligations. 1 4 In
Russell v. Sebastian the United States Supreme Court held a municipal
ordinance unconstitutional because it impaired a state contract.215 The Court
held the fact that "the grant, resulting from an acceptance of the State's offer,
constituted a contract, and vested in the accepting individual or corporation a
property right, protected by the Federal Constitution, is not open to dispute in
view of the repeated decisions of this Court."2 6 Likewise, in City of
Owensboro v. Cumberland Telephone & Telegraph Co. the United States
Supreme Court found: "If the grant be accepted and the contemplated
expenditure made, the right cannot be destroyed by legislative enactment or
city ordinance based upon legislative power, without violating the prohibitions
placed in the Constitution for the protection of property rights." 2 7 The street
franchise, or right to use city streets in conducting a telephone business, "has
been calledby various names-an incorporeal hereditament, an interest in land,
an easement, a right of way-but, howsoever designated, it is property. ' 218 The
nation's telephone system was constructed based on state franchise contracts
and the Supreme Court's holdings that these contracts were protected by the
federal contracts clause.
A statutory phrase that authorizes use of "the public roads and highways
in [the] state" for the construction oftelephone lines clearly includes the right
to use not only all nonprivate, rural roads in the state, but also the streets of a
city as well.2" The Minnesota federal district court in Abbott v. City ofDuluth
212. City of Des Moines v. Iowa Tel. Co., 162 N.W. 323, 332 (Iowa 1917).
213. According to Cayce, 326 S.C. 237,242-43,486 S.E.2d 92, 94-95, (1997), Art.
VIII, § 15 of the South Carolina Constitution requires municipal consent as a condition of the
state's offer of the franchise right. For companies like BellSouth and others that have long been
investing in and providing services within municipalities, no records documenting that consent
exist. However, the acquiescence of municipalities to decades of investment would appear to
foreclose their ability to expand Cayce to exact fees from these utilities.
214. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 4.
215. 233 U.S. 195, 204 (1914).
216. Id.
217. 230 U.S. 58, 66 (1913).
218. City of Louisville v. Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co., 224 U.S. 649, 661 (1912).
219. See Abbott v. City of Duluth, 104 F. 833, 836-37 (D. Minn.1900).
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stated: "'Public road' and 'highway' are usually understood to mean the same
thing, and include all ways which of right are common to the whole people, and
therefore differ from private roads or byways." ' The court continued:
The amendment of 1881... if it only grantedrights along
ruralroads, would never have been asked or enacted; but
granting, as it did, such rights upon all highways in the state,
it was of great value to telephone companies, besides saving
them the annoyance of dealing with municipal bodies for
rights and powers, and so obviously for the advantageof the
public as to induce the legislatureto act directly and at once
in respect to allparts ofthe state.22
In 1903 the Iowa Supreme Court also construed the statutory phrase "public
highways of this state" to authorize telephone companies to use city streets
because it was "known by all that the principal business of telephone
companies was confined to urban ways."' Telephone companies "were given
the use of highways and streets without limitation, and without control by city
authorities."'' Other courts have also prohibited cities from interfering with
state franchises. 4
Similarly, the Mississippi Supreme Court found a city ordinance
demanding "rental" payment for eachpole was illegal because a state franchise
allowed the company to use the city streets without payment. 225 The court
found that the ordinance was "exacting a certain sum as rent, pure and simple,
from the company, for the identical entry upon and occupation of the streets by
the company, with its poles, which it was authorized by the act of 1886 [state
franchise] to make, without compensation to the state or city. ' 226
In 1956 Mississippi enacted a statute that attempted to impose upon
Southern Bell a fee of 2% of the company's monthly service charges paid by
customers as payment for the continued use of the streets, alleys, and public
places within all state municipalities. 7 However, in order to induce the
construction of a statewide telephone system, Mississippi had enacted in 1886
a statutory offer22 8 almost identical to South Carolina's 1899 law. In Southern
220. Id. at 837.
221. Id. (emphasis added).
222. Chamberlain v. Iowa Tel. Co., 93 N.W. 596, 599 (Iowa 1903).
223. Id.
224. See, e.g., Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Mobile, 162 F. 523 (S.D. Ala.
1907); Northwestern Tel. Exch. Co. v. City of Minneapolis, 83 N.W. 527 (Minn. 1900); Village
of Carthage v. Central N.Y. Tel. &Tel. Co., 78 N.E. 165 (N.Y. 1906); City ofSeattle v. Western
Union Tel. Co., 153 P.2d 859 (Wash. 1944).
225. Hodges v. Western Union Tel. Co., 18 So. 84, 84 (Miss. 1895).
226. Id. at 85.
227. See SouthernBell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Meridian, 131 So.2d 666, 667 (Miss.
1961).
228. Act of Mar. 16, 1886, ch. 38, § 1, 1886 Miss. Laws 93.
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Bell Telephone & TelegraphCo. v. City ofMeridian the Mississippi Supreme
Court found this statute "constituted an offer by the State to telephone and
telegraph companies to use highways and streets for the purpose of providing
citizens with telephone service without any requirement of paying
compensation to either municipalities or the State."'' 9 Southern Bell and its
predecessors had accepted the offer by the construction, maintenance, and
operation of their lines.' 0 The court concluded that the company's acceptance
"resulted in the creation of an irrevocable contract between appellant, on the
one hand, and the State, on the other, which is protected from impairment by
the contract clause of the State Constitution. ' ' "I Consequently, the court
concluded that the imposition of the 2% fee "as compensation for the use of the
streets" amounted to "an unlawful impairment of the obligations of this
contract" in violation of the state constitution."2
South Carolina's constitution, like Mississippi's, provides that
"[n]o... law impairing the obligation of contracts... shall be passed." 3 In
Meridianthe court could not avoid the constitutional issue because the state
itself, with the 1956 law, had clearly impaired its own contract. 4 However, in
South Carolina the state itself has not contradicted or impaired the state
franchise. Instead, the actions of some municipalities, acting on their own, have
given rise to constitutional violations.23s Section 5-7-30 of the South Carolina
Code does not authorize cities to impose additional charges on telephone
companies that have been contractually entitled to operate on city streets since
1899.Y 6 Telephone companies, both local and interstate, have constructed and
maintained their lines in reliance upon their contracts with the state. The state
has not authorized, nor could it authorize, municipalities to impair existing state
contracts, including the contract set forth in section 58-9-2020 of the South
Carolina Code.z 7
IV. DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING THE INDUSTRY:

1980s TO THE PRESENT

A. 1980s South CarolinaBusiness License Tax Litigation
The litigation between South Carolina cities and Southern Bell in the

229. Meridian, 131 So.2d at 670.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. S.C. CONST. art. I, § 4; Miss. CONsT. § 16.
234. Meridian, 131 So.2d at 670.
235. See Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Aiken, 279 S.C. 269, 306 S.E.2d 220
(1983).
236. S.C. CODE ANN.§ 5-7-30 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1999).
237. S.C. CoNST.art. I,
§ 4; S.C. CODEANN. § 58-9-2020 (Law. Co-op. 1976). But see
BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. City of Orangeburg, No. 25009, 1999 WL 1037160 (S.C. Nov.
8, 1999) (holding that this code section did not create any contractual relationship).
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1980srs which led to the execution of various "franchise agreements" around
South Carolina, was based on a constitutional history dating to colonial days.
1. ConstitutionalHistory
The South Carolina Constitution grants the legislative power of the state
to the General Assembly." 9 The grant is unlimited except as it is limited
specifically by another provision of the constitution or by the United States
Constitution."' Municipal corporations "are the mere creatures of the
legislative will; and, inasmuch as all their powers are derived from that source,
it follows that those powers may be enlarged, modified, or diminished at any
time, without their consent, or even without notice."'
Under the 1895 South Carolina Constitution, municipal corporations hold
those powers delegated to them by the legislature in their incorporation law or
other statute. 242 A municipal corporation could not impose a tax unless the
legislature authorized it,243 but South Carolina cities enjoyed substantial "home
rule" because they could impose real estate taxes unless the legislature altered
or repealed their power.'"
South Carolina counties, on the other hand, were administered directly by
the General Assembly through annual county appropriations acts. These bills
were commonly referred to as "county supply bills."4" The supply bills set
forth the method and rate of tax and each item of expenditure, including
salaries for county employees. Through these county delegations, the General
Assembly ran the counties.
In April 1966 the General Assembly created a committee to study the
South Carolina Constitution of 1895. The committee elected Lieutenant
Governor John C. West as its chairman in 1967, presenting its final report to
the governor in 1969. Based on the West Committee's recommendations, the
General Assembly provided for a referendum vote to amend Article VIII of the
South Carolina Constitution on the general election ballot in November 1972.
After a favorable referendum vote, the General Assembly ratified the
amendment on March 7, 1973. Article VIII, Section 7 now provides:

238. See Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Spartanburg, 285 S.C. 495, 331
S.E.2d 333 (1985); Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City ofAiken, 279 S.C. 269,306 S.E.2d 220
(1983).
239. See S.C. CONST. art. I, § 1.
240. Moseley v. Welch, 209 S.C. 19, 27, 39 S.E.2d 133, 137 (1946).
241. Commissioners ofLaramie County v. Commissioners ofAlbany County, 92 U.S.
307,312 (1875), quotedin Lillard v. Melton, 103 S.C. 10, 27, 87 S.E. 421,428 (1915), overruled

inparton othergrounds,Weaver v. Recreation Dist., 328 S.C. 83, 87,492 S.E.2d 79, 82 (1997).
242. S.C. CoNsT. of 1895, art. VIII, § 1.

243. Carroll v. Town of York, 109 S.C. 1, 9-10, 95 S.E. 121, 124 (1918).
244. See Thorne v. Seabrook, 264 S.C. 503, 506, 216 S.E.2d 177, 181-82 (1975).
245. BRUCELIrrLEJOHN, LrrTLEJOHN'SPOLrrICALMEMOIRS (1934-1938)94(1989).
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The General Assembly shall provide by general law for
the structure, organization, powers, duties, functions, and the
responsibilities of counties, including the power to tax
different areas at different rates of taxation related to the
nature and level of government services provided. Alternate
forms ofgovernment, not to exceed five, shall be established.
No laws for a specific county shall be enacted and no county
shall be exempted from the general laws or laws applicable to
the selected alternative form of government."
Article VIII, Section 9 currently states that: "[t]he structure and organization,
powers, duties, functions, and responsibilities of the municipalities shall be
established by general law;provided,that not more than five alternative forms
of government shall be authorized. 24 7 Additionally, Article VIII, Section 14
prohibits the legislature, in exercising its Article VIII authority, from interfering
with the administration of any function which requires statewide uniformity.4 8
Article X, governing finance and taxation, was amended in 1977.249
Section 1 provides in part: "The General Assembly may provide for the ad
valorem taxation by the State or any of its subdivisions of all real and personal
property." Additionally, Section 6 provides in part: "The General Assembly
may vest the power of assessing and collecting taxes in all of the political
subdivisions of the State. Property tax levies shall be uniform in respect to
persons and property within the jurisdiction of the body imposing such
taxes .... ,251

InKnightv. Salisburythe South Carolina Supreme Court explained that the
purpose of these so-called Home Rule Amendments was to get the seat of
county government out of Columbia:
These changes were prompted by the feeling that Columbia
should not be the seat of county government, and that the
General Assembly should devote its full attention to problems
at the state level. It was against this background that Article
VIII was written. It is clearly intended that home rule be
given to the counties and that county government should
function in the county seats rather than at the State Capitol. If
the counties are to remain units of government, the power to
function must exist at the county level. Quite obviously, the

246. S.C. CONST. art. VIII, § 7.
247. Id. art. VIII, § 9.
248. Id. art. VIII, § 14. An example of a function requiring uniformity is the
construction and operation of a unified, interconnected telephone network.
249. Act of May 4, 1977, No. 71, § 1, 1977 S.C. Acts 90.
250. S.C. CONST. art. X, § 1.
251. Id. art.X, § 6.
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2

With powers delegated by the legislature, municipal corporations were already
governing themselves in a satisfactory way. Article VIII was directed at county,
not municipal, problems.
2. Home Rule Amendment andSection 5-7-30
South Carolina Code section 5-7-30 was enacted in 1975 pursuant to the
Home Rule Amendments. 3 It allows municipalities to enact ordinances to deal
with local concerns, provided the ordinances are not inconsistent with general
law. Section 5-7-30 states:
Each municipality of the State... may enact regulations,
resolutions, and ordinances, not inconsistent with the
Constitution and general law of this State, including the
exercise of powers in relation to roads, streets... which
appears to it necessary and proper for the security, general
welfare, and convenience of the municipality or for
preserving health, peace, order, and good government in it,
including the authority to... grantfranchisesfor the use of
public streets andmake chargesfor them .... '
Importantly, section 5-7-30 provides that it will not apply if it is inconsistent
with existing general law. Section 58-9-2020, enacted to revoke the city
franchise power respecting telephone companies, is such an existing general
law. Section 58-9-2020 states:
Any telegraph or telephone company... may construct,
maintain and operate its line through, upon, over and under
any of the public lands of this State, under, over, along and
upon any of the highways or public roads of the State, over,
through or under any of the waters of this State, on, over and
under the lands of any person in this State and along, upon
and over the right of way of any railroad or railway company
in this State ....
The only conditions on a company's authority to construct and operate its
telephone business are (1) that the lines must be "constructed so as not to

252. 262 S.C. 565, 571,206 S.E.2d 875, 877 (1974).
253. Act of June 25, 1975, No. 283, art. 3, § 47-32, 1975 S.C. Acts 692 (codified as
amended at S.C. CODE ANN. § 5-7-30 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1999).
254. S.C. CODE ANN. § 5-7-30 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1999) (emphasis added).
255. Id. § 58-9-2020.
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endanger the safety of persons or to interfere with the use" of the roads, "the
navigation of such waters or the operation and running" of railroad engines and
cars; and (2) that "just compensation" must first be paid to the owners of
private lands and the railroads for such rights." Again, the entire purpose of
the original 1899 enactment of what is now section 58-9-2020 was to withdraw
from the localities the previous delegation of the franchise power with respect
to telephones. The legislature had determined that as far as telephone
companies were concerned, a statewide franchise was in the best interests of
the state's citizens.
The police powers that section 58-9-2020 permit states to impose,
however, are regulatory only. Assuming that a city may recover the cost of
regulation from the telephone company, South Carolina law clearly mandates
that the city may not use the police power as a device to generate revenue."5 7
Our Supreme Court has stated that "[a] regulatory measure of this kind may
produce only such revenue as is reasonably necessary to defray the expense
connected with its operation, and that an ordinance passed for the real purpose
of raising revenue, under the guise of obtaining funds for the enforcement of
a police regulation, is invalid."5 8
3.

The Aiken and SpartanburgCases

9

Following the Home Rule Amendments and other legislation, South
Carolina municipalities dramatically raised business license taxes imposed on
Southern Bell.2"s Aiken, for example, raised its tax by 2100%261 and
Spartanburg raised its tax by 900% to 1,000%.262 Southern Bell resisted the
cities' demands, and in both Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. City
ofAiken and Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. City ofSpartanburg,
the South Carolina Supreme Court held for the company. 263 The court
established the constitutional limits on the local power to collect a license

256. Id.
257. See Southern Fruit Co. v. Porter, 188 S.C. 422, 428, 199 S.E. 537, 539-40
(1938); cf.McCoy v. Town of York, 193 S.C. 390, 397, 8 S.E.2d 905, 908 (1940) (holding that
a municipal police power regulation, to be lawful, cannot be unreasonable and arbitrary).
258. Owens v. Owens, 193 S.C. 260, 265, 8 S.E.2d 339, 341 (1940).
259. See also infra Part IV.C.1.c.i (discussing the gross disparities among the license
tax rates imposed on telephone companies and those imposed on other companies by
Spartanburg and Aiken); infra Part IV.C.I.d (discussing Due Process issues surrounding the
Aiken and Spartanburg license taxes).
260. See Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Spartanburg, 285 S.C. 495, 331
S.E.2d 333 (1985); Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City ofAiken, 279 S.C. 269,306 S.E.2d 220
(1983).
261. Transcript of Record at 7, Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Aiken, 279
S.C. 269, 306 S.E.2d 220 (1988) (No. 79-CP-02-860).
262. Spartanburg,285 S.C. at 497, 331 S.E.2d at 334.
263. Aiken, 279 S.C. at 274, 306 S.E.2d at 222-23; Spartanburg,285 S.C. at 498, 331
S.E.2d at 335.
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tax."2 The municipalities, which had budgeted revenue from the now-illegal
business license ordinances, faced deficits and sudden large real estate taxes.
To assist them, Southern Bell offered franchise agreements to make some
money available to them.26
Section 5-7-30, as noted above, confers specific powers on municipalities.
With respect to taxes, municipalities are authorized to (1) "levy and collect
taxes on real and personal property," and (2) "levy a business license tax on
gross income."26 These are the only taxing powers delegated; a city is not
authorized to impose an income or sales tax.267
In Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. City of Aiken the court
found that "the licensing power of municipalities is to be strictly construed and
' "At the same time,
exercised in strict conformity with the terms of its grant."268
however, the power to impose a license tax implies a power to classify business
and differentiate as to rates of taxation," so that some businesses pay higher
rates than others.269 The power to classify the license tax, unlike a uniform rate
tax like the property or income tax, is subject to the abuse of singling out a
business taxpayer for discriminatory treatment. A city council may define a
class in which only one, or very few, taxpayers will fall. By its very nature, a
license tax discriminates among taxpayers. The discrimination is reasonable,
or "rationally based," when the historical factors are considered properly. The
business license tax is a special tax whose classification must be rationally
based on the level of governmental services and benefits provided to the
taxpayer. Specifically, the South Carolina Supreme Court has required that a
license tax (1) be rationally based on the provision of governmental services,
the benefits derived by the taxpayer, and the burdens imposed by him; and
(2) that the license tax must act in aid of the real property tax to assure that all
taxpayers make a fair contribution to government.27
In State v. Columbia the court explained that the license tax had evolved
from a police power regulation to a revenue producer while retaining some of
its police power roots (i.e., that it is a special tax and classification must be

264. Aiken, 269 S.C. at 273,306 S.E.2d at 221; Spartanburg,495 S.C. at 497-98,331
S.E.2d at 335.
265. See generally Transcript of Record, Aiken (No. 79-CP-02-860).
266. S.C. CODE ANN. § 5-7-30 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1999).
267. But see Hospitality Ass'n, Inc. v. County of Charleston, 320 S.C. 219, 227-30,
464 S.E.2d 113, 118-20 (1995) (holding that the § 5-7-30 power to impose "uniform service
charges" authorized a "fee" which used a de facto 1% sales tax.) In 1997 the legislature
expressly provided that a local government "may not impose anew tax after December 31, 1996,
unless specifically authorized by the General Assembly." S.C. CODE ANN. § 6-1-310 (Law. Coop. Supp. 1999). The 1997 law also requires a "positive majority vote" to increase a business
license tax, id. § 6-1-320(C), and imposes specific limits on "fees." Id. § 6-1-330.
268. 279 S.C. 269, 272, 306 S.E.2d 220,222 (1983).

269. Id.
270. See United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. City of Spartanburg, 263 S.C. 169,

172-75, 209 S.E.2d 36, 37-38 (1974); S.C. CONST. art. VfI, § 7.
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rationally based on services provided to the business by the government).27'
Initially, the court noted, "a license of a trade... is referable to the police
power... and implies authority to prohibit the exercise of such business." '
Basically, licensing was intended to regulate the conduct of the undertaking
and the fee was related to the cost of enforcement.
In its next stage, the license tax was imposed on places of public
entertainment and amusement "based upon the idea that avocations of that class
should contribute specially to the support of the government in excess of the
burdens borne by the productive industries."273 In its last historical stage the tax
was imposed on lawful occupations "wherecircumstances ofapeculiarnature
renderedit requisite that eachparticularavocation should have its own rate
of taxation."274
If the city cannot show a rational basis for its classifications, a license tax
is an illegal gross receipts tax. A high tax rate must be based upon special or
disproportionate services rendered. The court's decision in Aiken reaffirmed
this traditional principle.2 75 The court held that the Aiken license tax ordinance
"offend[ed] the Equal Protection Clauses of the South Carolina and United
States Constitutions. 276 The court found that Aiken's 1979 ordinance imposing
a 3% tax on Southern Bell "applied an unreasonable and discriminatory rate to
the appellant. '2 77 Southern Bell "was taxed at twenty-four (24) times the
average rate imposed upon other businesses under the ordinance." ' The court
noted the record "lacks sufficient evidence that would support an express
finding of arational basis."' 7 9The court concluded: "[W]e look no further than
the disproportionality just noted and the lack of any rational basis therefor in
concluding that a denial of equal protection has here occurred. 28 0
The court found the Aiken case to be "comparable" to its 1972 decision in
United States Fidelity& GuarantyCo. v. City ofNewberry.8 ' In Newberry the
court held equal protection requires that a license tax be fair and
nondiscriminatory, stating that "the cardinal issues there is [sic] whether the
city had any rational basis for such a gross disparity and differentiation between
the rate charged" plaintiffand the rate charged others.28 2 "In all of our decisions
wherein a classification in a tax statute or ordinance has been
challenged . . . this Court has recognized that a reasonable basis for the

271. 6 S.C. 1, 4-5 (1874).
272. Id. at4.

273. Id.
274. Id. (emphasis added).
275. 279 S.C. 269, 271,306 S.E.2d 220, 221 (1983).

276. Id.
277. Id. at 274,306 S.E.2d at 222.
278. Id. at 273, 306 S.E.2d at 222.
279. Id.
280. Id.

281. 257 S.C. 433, 186 S.E.2d 239 (1972).
282. Id. at 439, 186 S.E.2d at 241.
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different treatment was essential to the constitutionality thereof."2 3
In Spartanburgthe court concluded the rate disparity between Southern
Bell and other companies "is palpably unreasonable and violative of equal
protection of the laws." 2 " The court found a gross disparity and a lack of any
rational basis for the disparity:
The gross disparity in the license tax rate imposed by the
Spartanburg ordinance is reflected by the fact that Southern
Bell pays a tax of 1% of its gross receipts ($238,875 in 1981
and $267,262 in 1982), while a textile mill or manufacturing
plant with the same revenue as Southern Bell pays a
maximum of $725. The city has advanced no reasonable basis
for the differential treatment. 285
Spartanburgillustrates that the South Carolina Supreme Court requires a city's
ordinance to be based on an understandable classification system. Ordinances
must indicate the standard or standards used to divide businesses into different
classes to pay different rates. Equal protection requires that known standards
be consistently applied to all taxpayers. 286 The taxpayer is denied equal
protection if the city refuses to disclose what standards, if any, it has used.
InAiken the court affimed the ruling of Circuit Judge Rodney A. Peeples
in favor of Southern Bell as follows:
By way of cross-appeal, the City of Aiken contends that
the trial court erred in failing to sustain its claim that
intrastate calls should be included in gross income of the
appellant for license tax purposes. The trial court expressly
found that such a claim had no rational basis in the record.
We agree
and affirm the finding of the trial judge on this
28 7
point.
Judge Peeples had ordered Aiken to refund the tax attributable to intrastate
tolls:288",I find a definite lack of adequate basis by which an intrastate toll that
may be made or placed, why it's fair, or proper, or reasonable, or rational for

283. Id. at 440, 186 S.E.2d at 242.
284. Southern Bell TeL & Tel. Co. v. City of Spartanburg, 285 S.C. 495,498, 331
S.E.2d 333, 335 (1985).
285. Id. at 497, 331 S.E.2d at 335 (emphasis added). The City of Spartanburg, in its
Brief to the South Carolina Supreme Court, stated at page 20 that the "South Carolina Supreme
Court is unique among the Courts in the United States in holding" that the burden of coming
forward with a rational basis shifts to the taxing authority once a gross disparity is shown.
286. City of Laurens v. Anderson, 75 S.C. 62, 66-67, 55 S.E. 136, 137 (1906).
287. Aiken, 279 S.C. at 273-74, 306 S.E.2d at 222.
288. Transcript of Record at 202-04, Aiken (No. 79-CP-02-860).
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that to have been taxed as being locally performed within the City ofAiken."2 "9
Judge Peeples' finding, affirmed by the court, was that the
Doctrine of Fair Apportionment requires a local license tax
upon businesses doing business both within and outside the
taxing jurisdiction, be apportioned by a municipality in a
manner by which the measure of the tax fairly reflects that
proportion of the taxed activity which is actually carried on
within, andI emphasize within, the taxing jurisdiction.29
In the case of the intrastate toll, he continued, where "you have unitary
activities carried on almost simultaneously in several cities, that being the
intrastate toll call, I do not think that a tax can fail to do anything but
unreasonably discriminate or deny equal protection."29 ' The "complexity ofthe
system just makes it impossible to apply the language of the ordinance to the
toll charges in a manner which would arrive at a reasonable proportion of such
charges."' Similarly, the Spartanburg court found "no rational basis for
including intrastate calls in gross income for license tax purposes."'293
Indeed, the State legislature has never authorized its cities to impose a
statewide or worldwide tax.294 Under South Carolina law a city may only
impose a reasonable tax based on business actually carried on in the city.29 It
may not impose a tax on extraterritorial revenues earned by activities taking
place elsewhere and from customers residing elsewhere.29 Due Process and
Equal Protection require that cities confine their taxes to their own
boundaries.297
Even a lawful city license tax, of course, must be passed on to the
company's customers in the city that imposes it. The Southern Bell General
Subscriber Service Tariff, like those of other utilities, provides a schedule of
permitted license tax levels. Taxes in excess of the schedule are passed on to
subscribers within the municipal boundaries."ss The purpose of the pass-on

289. Id. at 196.
290. Id. at 197 (emphasis added).
291. Id.
292. Id. at 198.
293. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Spartanburg, 285 S.C. 495, 497, 331
S.E.2d 333, 334 (1985).
294. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 5-7-30 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1999). But see Eli Witt Co.
v. City of W. Columbia, 309 S.C. 555, 425 S.E.2d 16 (1992) (allowing the City of West
Columbia to tax income from sales made outside the city where the company's business property
was all in West Columbia).
295. Triplett v. City of Chester, 209 S.C. 455,459,40 S.E.2d 684, 685 (1946).
296. Id.; Spartanburg,285 S.C. at 497, 331 S.E.2d at 334.
297. Eli Witt Co. v. City of W. Columbia, 309 S.C. 555, 558-59, 425 S.E.2d 16,17-18
(1992).
298. City of Spartanburg v. Public Serv.Comm'n, 281 S.C. 223,224-25,314 S.E.2d
599, 600 (1984).
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tariff is to prevent one city from imposing what would in substance be an
extraterritorial tax on ratepayers throughout the state.2 The pass-on tariffwas
upheld by the South Carolina Supreme Court, over Spartanburg's objection, in
City of Spartanburgv. Public Service Commission."0 The Court held that "to
charge customers outside the city exchange or across the state for a city license
tax would be unjust discrimination.""3 1
4. Settlement of the 1980s Litigation
As federal funds diminished in the 1980s, municipalities across the state
struggled with the need to maintain and expand services to their citizens. Many
of the state's larger cities-such as Columbia, Spartanburg, Charleston, and
North Charleston-began to impose substantial business license fees on
utilities, intending to generate hundreds of thousands of dollars in new
revenues. When compromise negotiations between the cities and Southern Bell
proved futile, Southern Bell successfully challenged this type of license fee in
Aiken and Spartanburg,as detailed above. A number of other suits were
pending, but the principles of Aiken and Spartanburgindicated Southern Bell
would succeed in those as well.
Harry Marsh, then Southern Bell's chief executive in South Carolina, was
troubled by the impact these South Carolina Supreme Court rulings would have
on the cities, and on the company's relationship with them. He directed his
lawyers to undertake negotiations with the cities against which suits were
pending with the stated goal of keeping them, for the most part, whole while
preserving the principles established by the state supreme court. These
negotiations began in earnest, first with then-Mayor John Bourne of North
Charleston. Discussions continued over a number of weeks until what became
the standard "voluntary franchise" agreement was developed. The so-called
"franchise" agreement was in reality a vehicle to provide funds to the cities,
because the cities had not possessed the power to franchise BellSouth or any
other telephone company since 1899.
Weighing the recent South Carolina Supreme Court rulings against the
inevitable litigation costs, cities across South Carolina-from Charleston to
Rembert to Greenville-embraced the new voluntary franchise agreements.
However, many municipalities chose not to accept BellSouth's offer because
the "franchise" fees were to be passed on to subscribers within the city's limits.
Indeed, the City of Spartanburg even challenged this "pass-on" ability in 1984,
albeit unsuccessfully." 2
The nature of the telecommunications industry has drastically changed
since the execution of the initial agreements. Today, hundreds of new carriers

299. Id.
300. Id. at 225, 314 S.E.2d at 600.

301. Id. at 226, 314 S.E.2d at 600.
302. Id. at 223, 314 S.E.2d at 599.
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are authorized to provide telephone service in South Carolina. Congress, the
FCC, and the Public Service Commission have allowed competition in every
part of the industry. The next challenge is to implement a uniform assessment
and collection of taxes from all taxpayers to allow competition to take place on
a level playing field.
5. 1984 Divestiture
Before divestiture, an intrastate long distance call (e.g., Charleston to
Greenville) was accomplished solely by Southern Bell, which was then a
wholly owned subsidiary of AT&T. Southern Bell carried the call from the
caller's residence in Charleston to its terminus in Greenville. Because the call
was totally intrastate, Southern Bell retained 100% of the call revenues.
Interstate calls required an extra step. Southern Bell and AT&T
participated jointly to provide interstate service, and both were compensated
pursuant to a business arrangement known as "division of revenues." The long
distance call was billed and collected by Southern Bell, and all revenues
collected by Southern Bell from interstate service were pooled. AT&T and
Southern Bell then shared such revenues, pro rata, based upon a formula
contained in the division of revenues agreement between the two carriers.
In 1982 a Federal court issued an order that changed the structure of the
telephone industry forever.3 3 The court decree split the old Bell System into a
new AT&T and 22 operating companies grouped under seven regional holding
companies.3 The new AT&T inherited the Bell System long distance network,
which remains subject to FCC regulation."' 5 However, AT&T can sell
telecommunication and computer equipment and services without regulation."
The operating companies inherited the Bell system local networks, which are
subject to regulation by state regulators, the FCC, and the associated "Yellow
Pages" operations. The regional holding companies may sell, but not make,
equipment. 7 They are notpresently allowed to offer information services (like
data processing) directly.30 8
The Modified Final Judgment in United States v. American Telephone &
Telegraph Co. 309 held that Southern Bell could no longer function as a long
distance carrier; its phone service was limited to a defined local exchange area.
Further, AT&T was not to provide local facilities or services; correspondingly,
long distance was off limits for the operating companies." Under the Modified
Judgment the operating companies may provide long distance, or toll, services
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.

United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.C. 1982).
Id. at 142 n.41.
Id. at 141.
Id. at 174.
Id. at 225.
Id.
Id. at 131.
Id. at224.
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only inside the 169 "local access and transport areas" (LATAs) into which the
decree divides the country.311 The operating companies were specifically
forbidden to place calls between LATAs. In that regard their required role was
to provide mere "access" from the local network to the "long distance" carriers'
switches. The operating companies were also locked out of any new lines of
business unless they receivedspecial permission of the Justice Department and
the district court.3 12
As a result of divestiture, Southern Bell became part of an independent
entity renamed BellSouth. The manner of doing business with AT&T pursuant
to the division of revenues arrangement ended, and BellSouth was required to
offer any and all long distance carriers equal access to its lines on a tariff
basis.313 Accordingly, all long distance carriers now pay BellSouth an access
charge-an FCC or PSC approved charge for the provision of BellSouth
service for originating or terminating long distance telecommunication, whether
intrastate or interstate, on behalf of the long distance carrier. The access charge
is calculated based on the long distance carrier's actual use of BellSouth's
lines.314
Coupled with the independence of BellSouth, all telephone users were
given the opportunity, in both intrastate and interstate telecommunication, to
select the long distance carrier to carry their calls. Each long distance carrier
bills directly, on behalf of itself, for the total charge of the call. The long
distance carrier does not share these revenues with BellSouth. Instead,
BellSouth charges the long distance carrier an access charge, as explained
above, that is a part of the long distance carrier's overall cost for the long
distance call.
Southern Bell no longer functions as the long distance carrier, although it
has tried on three different occasions to obtain FCC permission to do so. While
BellSouth could offer long distance services to customers outside it nine-state
operating territory it has chosen not to. Because Southern Bell's
telecommunications service is now limited to service within its LATA, the
Charleston to Greenville call is now carried by BellSouth to its interface with
the long distance carrier, which then takes the call to Greenville; there the call
is carried to its terminus by BellSouth. To give another example, in an
intrastate call from Columbia to Charleston, the call (1) originates in Columbia,
where BellSouth carries it to its interface with the long distance carrier
(sometimes called an interexchange carrier), (2) is carried to a Charleston
interface by the long distance carrier, and (3) is carried it to its end by
BellSouth. In the above example the long distance carrier charges the phone
user for the whole call (perhaps $1.22 for a three minute call), which includes

311. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 569 F. Supp 990 (D.C. 1983).
312. United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 227-228.
313. Id. at 131.
314. To avoid these charges, some carriers are going so far as to build their own
networks or pursue the use of cable T.V. facilities.
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the access charge paid to BellSouth (perhaps $.49 for the three minute call).
After divestiture, BellSouth must provide access service to any long
distance carrier, and must provide this service under terms and conditions
established by the regulatory authorities-the FCC and the PSC. The
agreements between BellSouth and the long distance companies are imposed
by law in the form of FCC and PSC tariffs. BellSouth is not free to alter the
terms and conditions established by the tariffs,3" 5 and it is not free to refuse to
deal with any long distance carrier." 6 The relationship is legally imposed as
part of the regulatory framework of the country's telephone business.
Since divestiture, AT&T and the other long distance carriers have been free
to sell to BellSouth's large business customers by selling them intracompany
phone networks and providing them direct access to long distance service as
opposed to access through BellSouth. Today, literally hundreds of telephone
companies that did not exist even ten years ago operate throughout the
Southeast. They compete in every aspect of the telecommunications industry.
Because they are accessing BellSouth's services to operate, these companies
are not forced by any city to pay for business licenses or franchises-even
though many of them are deriving revenues from customers in almost every
South Carolina municipality. As radically as the industry changed in the late
1980s, however, unheard of leaps in technology and Congressional reaction
brought about even more radical change before the century came to a close.
B. The TelecommunicationsAct of 1996: The NationalFranchisefor
Telecommunications
Congress established national jurisdiction and federal regulation over
telecommunications to avoid the "practical difficulties inhering in state by state
regulation of parts of an organic whole."3 '7 As noted earlier, Congress granted
the FCC the authority to regulate "interstate and foreign commerce in wire and
radio communication."3 ' 8 However, Congress permitted state regulation to
continue. Although state Public Service Commissions continued to fix
intrastate rates and cities still imposed franchise fees, Congress could end state
and local regulation at will under the commerce power."
During the dual-regulation period, state and local governments viewed the
telecommunications industry as a traditional public utility that enjoyed
substantial freedom from competition, special governmental privileges, and a
guaranteed rate of return. However, many states and municipalities subjected
the industry to special taxes (e.g., statewide utility gross receipts taxes) and

315. American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Central Office Tel., 524 U.S. 214, 227 (1998).
316. 552 F. Supp. 131, 227-228 (D.C. 1982).
317. General Tel. Co. v. FCC, 413 F.2d 390,398 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
318. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (Supp. 1I 1997).
319. 47 U.S.C. § 152(b) (Supp. 11997); Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476
U.S. 355,360 (1986).
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local franchise fees.320 The special taxes, at times, were justified as a return for
the special rights and privileges the state and localities had granted, such as the
power of eminent domain and the right to use the public rights-of-way. At other
times, states and localities justified the special charges on the pragmatic ground
that the utility was able to pass the charges along to its customers. In many
cases, states also singled out utilities for higher rates under more general taxes,
such as the property tax,32 ' the state license tax on utilities' property and gross
receipts,3" and sales and use taxes. 3" The classic telephone monopoly was thus
an important source of revenue for state and local government.
For more than sixty years Congress dealt with telecommunications as a
vital national asset that required strong regulation to promote and protect the
public interest and national defense. A regulated legal monopoly, of course,
charges the rate fixed by the regulatory authorities.3" The regulatory authorities
may set the rate high enough to allow the company to eam excess revenues that
are available for other purposes. For many years the federal regulatory scheme
allowed telephone companies to earn long distance revenues that could be used
to subsidize universal service at the local level.
However, in recent years new telecommunications technology has rapidly
replaced the industry's traditional network. The old system based on poles and
wires has quickly turned into a modem one based on microwaves, fiber-optic
technology, and satellites. The system now transmits, in addition to voice, a
variety of data and video. Consequently, the traditional regulated monopoly is
no longer an effective legal framework to release the potential of available
telecommunications technology for the benefit of consumers and business. In
th. 1990s Congress came to the realization that "[t]echnological advances
would be more rapid aad services would be more widely available and at lower
prices if telecommunications markets were competitive rather than regulated
monopolies." 3'
1. The Removal of Barriers and the Prohibitionof Discrimination
Among New Entrants
In 1996, following years of debate, Congress created a new legal
framework to carry out an updated national telecommunications policy. The
Telecommunications Act of 1996326 was designed "to provide for a pro-

320. See BROOKs, supra note 7, at 297.
321. S.C. CONST. art. X, § 1, cl. 1 (imposing a 10.5% ratio assessment on utilities).
322. S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-20-100 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1999).
323. S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-36-910 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1999) (imposing a tax on
telecommunications services although services are not generally included in the sales tax that
is imposed on selling tangible personal property at retail).
324. See generally Livia Solange West, Deregulating Telecommunicaions: The
Conflict Between Competition and UniversalService, 9 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 159 (1996).
325. H.R. REp.No. 104-204, at 48 (1995).
326. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996).
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competitive, de-regulatory national policy framework designed to accelerate
rapidly private sector deployment of advanced telecommunications and
information technologies and services to all Americans by opening all
telecommunications markets to competition.' 327 The 1996 law prohibits any
local burdens or discriminatory costs directed against the provision of
telecommunications services. 328 The Conference Report reveals that the Act "is
intended to remove all barriersto entry in the provision of telecommunications
services,"329 and in the spirit of free competition, Senator Hollings declared "let
the games begin. 33 1 The Act recognizes, in short, that the citizen-consumer is
entitled to a more accountable system-one in which taxes are called taxes and
phone bills are for phone services alone.
The Telecommunications Act imposes a series of duties on carriers to
promote competition. The local company must provide competitors
(1) interconnection;33 (2) "unbundled access" (i.e., access to the individual
elements of the local phone company's network); 332 and (3) "resale options"
(i.e., the sale to competitors, at wholesale rates, any service the local phone
company provides to its customers at retail rates to allow competitors to resell
the services). 333 When a competing carrier requests that the local phone
company provide interconnection, unbundled access, or resale, both parties
have a duty to negotiate in good faith the terms and conditions of an
agreement. 3 If they fail to reach an agreement, either party may petition the
State Utility Commission to arbitrate and resolve open questions.335 The final
agreement, however accomplished, must be approved by the State
Commission.336
The Supreme Court has described the background and purpose of the
Telecommunications Act as follows:
Until the 1990s, local phone service was thought to be a
natural monopoly. States typically granted an exclusive
franchisein each local service area to a local exchange carrier
(LEC), which owned, among other things, the local loops
(wires connecting telephones to switches), the switches
(equipment directing calls to their destinations), and the
transport trunks (wires carrying calls between switches) that
constitute a local exchange network. Technological advances,

327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.

S. REP. No. 104-230, at I (1996).
Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 253(a), 110 Stat. at 70 (1996).
S. REP. No. 104-230, at 126 (emphasis added).
141 CONG. REc. S8174 (daily ed. June 12, 1995).
47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(2) (Supp. III 1997).
Id. § 251(c)(3).
Id. § 251(c)(4).
Id. § 251(c)(1).
Id. § 252(a)(2).
Id. § 252(e)(1).
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however, have made competition among multiple providers
of local service seem possible, and Congress recently ended
the longstanding regime of state-sanctioned monopolies.
The Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-104,
110 Stat. 56 (1996 Act or Act) fundamentally restructures
local telephone markets. States may no longer enforce laws
that impede competition, and incumbentLECs aresubject to
a host ofduties intended tofacilitatemarket entry. Foremost
among these duties is the LEC's obligation under 47 U.S.C.
§ 251(c) (1994 ed., Supp. II) to share its network with
competitors.337

The Federal policy of facilitating competition in telecommunications services
in order to reduce consumer costs and encourage invention is discussed further
below.
Section 253(a) of the Act comprehensively preempts any state or local law
or requirement that could prohibit the provision of telecommunication
services.33 Indeed, section 253(a) is so broad that, as Senator Hollings reports,
the states and mayors went to Congress and said: "Wait a minute, that sounds
good but we have the responsibilities [in some specific situations to regulate in
the public interest] .... So what about that? How are we going to do our job
'
In
with that overencompassing general section (a) you have there[?]"339
response Congress drafted four exceptions to section 253(a)'s preemption. The
four exceptions are discussed in the following subsections of this Article.
The term "telecommunications" is defined broadly under the Act, and
clearly includes wireless communication. 31 "Telecommunications service" is
defined as the "offering of telecommunications for a fee directly to the public,
effectively available directly to the public,
or to such classes of users as to be
34 1
regardless of the facilities used."5
Under the Act, BellSouth Telecommunications is authorized to provide
service anywhere in the country because federal law preempts any state or local
requirement that "may prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the ability of
any entity to provide any interstate and intrastate telecommunications
service."" The traditional city franchise, which was based on the power to

337. AT&T v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 371 (1999) (emphasis added).
338. 47 U.S.C. § 253 is titled "Removal of barriers to entry." Section 253(a) states:
"No state or local statute or regulation, or other state or local legal requirement, may prohibit or
have the effect of prohibiting the ability of any entity to provide any interstate or intrastate
telecommunications service."
339. 141 CONG. REc. S8174 (daily ed. June 12, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hollings).
340. "[The] transmission, between or among points specified by the user, of
information of the user's choosing, without change in the form or content of the information as
sent and received." 47 U.S.C. § 153(43) (Supp. 1I 1997).
341. 47 U.S.C. § 153(46) (Supp. 1111997).
342. Id. § 253(a).
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exclude a company, is thus preempted by this Act. Otherwise, one city could
hold hostage the entire national and international telecommunications network.
Senator Pressler explained that because this Act would not allow cities and
states to exclude service, the Act would remove the cost and uncertainty of
endlessly lobbying state legislatures and city councils:
Ifour companies and our investors have the uncertainty of not
knowing what every city will do, of not knowing what every
State will do and each State legislature and each city council
may change, the companies will be in the position of having
to endlessly lobby city officials and State officials on these
issues-not only that, at any time certainty is taken out, thus
discouraging investment. 43
Any cost imposed by a state or local government on a provider burdens the
company and may discourage it from entering, or staying, in a market; such
costs are thus prohibited by section 253(a). 344 But not all costs are forbidden.
Congress did not intend to exempt the industry from laws that apply equally to
all or from taxes that other businesses in the community pay. These costs,
unlike special or discriminatory charges, are part of the normal expenses of
doing business.
Section253(a), therefore, does notbar aproperty tax that applies a uniform
rate to all property assessed in the same manner. But if a state imposes a higher
millage on telecommunications property than another business property, or
values it in a different way, the state will violate section 253(a). Similarly, other
general taxes-like a sales and use tax or a corporate income tax-are valid
unless they are manipulated in some way to single out, or target,
telecommunications providers. Section 253(a) bars discrimination against any
particular telecommunications provider as well as discrimination against the
industry as a whole.
In enacting section 253(a), Congress reserved only four areas for continued
state and local regulatory authority. The four sections are (1) section 253(b)
(authorizing nondiscriminatory state regulation of specified areas); (2) section
253(c) (authorizing state or local government to manage the public rights-ofway and charge for the cost of this management); (3) section 253(e)
(authorizing state regulation of the terms and conditions of mobile service but
not entry or rates charged); and (4) section 253(f) (authorizing states to
continue to control entry in rural markets). 45 Each of these reservations are
discussed below.
2. The FirstReservation: State Regulation
343. 141 CONG. Rac. 58176 (daily ed. June 12, 1995) (statement of Sen. Pressler).
344. 47 U.S.C. § 253(a) (Supp. II 1997).
345. 47 U.S.C. § 253 (Supp. M 1997).
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Section 253(b) permits the state to impose, "on a competitively neutral
basis," requirements that are "necessary to (1)preserve and advance universal
service; (2) protect the public safety and welfare; (3) ensure the continued
quality of telecommunications services; and (4) safeguard the rights of
consumers." 3" Except for a cost imposed on companies "to preserve and
advance universal service," such state requirements would not appear to
prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the ability of companies to provide
telecommunications services.
As the Court noted inAT&T Communications,Inc. v. City ofDallas,cities
have no authority under section 253(b) unless the state legislature expressly
grants it to them. 3 47 The federal district court in Dallasfound:
The language of § 253 is straightforward. Absent explicit
delegation by the state legislature, cities do not have the more
general authority to regulate to protect public safety and
welfare, advance universal service and ensure quality-this
is a function reserved to states by § 253(b), not to local
governments. 3"
The South Carolina legislature has not delegated any authority to its cities
pursuant to section 253(b), nor is it likely to do so as these are functions already
provided by the state Public Service Commission.
3. The Second Reservation: Cost Reimbursement
Section 253(c) allows state or local governments to (1) manage public
rights-of-way in a nondiscriminatory manner and (2) demand compensation for
doing so by companies that use the rights-of-way. This reservation is designed
to forestall the argument that a city managing its rights-of-way in the normal
course of business and recovering its costs is "prohibiting service" by doing so.
Section 253(c) provides for management cost reimbursement as follows:
(c) State and local government authority

346. Id. § 253(b) (numbering and punctuation added).
347. 8 F. Supp. 2d 582, 591 (N.D. Tex. 1998). The House version of section 253(b)
authorized both local and state governments to impose costs on telecommunications companies.
However, the conference committee adopted only the Senate version of section 253(b), which
grants authority to state governments alone. Comparesection 243 of H.R. 1555, 104th Cong.
§ 243 (1995), reprintedin 141 CONG. REc. H8427 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) with 47 U.S.C. 253
(Supp. 1 1997).
348. Dallas, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 591 (footnotes omitted); see also AT&T Comms., Inc.
v. City of Austin, 975 F. Supp. 928, 940 & n.10 (W.D. Tex. 1997) (recognizing that states may
"delegate local regulation ...
to local authorities," but maintaining that "it appears that Congress
did not anticipate that local governments would attempt to regulate telecommunications service
providers for the public good."). The City of Austin has appealed to the Fifth Circuit.
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Nothing in this section affects the authority of a State or local
government to manage the public rights-of-way or to require
fair and reasonable compensation from telecommunication
providers, on a competitively neutraland nondiscriminatory
basis,for use ofpublic rights-of-way on a nondiscriminatory
basis, if the compensation required is publicly disclosed by
such government.349
Congress likely felt compelled to add section 253(c) because it recognized that
an over-broad construction ofthat section, standing alone, might be interpreted
as limiting local police power to manage the rights-of-way. Ironically, the small
exception centered in section 253(c) has itself become the target of over-broad
interpretation by cities, which have used the exception to justify exorbitant
"franchise" fees that
actually have little or no relation to reimbursement for
350
management costs.
As SenatorHollings has explained, "we [Congress] wrote in there" section
253(c) to create a small exception allowing a city to recover the actual cost of
managing its rights-of-way.Y Senator Pressler added:
Are we going to allow the cities and the State to put up
barriers ofentry to telecommunications firms? In the past, we
have done so, with cable television. We have allowed cities
not only to add a franchise fee, but also to require certain
programming, and sometimes the companies do something
else for the city as an incentive.
In telephones, we have allowed our States to set up a
monopoly in the State and sometimes to collect certain things
or to put certain requirements on. In this bill, .. . we are
trying to deregulate, open up markets, and we are trying to let
the fresh air of competition come forward.3" 2
Since the enactment of section 253, a city has no authority to require a
franchise, franchise fee, or even the cost reimbursement allowed by section
253(c) from a telecommunications provider that does not use the city's rightsof-way. 3 Nonetheless, obdurate cities still try. For example, in 1997 the city
ofAustin, Texas adopted an ordinance requiring telecommunications providers

349. 47U.S.C. § 253(c) (Supp. 111 1997) (emphasis added).
350. See, e.g., BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. City of Orangeburg, No. 25009, 1999
WL 1037160, at *2 (S.C. Nov. 8, 1999).
351. 141 CONG. REc. S8174 (daily ed. June 12, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hollings).
352. 141 CONG. REc. S8176 (daily ed. June 12, 1995) (statement of Sen. Pressler).
353. AT&T Comms., Inc. v. City of Austin, 975 F. Supp. 928,941 (W.D. Tex. 1997)
("The City's only legitimate interest under federal and Texas law is to regulate its public rightsof-way, an interest that is in no way implicated by AT&T's activities in Austin."); see infra Part
IV.C.l.a.
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"to obtain municipal consent before operating telecommunications services in
' The consent application required a fee and also detailed corporate
the City."354
financial and technical information.355 Under the ordinance a company was
subject to criminal penalty and fines ifit failed to secure a municipal consent. 56
The federal district court noted that section 253(c) "reserves to municipalities
only the limited authority" to manage the rights-of-way andbe compensated for
costs incurred.357 The court found the municipal consent ordinance could not
be justified "under § 253(c) since AT&T is not installing or maintaining any
' The court found that the ordinance thus
facilities in the public rights-of-way. 358
"violates § 253(a) of the FTA [Federal Telecommunications Act] by flatly
like AT&T from providing local
prohibiting non-facilities-based providers
' 359
consent.
City's
the
without
service
Ifatelecommunications provider does use thepublic rights-of-way, a city's
franchise power is now largely formal. A city cannot exclude a company, and
consequently, it cannot deny a franchise based on its own arbitrary
discretion.360 The Dallascourt found that a city's "requirement that AT&T pay
four percent of the gross revenue from all of its activities in Dallas" was illegal
because it "contradicts the requirements of the FTA. '361 Consistent with the
FTA, a city is only entitled under 253(c) to reimbursement of its cost in
managing the rights-of-way attributable to AT&T's use: "In sum, any fee that
is not based on AT&T's use of City rights-of-way violates §253(a) ofthe FTA
as an economic barrier to entry."362
The 1996 Act does not define the term "fair andreasonable compensation"
used in section 253(c). However, courts have held that in order to be fair and
reasonable, the compensation must be tied to the carrier's use of the rights-ofway. 363 Fees based not on actual usage of rights-of-way but on overall profits
have been found not to be "fair and reasonable," as have requirements that the
carrier provide service elsewhere in the jurisdiction as a condition of gaining
use of public rights-of-way. 3 " For example, the court in Bell AtlanticMaryland,Inc. v. Prince George's County reasoned that "local governments
may not set their franchise fees above a level that is reasonably calculated to
compensate them for the costs of... maintaining and improving their public

354. Austin, 975 F. Supp. at 934.
355. Id. at 934-35.
356. Id. at 935.
357. Id.
358. Id.
359. Id. at 935-36.
360. AT&T Comms., Inc. v. City of Dallas, 8 F. Supp. 2d 582,592 (N.D. Tex. 1998).
361. Dallas, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 593.
362. Id.
363. Bell Atlantic-Maryland, Inc. v. Prince George's County, 49 F. Supp. 2d 805,817
(D. Md. 1999); City ofChattanooga v. BellSouthTelecomnis., Inc.,No. E1999-01573-COA-R3CV, slip op. at 6-7 (Tenn. Ct. App. filed Jan. 26, 2000).
364. Dallas, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 593.
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rights-of-way."
The original House version of section 243 contained a section 243(e),
entitled "Parity ofFranchise and Other Charges."3 This subsection, known as
the Schaefer amendment, provided that local government could not impose any
"franchise, license, permit, or right-of-way fee" that "distinguishes between or
among providers of telecommunication services. 367 That is, a locality could
impose a franchise fee-as an exception to the general prohibition of section
253(a)-provided it charged all carriers the same fee; a one-fee-franchise.
However, section 243(e) was deleted at the request of the mayors.
Representative Stupak, speaking for the mayors, explained that section 243(e)
did not allow for sufficient local control and stated that "local governments
must be able to distinguish between different telecommunication providers....
[The existing bill] states that local governments would have to charge the same
fee to every company, regardless of how much or how little they use the rightof-way or rip up our streets. 368 The Representative explained that local
governments must be able to distinguish between companies in certain cases
because "if a company plans to run 100 miles of trenching in our streets and
wires to all parts of the cities, it imposes a different burden on the right-of-way
than a company that just wants to string a wire across two streets to a couple
' Stupak's
of buildings."369
amendment passed the House by a 338 to 86 vote.37
By deleting the one-fee-franchise, the Stupak amendment removed the
statute's only express exception to section 253(a)'s prohibition of franchises
based on the power to exclude. The mayors preferred the power under section
253(c) allowing them to manage a city's rights-of-way and be compensated for
the cost thereof.37 ' Section 253(c) expressly requires the city to exercise its
authority "on a competitively neutral and nondiscriminatory basis."37 2 Because

365. Prince George's County, 49 F. Supp. 2d at 817. In denying a preliminary
injunction, a New York district court questioned the correctness of limiting local governments
to recovering their reasonable costs. Omnipoint Comms., Inc. v. Port Authority, No. 99 Civ.
0060(BJS), 1999 WL 494120 at *8 (S.D.N.Y. July 13,1999). As discussed below, however, cost
is the only available objective standard.
366. H.R. 1555, 104th Cong. § 243(e) (1995).
367. Id.
368. 141 CONG. REc. H8460 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Stupak).
369. Id.
370. Id. at H8477.
371. 47 U.S.C. § 253(c) (Supp. H 1997).
372. Id. The First Circuit, in Cablevision of Boston, Inc. v. PublicImprovement
Comm'n of Boston, 184 F.3d 88 (1st Cir. 1999), construed "competitively neutral and
nondiscriminatory" to mean that local authorities need not be required to "seek out opportunities
to level the telecommunications playing field." Id. at 105. However, ifa local authority "decides
to regulate for its own reasons (e.g., to minimize disruption to traffic patterns), § 253(c) would
require that it do so in a way that avoids creating unnecessary competitive inequities among
telecommunications providers." Id. The court upheld denial of a preliminary injunction sought
by Boston's cable monopoly against the city and its electric monopoly. Id. at 106. The cable
company maintained that the city discriminated by permitting Boston Edison to pull fiber-optic
cable through its existing conduitwithout hearing and notice while requiring no procedures when

Published by Scholar Commons, 2000

57

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 51, Iss. 2 [2000], Art. 5
2000]

HISTORY OF THE TELEPHONE BUSINESS IN SOUTH CAROLINA

347

a city, by the statute's express terms, cannot discriminate against a carrier, it
consistently must apply the same standard to all. A uniform fee would be
nondiscriminatory, but a city, in view of the specific legislative history deleting
the parity proposal, cannot impose a one-fee-franchise or right-of-way fee.
Consequently, as indicatedby Representative Stupak's floor comments and the
Dallascase, the standard must be tailored to the individual carrier's use of the
right-of-way. The only available objective standard is the city's actual cost
incurred because of the carrier's use of the right-of-way.
At least one federal district court, however, has taken a different view. In
TCG Detroitv. City ofDearbornthe court found that section 253(c) allows a
city to require a telecommunications provider to pay an annual franchise fee of
4% of gross revenues, "a $50,000 one time payment (in lieu of providing the
City with four fiber-optic strands), and up to $2500 of the costs incurred by the
City" in granting the franchise.373 The district court held the city franchise did
not violate section 253(a) because "[t]he City is not prohibiting TCG from
entry, rather, TCG has chosen not to pay for its access." 74 However, the district
court's conclusion is inconsistent with the language and history of section
253(a) and (c). A state or locality cannot, consistent with section 253(a),
exclude, regulate, or impose a special tax on a telecommunications provider. 75
In BellSouth Telecommunications,Inc. v. City of CoralSprings,a federal
district court in Florida recently held that a city could not impose a mandatory
buy-out provision in an ordinance because that would exclude the bought-out
company from providing telecommunications services in violation of section
253(a).17 1 The buy-out provision, the court concluded, was a barrier to the
provision of service and would "prohibit BellSouth from providing such
service77in the City, and is not a reasonable regulation to manage the rights-ofway.

3

The Telecommunications Act permits a city to manage its right-of-way if
state law so authorizes. However, the court in CoralSprings held the Act does
not permit the type of regulation attempted by Coral Springs. The court quoted
sections 253(b) and 253(c), which provide:
(b) State regulatory authority
Nothing in this section shall affect the ability of a State to
impose, on a competitively neutral basis and consistent with
section 254 of this title, requirements necessary to preserve
and advance universal service, protect the public safety and

ground had to be broken. Id. at 103.
373. 16 F. Supp. 2d 785, 787 (E.D. Mich. 1998). Both sides have appealed, and
arguments were heard by the Sixth Circuit on November 5, 1999.
374. Id. at 793.
375. 47 U.S.C. § 253(a) (Supp. II 1997).
376. 42 F. Supp. 2d 1304, 1311 (S.D. Fla. 1999).
377. Id.
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welfare, ensure the continued quality of telecommunications
services, and safeguard the rights of consumers.
(c) State and local government authority
Nothing in this section affects the authority of a State or local
government to manage the public rights-of-way or to require
fair and reasonable compensation from telecommunications
providers, on a competitively neutral and nondiscriminatory
basis, for use of public rights-of-way on a nondiscriminatory
basis, if the compensation required is publicly disclosed by
such government.378
The Coral Springs court noted that Congress distinguished between the
authority of the states in subsection (b) and local governments in subsection (c):
"While states may regulate universal service, protect consumers, ensure quality
and protect the public safety and welfare, localgovernmentscan only manage
thepublicrights-of-way,unless of course a state specifically delegated the state
'
authority to its local governments."379
Since before the turn of the century, Florida provided a statewide
franchise-pursuant to a statute similar to South Carolina Act No. 40 of
1899-to any telephone company. On May 20, 1997 Coral Springs passed
Ordinance 97-114, entitled "Telecommunications," which set out an extensive
regulatory scheme for telecommunications providers.38 Section 20-2 of the
Coral Springs ordinance required all operators oftelecommunications services
to obtain a franchise before constructing a telecommunications facility or
providing telecommunications services.381 Section 20-3 required (1) an annual
occupancy fee to recover an apportioned share of the cost to the city of
maintaining the rights-of-way used by the telecommunications provider, and
38 2
(2) a market value fee intended to reflect the value of the rights-of-way.
Section 20-4 provided for numerous restrictions on BellSouth's ability to use
the rights-of-way. 3 3 Section 20-6 provided for fines and the seizure of all
facilities in the event BellSouth did not apply for a franchise or violated the
franchise agreement. 31 Section 20-21 also required franchisees to comply
with
35
any universal service plan or quality standards the city may adopt.
Based on the "plain language of both the state and federal law" and the
Dallas decision, the CoralSprings court held that Coral Springs "can only

378. Id. at 1307 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 253(b)-(c) (Supp. III 1997)).
379. Id. (citing AT&T Comms. v. City of Dallas, 8 F. Supp. 2d 582, 591 (N.D. Tex.
1998)) (emphasis added).
380. Id.
381. Id.
382. Id.
383. Id.
384. Id. at 1310.
385. See generallyCoral Springs,42 F. Supp. 2d at 1309-11 (containing the court's
reaction to selected sections of the ordinance).

Published by Scholar Commons, 2000

59

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 51, Iss. 2 [2000], Art. 5
2000]

HISTORY OF THE TELEPHONE BUSINESS IN SOUTH CAROLINA

349

regulate the use of its rights-of-way."38 Hence, "those parts of Ordinance 97114 that do not deal directly with managing the rights-of-way must be struck
down on grounds of preemption. 387 The court quoted from In the Matter of
Classic Telephone,Inc.388 to the effect that a city can justify a requirement only
"if it can show that the requirement is 'an exercise of public rights-of-way
management authority or the imposition of compensation requirements for the
use of such rights of way."' 389

The court analyzed each section of the ordinance with an eye towards
striking any provisions that "do not deal directly with managing the rights-ofway. '390 The franchise requirement of section 20-2 was held valid but limited,
because a grant of a "franchise may only be conditioned on a company's
agreement to comply with the city's reasonable regulations of its rights-of-way
and the fees for use of those rights-of-way. ' 39 As the Dallas court found, "In
sum, any fee that is not based on AT&T's use of City
rights-of-way violates
'392
§ 253(a) of the FTA as an economic barrier to enty.
The CoralSprings court struck down section 20-4, through which the city
had claimed authority to require information concerning future plans, holding
that "[s]uch investigation into future plans of a telecommunications provider
go beyond
the allowable reasonable regulation of the management of the rights' 393
of-way. 2

The CoralSpringscourt preempted most of section 20-21 for requiring that
an applicant "submit proof of its financial, technical, and legal
qualifications. '39 The court noted that Dallas "specifically holds that such
requirements are unrelated to the
use of the rights-of-way, and thus beyond the
395
scope of municipal authority.,

The CoralSprings court also preempted subsection (4)(A) of the Coral
Springs ordinance because "it allows the City to review an applicant's
qualifications when reviewing a franchise application."3 96 The court again
noted that the "grant of a franchise must only be conditioned" on an agreement
to comply with reasonable right-of-way regulation and the fees for using those

386. Id. at 1309.
387. Id. (emphasis added).
388. 11 F.C.C.R. 13082 (1996) (cited by Orangeburg at p.12 of its Brief).
389. Id. 40 at 13103, quoted in Coral Springs,42 F. Supp. 2d at 1308 n.3.
390. CoralSprings, 42 F. Supp. 2d at 1309-11.
391. Id. at 1309 (citing AT&T Comms. v. City of Dallas, 8 F. Supp. 2d 582, 592-93
(N.D. Tex. 1998)).
392. Dallas, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 593.
393. CoralSprings, 42 F. Supp. 2d at 1309-10. Sections 3 and 4 of the Orangeburg
ordinance recently upheld by the South Carolina Supreme Court are similar to the provision
struck down in Coral Springs. See BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. City of Orangeburg, No.
25009, 1999 WL 1037160, at *3 (S.C. Nov. 8, 1999).
394. Coral Springs, 42 F. Supp.2d at 1310.
395. Id. (citing Dallas,8 F. Supp. 2d at 593).

396. Id.
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rights-of-way.397 The court also preempted the ordinance's claimed power to
impose universal service requirements, stating "Coral Springs cannot include
within a franchise398
the reservation to comply with any universal service plan the
City may adopt."
South Carolina has over two hundred municipalities, any or all of which
could pass ordinances similar to that of Coral Springs. The essential question,
as the court inDiginet,Inc. v. Western Union ATS, Inc. posed it, is whether the
modem telecommunications industry can withstand the burden and regulation
of such local ordinances."'
4. The Third andFourthReservations
Section 253 includes two further reservations to the all-encompassing
prohibition of state and local impediments to competition contained in section
253(a).
First, section 253(e) provides that "nothing in this section shall affect the
application of section 332(c)(3) of this title to commercial mobile service
providers. '" Section 332(c)(3) provides that "no State or local government
shall have any authority to regulate the entry of or the rates charged by any
commercial mobile service or any private mobile service," but a state may
regulate "the other terms and conditions of commercial mobile services. 4 1
Section 253(a), by its own terms, like section 332(c)(3), would prohibit any
state effort to regulate either entry or rates for commercial mobile services.
Without the reservations in 253(e), section 253(a) would also preempt the
state's ability to regulate "other terms and conditions."4
Second, section 253(f) provides that "it shall not be a violation of this
section for a State to require a telecommunications carrier" that seeks to serve
a rural market (defined by section 214(e)) to be an "eligible
telecommunications carrier."'4 3 Section 214 reserves to the states the power to
designate an "eligible telecommunications carrier" if the state finds it consistent
with the "public interest, convenience, and necessity."4 4 Consequently, section
253(f) preserves the state's ability to limit competition in rural markets by
failing to designate a carrier. In all other markets section 253(a) denies a state
the power to exclude a provider. 40'
Congress recognized the broad sweep and comprehensive preemption that

397. Id.
398. Id. at 1311.

J.).

399. Diginet, Inc. v. Western Union ATS, Inc., 958 F.2d 1388 (7thCir. 1992) (Posner,

400. 47 U.S.C. § 253(e) (Supp. M 1997).
401. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(3) (Supp. 1 1997).
402. Id.
403. 47 U.S.C. § 253(f) (Supp. 1111997).

404. 47 U.S.C. § 214(e)(2) (Supp. III 1997).
405. See 47 U.S.C. § 253(e)-(f) (Supp. I 1997).
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it had written into section 253(a). While legislators debated the bill, governors
and mayors provided examples of special cases to show where it was necessary
to preserve some state and local control. In response, Congress drafted the four
specific exceptions discussed above to cover these situations.
The House Report summarizes the purpose of the Act:
Technological advances would be more rapid and services
would be more widely available and at lower prices if
telecommunications markets were competitive rather than
regulated monopolies. Consequently, the Communications
Act of 1995 opens all communications services to
competition. The result will be lower prices to consumers and
businesses, greater choice of services, more innovation, a
competitive edge for American businesses, and less
regulation. Indeed, the enormous benefits to American
businesses and consumers from lifting the shackles of
monopoly regulation will almost certainly earn the
Communications Act of 1995 the distinction of being the
most deregulatory bill in history.'
What has indeedbeen called the most "deregulatory bill in history" was written
to bar discriminatory taxes, period. If the Act is not so enforced, its purpose is
lost; it will not engender "lower prices to consumers and businesses, greater
choice of services, more innovation, [or] a competitive edge for American
businesses.
C. South CarolinaBusiness License Tax LitigationH1
1. The 1997 and 1998 Municipal Association Ordinances and
EnsuingLitigation
As noted above, in 1997 the South Carolina Supreme Court held in City of
Cayce v. AT&T Communications that the state legislature cannot grant a
company "the right to construct and operate in a public street a... telephone
[utility] ...without first obtaining the consent of the governing body of the
municipality." 8 The court found that "a municipality may require payment of
a fee as a condition of permitting a telephone utility to construct and operate
[lines] using the city's streets." 9
In late 1997 the Municipal Association of South Carolina recommended

406. H.R. REP. No. 104-204, pt. 1, at48 (1995).
407. Id.
408. City of Cayce v. AT&T Comms., 326 S.C. 237,242,486
(quoting Article VIII, § 15 of the 1895 South Carolina Constitution).
409. City of Cayce, 326 S.C. at 242,486 S.E.2d at 94.
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a model ordinance to its members (hereinafter "Consent Ordinance"). The
Association believed the Consent Ordinance properly implemented the Cayce
decision. A number of municipalities adopted the Consent Ordinance in the
first part of 1998, including Whitmire (January) and Orangeburg (May).
Section 1 provides:
Sec. 1 Permissionto use streets required.
It shall be unlawful for any person to construct, install,
maintain or operate in, on, above or under any street right-ofway or public place under control of the municipality any
line, pipe, cable, pole, structure or facility for utilities,
communications, Cablevision or other purposes without a
consent agreement or franchise agreement issued by the
municipal council by ordinance which prescribes the term,
fees and conditions for use.410
Section 2 provides that the annual consent or franchise fee shall be set by the
ordinance approving the agreement and shall be based on gross revenues.4 1 No
consent or franchise fee shall be construed to be in lieu of a business license tax
unless specifically provided by ordinance.412 Section 2 also provides for a
business license tax of 3% of gross receipts imposed on telephone companies
not using public streets under a franchise or consent agreement.1 3 Telephone
companies are defined-as described in Standard Industrial Classification
(SIC) group 481-as companies that, among other things, provide local and
long distance service and cellular services. 4 The 3% tax is imposed on "all
communications activities conducted in the municipality and for
communications services billed to customers located in the municipality
on
415
which a business license tax has not been paid to another municipality.
Section 253(a) of the Telecommunications Act provides that no state or
city legal requirement "may prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting" the
ability of any entity to provide telecommunications services. 4 6 In other words,
section 253(a) preempts the city's power to exclude such entities. Nevertheless,
section 1 of the Consent Ordinance unmistakably claims the power to exclude
by providing that it is illegal for telephone companies to operate without the
city's consent.417 The Model Consent Ordinance-and the Cayce Ordinance on
which it was based-thus clearly conflict with federal law, despite the court's

410. Orangeburg, S.C., Ordinance 1998-7 (May 5, 1998).

411. Id.

412. Id. at§ 2.
413. Id.
414. MUNICIPALASSOCIATIONOFSOUTH CAROLINA, BUSINESS LICENSING HANDBOOK

A-9 (1997 Revised) [hereinafter HANDBOOK].
415. 47 U.S.C. § 253(a) (Supp. 1111997).

416. Id.
417. See Orangeburg, S.C., Ordinance 1998-7, § 1 (May 5, 1998).
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holding in Cayce."8
In July of 1998 the Municipal Association recommended to its members
a model ordinance entitled "Amending the Business License Ordinance
Levying a Business License Tax or Telecommunications" (hereinafter
"Business License Ordinance"). Section 1 of this ordinance also categorizes
telecommunications providers according to SIC 481. This section defines the
tax base as "gross receipts from all communications activities conducted in the
municipality and for communications services billed to customers located in the
municipality on which a business license tax has not been paid to another
municipality." Further, the tax is due on December 31 and the "penalty for
delinquent payments shall be 5% of the tax due each month." Section 2
provides that existing exemptions from interstate commerce are repealed, and
that gross income from interstate commerce is included for every business
subject to a license tax. Section 3 approves, "in the form attached," an
Agreement with the Municipal Association for collection of current and
delinquent license taxes.4' 9 Approximately 200 municipalities adopted the
Business License Ordinance in July and August of 1998.
Before its 1997 and 1998 telecommunications ordinances the Municipal
Association recommended a Sample SIC Business License Ordinance to its
members.42 The Municipal Association describes the design of the first seven
classes of Model Ordinance as follows:
A sample ordinance using the classification system based
on SIC code groups assembled accordingto indexes of ability
to pay is included in Appendix A. The sample ordinance is
based on 1987 SIC Manual codes and 1991 IRS statistics.
Use of this sample ordinance requires a basic understanding
of the concept and necessity for maintaining the integrity of
the system.
The following steps used to develop the classification
systembased on indexes of ability to pay explain the basis for
the system:
1. Businesses were grouped according to major groups in
the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Manual,
1987, published by the United States Office of
Management and Budget. Each business is required to
indicate the appropriate SIC number on federal tax
returns.
2. IRS statistics on nationwide business income published

418. City of Cayce v. AT&T Comms., 326 S.C. 237,242,486 S.E.2d92, 94 (1997).
Again, the Telecommuncations Act's requirements were not addressed by the court in Cayce.
419. MuNiCiPALASSOCIATIONOF SOUTH CAROLINA, MODEL ORDiNANcE MASC-50,
98-002; see also infra Part IV.C.1.f.
420. See HANDBOOK, supranote 414, at A-I.,
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periodically through the Government Printing Office
were used to calculate a ratio or index of ability to make
a profit for each SIC group to be included in the business
license ordinance.42

The Municipal Association recites that the basic approach of4 the
Model
2
Ordinance "has been ruled constitutional by the Supreme Court." 1
The Town of Whitmire's 1994 ordinance follows the Model Ordinance. It
defines a "classification" at section 10-2 as: "C. 'Classification' means that
division of businesses by major groups subject to the same license rate as
determined by a calculated index of ability to pay based on national averages,
benefits, equalization of tax burden, relationships of services, or other basis
deemed appropriate by Town Council."
The uniform objective standard applied to other taxpayers is the
"calculated index of ability to pay." Under this index, the telephone business
would fall in Rate Class Four, which is composed of the following business
groups (preceded by their SIC number): "27: Printing, Publishing & Allied
Products; 28: Chemicals and Allied Products; 35: Machinery (except
Electrical); 48: Communication (except Telephone); 76: Miscellaneous Repair
Services." The rates for Class Four are $175.00 for the first $2,000 of gross
income and $1.60 per $1,000 for each additional $1,000.425 Declining rates
apply where income exceeds $1,000,000 (e.g., only 75% of the normal rate is
payable on amounts in excess of $9,000,000). A Class Four business that
earned $1,000,000 of gross income would pay a license tax of $1,147.70.
Based on this comparison, a City of Aiken 3% business license tax on
telephone companies was held unconstitutional by the state supreme court,
which declared "we look no further than the disproportionality just noted and
the lack of a rational basis therefor in concluding that a denial of equal
protection has here occurred. ' 426 The Aiken court applied the following
standard to telecommunications companies:
The record reveals that the City of Aiken in 1979 adopted a
revised licensing ordinance. Seven classifications of business
were designated and rates of taxation established for each
category. This portion of the ordinance was drafted for the
City of Aiken by a consulting firm. An eighth category was

421. HANDBOOK, supranote 414, at 48.
422. Id. (citing Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Aiken, 279 S.C. 269, 306
S.E.2d 220 (1983); see North Charleston Land Corp. v. North Charleston, 281 S.C. 470, 316
S.E.2d 137 (1984)).
423. See also HANDBOOK, supranote 414, at A-1.
424. Id. at A-14.
425. Id. at A-7.
426. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Aiken, 279 S.C. 269,273,306 S.E.2d
220, 222 (1983).

Published by Scholar Commons, 2000

65

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 51, Iss. 2 [2000], Art. 5
2000]

HISTORY OF THE TELEPHONE BUSINESS IN SOUTH CAROLINA

355

thereafter created which, in the words of the trial court,
presented a "hodge podge" assortment of occupations and
businesses. We are struck by the fact that at no point does the
trial court find any rational basis for this residual
classification nor does the record, in our view, support it.
Even more striking is the undisputed fact that the appellant
was taxed at twenty-four (24) times the average rate imposed
upon other businesses under the ordinance.427
The drafter of the Model Ordinance even testified that telephone
companies would be classified in Class Four if the uniform standard is applied
to them. "Q:[Southem Bell Attorney] So if it had not been for the franchise,
and by applying the standard national data that you used, that is the industry
grouping and the profitability, the net profit ratio, Southern Bell would have
been in rate Class Four, is that correct? A: [Mr. G. C. Robinett, Jr., draftsman
of the Model Ordinance] That is correct."428 Unsurprisingly, the court found
that Aiken's ordinance did not afford Equal Protection of the law because it did
not apply the same standard to all taxpayers.429
a. Section 253 Preempts the MunicipalAssociationOrdinances
and Cayce
The Telecommunications Act of 1996, discussed at Part IV.B, does not
preempt a business license tax that treats telecommunications as it treats other
businesses. However, it does preempt ordinances that discriminate against
telecommunications providers, like the 1997 and 1998 Municipal Association
Ordinances. Courts in other jurisdictions have correctly interpreted the Act as
prohibiting similar ordinances.
AT&T Communications of the Southwest, Inc. v. City of Austin43 ° is the
clearest holding on the meaning of section 253(a)."3 There the court held that
section 253(a) preempts a city consent agreement requirement (including a
detailed financial disclosure or a quarterly franchise fee requirement) that is
imposed on a provider that does not use the city's rights-of-way. 2 The court
also held that the state regulation exception contained in section 253(b) and the
cost reimbursement exception of section 253(c) did not apply. Section 253(c)
was inapplicable because it reserves power for the state, not the city, to

427. Id. at 273, 306 S.E.2d at 222.
428. Transcript of Record at 71, Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Aiken, 279
S.C. 269,306 S.E.2d 220 (1983) (No. 79-CP-02-860).
429. Aiken, 279 S.C. at 271, 306 S.E.2d at 221.
430. 975 F. Supp. 928 (W.D. Tex. 1997).
431. Id. at 933-34 ("AT&T will use SWBT's [Southwestern Bell Telephone's]
existing facilities and will not install, operate, maintain, or repair any telecommunications
facilities in the City's public rights-of-way.").
432. Id. at 939.
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determine whether a particular entity is fit to serve.433 Section 253(c) was
inapplicable because there was no "use" of the rights-of-way-AT&T was
simply reselling services purchased from Southwestern Bell Telephone
[SWBT].434 The court found section 253(c) reserves only limited authority to
cities: "The City's interest in regulating local telephone service providers is
limited by federal and state law to managing and demanding compensation for
the use ofthe City's public rights-of-way., 435 The city argued that its ordinance
was a small burden that did not amount to exclusion. The court disagreed,
stating "the threat of criminal sanctions and fines for the failure of an entity 436
to
obtain municipal consent can indubitably only be described as a prohibition.,
TheAustin holding shows thatneither section 253(b) nor section 253(c) creates
any additional rights; rather, both limit the power of states and municipalities
to assess fees.
Another Texas case, AT&T Communicationsofthe Southwest, Inc. v. City
ofDallas,437 involved a provider who intended to use the city's rights-of-way.
The federal district court in Dallasemphasized the provider's actual use ofthe
rights-of-way, noting "in sum, any fee that is not based on AT&T's use of City
rights-of-way violates section 253(a) of the FTA as an economic barrier to
' The court reconciled sections 253 (a) and 253 (c)
entry."438
by holding that a city
may require a franchise to use the rights-of-way, but the requirement is largely
formal; the city cannot condition the franchise on anything "other than AT&T's
agreement to comply with the City's reasonable regulations of its rights-of-way
and the fees for use of these rights-of-way. ' 43 9 The court's reconciliation is
incomplete because the use of the term "fees" is not based on the statute. The
emphasis on actual use by the provider is consistent with a cost reimbursement
approach, but the term "fee" is not. Unfortunately, the district court leaves the
issue up in the air, asserting that "it is not necessary for the Court to determine
at this time what would constitute a reasonable fee for the use of rights of
way."
The Dallas court held that the city had no power to require a
comprehensive application or a fee of 4% of gross revenues.4' But the dictum
concerning a "reasonable fee" is vague and the facts are limiting: the "vast
majority" of facilities needed by AT&T were to be SWBT lines obtained by
arrangement with SWBT.44 The SWBT agreement called for AT&T to pay its

433. Id. at 939-40 n.10 (suggesting that although § 253 does not preempt all local
regulatory power, suchpoweris limitedby the specifications of§ 253(c)); seesupraPart IV.B.2.
434. Austin, 975 F. Supp. at 942-43.
435. Id. at 942-43.
436. Id. at 939.
437. 8 F. Supp. 2d 582 (N.D. Tex. 1998).
438. Id. at 593; see supra Part IV.B.3.
439. Dallas, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 586.
440. Id. at 593.

441. Id.
442. Id. at 587.
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pro rata share of SWBT's franchise fee." 3 The court said it would be "double
billing" to also charge AT&T a franchise fee on the resale revenues.'
On the other hand, Judge Zatkoff in TCG Detroit v. City ofDearborn"5
upheld a Dearborn ordinance requiring a telecommunications provider to enter
into a franchise agreement including, among other obligations, a new entrant
franchise fee of4% of gross revenues by stating that "the City is not prohibiting
the TCG from entry, rather, TCG has chosen not to pay for its access."' Judge
Zatkoff apparently read section 253(a) to mean that city can prohibit a
telecommunications provider if it does so in a nondiscriminatory and
reasonable way. However, the comprehensive terms of section 253(a) bar all
prohibitions, including nondiscriminatory and reasonable ones. Thus, the
Dearbornconstruction of section 253(a) is in error.
The statutory language "fair and reasonable compensation" is
understandable if "compensation" means cost. "Fair and reasonable" modify
cost to require that the city's costs that will be reimbursed are reasonably
connected with the provider's use of the rights-of-way. But if "compensation"
is read to mean rent, or otherwise allows profit to the city, the statute becomes
self-contradictory. Unlike the fair market rental of a piece of land that can be
determined in a private market, rights-of-way are unique assets for which no
market exists. "Fair and reasonable," without statutory standards, is wholly
subjective. The judge can say, as Judge Zatkoff did in Dearborn,that he will
determine its meaning "by examining the totality of the facts and
circumstances,"' 7 but both the selection of facts and circumstances he will
examine and the amount of weight he will give to them are subjective. Judge
Zatkoff wrote, "[f]irst, there is nothing inappropriate with the city charging
compensation, or 'rent,' for the City owned property that the Plaintiff seeks to
appropriate for its private use. The statutespecifically allows it.' " However,
the statute clearly does not specifically allow a city to charge rent. Because
there is no way to objectively determine "fair and reasonable," reading the
statute to allow "fees" or "rent" deprives section 253 and the
Telecommunications Act of purpose.
Section 253(c), if read apart from its historical context and statutory
purpose, could have three meanings, depending on how "compensation" is
viewed:
(1) "fair and reasonable" rental.The main problem with this
reading is that rights-of-way are unique and do not trade in a
443. Id. at 593.
444. Id.
445. 16 F. Supp. 2d 785 (E.D. Mich. 1998) (currently on appeal in the Sixth Circuit).
The district held that while the ordinance could be enforced against a new entrant it could not
be enforced against the incumbent local exchange carrier, Ameritech. Id. at 791.
446. Id. at 793; see supra Part IV.B.3.
447. Id. at 789.
448. Id. (emphasis added).
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normal market. There is no objective standard.
(2) "fair and reasonable" fee. The lack of an objective
standard is even more pronounced in the case of a reasonable
fee. Judges, in the absence of statutory guidance, have no
competence to determine reasonable fees.
(3) "fair and reasonable" recovery ofcost. This is the correct
reading. The city is allowed to recover its costs incurred that
are attributable to a particular provider, but it must be
reasonable in what costs it assigns to the provider.
A proper construction of section 253(c) should also incorporate its
legislative history, which required parity between all franchise and right-of-way
fees or rental and "any other charge or equivalent thereof as a condition for
operating in the locality."" 9 Representative Stupak successfully argued that
local government needed to be able to distinguish between providers since it
is unfair "to charge the same fee to every company, regardless of how much or
how little they use the right-of-way or rip up our streets."45 The House
consequently rejected a one-fee-franchise or right-of-way fee. Section 253(c),
as proposed by Stupak and as enacted, requires that any city action be
nondiscriminatory. In view of the legislative history, cities cannot comply with
the nondiscriminatory requirement by charging flat fees, as the 1997 and 1998
Municipal Association Ordinances attempt to do by requiring that all providers
pay 3% of gross receipts. 5' Instead, cities must apply the same standard
consistently to all providers. The cost recovery interpretation is the only
approach that satisfies the statutory language and history, and the only one that
is subject to an objective standard.
b. Commerce Clause
In Complete Auto Transit,Inc. v. Brady the United States Supreme Court
held the Commerce Clause requires (1) a substantial nexus with the taxing
state, and (2) proper apportionment of the income to the taxing jurisdiction. In
other words, a state may not tax interstate activities carried on outside the
state's borders.45 The 1997 Municipal Association ordinance imposes a
business license tax of"3% ofgross receipts from all communications activities
conducted in the municipality and for communications services billed to
customers located in the municipality on which a business license tax has not

449. H.R. 1555, 104th Cong. § 243(e) (1995).
450. 141 CONG. REC. H 8460 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Stupak).
451. But see BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. Orangeburg, No. 25009, 1999 WL
1037160, at *4 (S.C. Nov. 8, 1999) (finding a flat fee of 5% of gross receipts nondiscriminatory,
noting "BellSouth is the only telephone service provider required to pay these fees because it is
the only telephone service provider that holds a franchise for private use of the public streets.").
452. 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
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been paid to another municipality." 45 3 The 1997 ordinance thus fails both
Commerce Clause tests.454
In Goldberg v. Sweet4 5 the United States Supreme Court sustained the
Illinois Telecommunications Excise Tax, which was imposed on the "act or
privilege of originating" or "receiving... interstate telecommunications... in
[the] State at the rate of 5% of the gross charge for [the]
' The tax applied only to calls charged to an
telecommunications."456
Illinois
service address regardless of where the call was billed or paid.4 17 The Illinois
Act provided a credit to any taxpayer on proof that the taxpayer had paid a tax
on the same call in another state.45 The plaintiffs argued that the Illinois Act
violated the Commerce Clause because "Illinois is attempting to tax the entire
cost of an interstate act which has taken place only partially in Illinois. 459
However, if apportionment were required, how could it be done? The Court
found the tax internally consistent "for if every State taxed only those interstate
phone calls [which begin or end in Illinois and] which are charged to an in-state
service address, only one State would tax each interstate phone call."" ° The
Court found only a small possibility of multiple taxation. If a second state taxed
the origination or termination of an interstate call billed or paid in that state, it
was possible that a call from an Illinois subsidiary to its headquarters in the
second state would be subject to two state taxes if the headquarters paid the
bill."' However, the risk was obviously remote and the credit was available to
avoid actual multiple taxation.
The question of external consistency "asks whether the State has taxed
only that portion of the revenues from the interstate activity which reasonably
reflects the in-state component of the activity being taxed."" 2 In Oklahoma Tax
Commission v. Jefferson Lines, Inc.4 3 the Court explained that "external
consistency... looks... to the economic justification for the State's claim
upon the value taxed, to discover whether a State's tax reaches beyond that
portion of value that is fairly attributable to economic activity within the taxing
State." 4" Usually, apportionment requires the division of the rate base among
the taxingjurisdictions claiming it. However, in the case of a sale of goods, the

453. HANDBOOK, supra note 414, at 39.
454. The actions of the General Assembly in 1999 fortunately obviate the problem.
See infra Part IV.D.
455. 488 U.S. 252 (1989).
456. Id. at 256 n.5.
457. Id.
458. Id.
459. Id. at 258 (quoting App. to Juris. Statement in No-87-826 at 24a, Goldberg v.
Johnson, No. 85 CH 8081 (Cook County, Oct. 21, 1986)).
460. Id. at 261.
461. Id. at 263.
462. Id. at 262 (citing Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 169-70
(1983)).
463. 514 U.S. 175 (1995).
464. Id. at 185.
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Court does not require a division of the sales tax base because the sale is most
readily viewed as a "discrete event facilitated by the laws and amenities of the
place of sale, and the transaction itself does not readily reveal the extent to
which... interstate activity affects the value. ' 4"SBecause a division ofthe sales
tax base is not practicable, the Court has "consistently approved taxation of
sales [of goods] without any division of the tax base among different States,
and [has] instead held such taxes properly measurable by the gross charge for
the purchase."'
In Goldbergthe Supreme Court noted that in cases involving "intangible
movement of electronic impulses through computerized networks[,... [a]n
apportionment formula based on mileage or some other geographic
division.., would produce insurmountable administrative and technological
barriers.""' The Court found the Illinois tax "has many of the characteristics
' The
of a sales tax."" Further, "its economic effect is like that of a sales tax."469
Court concluded the tax, as a tax on the sale of services, is "fairly apportioned"
because the call originated or terminated in Illinois and was charged to a
service address in Illinois, and because "the risk of multiple taxation is
low.., and actual multiple taxation is precluded by the credit provision."47
In contrast, the 1997 Municipal Association license tax is not a sales tax
and has none of the characteristics of one. The Municipal Association tax is
imposed on "3% of gross receipts from allcommunicationsactivitiesconducted
in the municipalityand for communications services billed to customers located
in the municipality on which a business license tax has not been paid to another
municipality."4 " Unlike the Illinois tax on interstate calls upheld in Goldberg,
the 1997 Municipal Association Ordinance does not limit itself to calls begun
or ended in the city and charged to a service address within the city. It applies
to "all communications activities conducted in the municipality and [to]
communications services billed to customers located in the municipality. '472
The 1997 Municipal Association ordinance imposes a tax on two separate
bases: (1) "activities" performed in the city (an undefined term), and
(2) billing, without respect to activities in the city. An example of the second
basis would be a Charleston resident visiting New York who calls Paris and
charges the call to his home phone. The Municipal Association's ordinance
would tax the call. However, the Goldberg standard approves only the
"activities" basis, which would encompass calls that originate or terminate in
the state "as long as the call is billed or charged to a service address, or paid by

465.
466.
467.
468.
469.
470.

Id. at 186.
Id.
Goldberg,488 U.S. at 264.
Id. at 262.
Id. at 265.
Id.

471. MUNICIPAL AssOCIAION OF SOUTH CAROLINA, MODEL ORDINANCE MASC-50,

98-002 (emphasis added).
472. Id.
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an addressee, within the taxing State."473
The Supreme Court in Goldberg expressed doubt that jurisdictions
"through which the telephone call's electronic signals merely pass have a
sufficient nexus to tax that call."'474 The Court found the issue analogous to that
in UnitedAir Lines, Inc. v. Mahin,475 in which the court held the "State has no
' The
nexus to tax an airplane based solely on its flight over the State."476
Goldberg Court continued, "[w]e also doubt that termination of an interstate
telephone call, by itself,provides a substantial enough nexus for a State to tax
a call. 477 The Court stated:
We believe that only two States have a nexus substantial
enough to tax a customer's purchase of an interstate
telephone call. The first is a State like Illinois which taxes the
origination or termination of an interstate telephone call
chargedto a service addresswithin thatState. The second is
a State which taxes the origination or termination of an
interstate telephone call billed orpaid within that State.47
In its 1995 Jefferson Lines479 decision the Court characterized its Goldberg
holding as follows:
[I]n addressing the interstate provision of services, we
recently held that a State in which an interstate telephone call
originates or terminates has the requisite Commerce Clause
nexus to tax a customer's purchase of that call as long as the
call is billed or charged to a service address, or paid by an
addressee, within the taxing State."0
The 1997 Municipal Association ordinance not only lacks a substantial
nexus, as this concept is enunciated in Goldberg,but it also fails that decision's
standard forproper apportionment. Apportionment under Goldbergrequiresthe
origination or termination of a call that is charged to a service address in the
state. The 1997 ordinance makes no provision for apportioning income to
assure that the tax is not imposed on activities carried on outside the city's
borders. A gross receipts tax is "simply a variety of tax on income, which [is]
required to be apportioned to reflect the location of the various interstate

473. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. 175, 184 (1995) (citing
Goldberg, 488 U.S. at 263) (emphasis added).
474. Goldberg,488 U.S. at 263.
475. 410 U.S. 623, 631 (1973).
476. Goldberg,488 U.S. at 263.
477. Id. (emphasis added).
478. Id. (emphasis added).
479. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. 175 (1995).
480. Id. at 184 (citing Goldberg,488 U.S. at 263) (emphasis added).
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activities by which it [is] earned."'" The taxbase mustbe apportioned to reflect
interstate values. An unapportioned gross receipts tax on interstate commerce
is simply illegal."s
The Municipal Association takes the position that a tax is properly
apportioned if the statute provides a credit in the event that the same tax is paid
to another jurisdiction.8 3 Both the Due Process and Commerce Clauses,
however, require that a city can only tax income that is "fairly related" to it."
A city has no power to tax economic activities that take place elsewhere, as
discussed above under external consistency and more fully below under Due
Process.
c. EqualProtection
i.

Gross Disparity

License taxes require close judicial scrutiny because, unlike uniform rate
taxes, the license tax is particularly subject to the abuse of singling out a
taxpayer, or group of taxpayers, for special treatment. By its very nature,
license taxes classify and discriminate among taxpayers.
The South Carolina Supreme Court has upheld a municipality's power to
classify its various businesses and professions for license taxing purposes.48 In
UnitedStates Fidelity& GuarantyCo. v. City ofNewberry the court noted that
a city had "considerable discretion." However, the court also stated that:
In all of our decisions wherein a classification in a tax statute
or ordinance has been challenged as being in violation ofthe
equal protection clauses of the state and federal Constitutions,
this Court has recognized that a reasonable basis for the
different treatment was essential to the constitutionality
thereof. 6
Similarly, in its earlier decision in City of Columbia v. Niagra Fire

481. Id. at 190.
482. See, e.g., City ofWinchester v. American Woodmark Corp., 471 S.E.2d 495 (Va.
1996) (holding that the city's occupation license tax on 100% of the company's
revenues-although it had facilities and operations elsewhere-was "'out of all appropriate
proportions to' and has 'no rational relationship' to the business transacted in [the city]" and,
consequently, violated the Commerce Clause) (citing Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463
U.S. 159, 180 (1982)).
483. See Municipal Association Amicus Brief 9, City of Charleston v. Government
Employees Ins. Co., 512 S.E.2d 504 (S.C. 1999) (No. 93-CP-10-2567).
484. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
485. See, e.g., United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. City ofNewberry, 257 S.C.
433, 439, 186 S.E.2d 239, 241 (1972); State v. City of Columbia, 6 S.C. 1 (1874); State v.
Hayne, 4 S.C. 403 (1873).
486. Newberry, 257 S.C. at 440, 186 S.E.2d at 242.
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Insurance Co., the court held that "[t]he obvious purpose of the license
ordinance is to impose a tax, or license fee, upon the privilege of doing
business in the city during the current year. Implicit 'in487that purpose is the
requirement that the tax be fair and nondiscriminatory.
If the taxpayer can show a "gross disparity" ofrates, the court will inquire
closely into whether the city had any rational basis. The court in Newberry
held:
It is conceded that the city had the right to classify for the
purpose of license taxes and considerable discretion as to the
rate to be imposed upon the respective classifications, but the
cardinal issue [here] is whether the city had any rational
basisfor such a gross disparity and differentiationbetween
the ratecharged.'
InNewberry,the court found a "gross disparity" to exist when fire and casualty
insurance companies were required to pay 2% of gross receipts while other
businesses in the city were taxed at much lower rates." 9
In Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. City ofAiken 9 the court
held that Aiken's 1979 license tax, which imposed a 3% gross receipts tax on
Southern Bell, was an "unreasonable and discriminatory rate. ' 491 The court
found Southern Bell "was taxed at twenty-four (24) times the average rate
imposed upon other businesses under the ordinance.""92 The record contained
the company's exhaustive requests to the city for every justification-special
services provided by the city or burdens imposed upon the city by the
company-which conceivably could support the tax as well as the company's
exhaustive factual rebuttal of each justification.493 The record, the court
concluded, "lacks sufficient evidence that would support an express finding of
a rational basis."49
Similarly, in Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. City of
Spartanburg,the South Carolina Supreme Court found the city's business
license tax violated equal protection."9 The court held Spartanburg's 1% gross
receipts tax on Southern Bell to be "palpably unreasonable and violative of
equal protection of the laws.""'96 The court's opinion stated that:

487. 249 S.C. 388, 392, 154 S.E.2d 674, 676 (1967).
488. Newberry, 257 S.C. at 439, 186 S.E.2d at 241 (emphasis added).
489. Id. at 441-42, 186 S.E.2d at 242-43; see supra Part IV.A.3.
490. 279 S.C. 269, 306 S.E.2d 220 (1983).
491. Id. at 274, 306 S.E.2d at 222; see supra Part IV.A.3.
492. Newberry, 257 S.C. at 273, 306 S.E.2d at 222.
493. See generally Transcript of Record, Aiken (No. 79-CP-02-860) (containing
testimony regarding city services).
494. Newberry, 279 S.C. at 273, 306 S.E.2d at 222.
495. 285 S.C. 495, 331 S.E.2d 333 (1985); see supra Part IV.A.3.
496. Spartanburg,285 S.C. at 498, 331 S.E.2d at 335.
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The gross disparity in the license tax rate imposed by
the Spartanburg ordinance is reflected by the fact
that Southern Bell pays a tax of 1% of its gross
receipts ($238,875 in 1981 and $267,262 in 1982),
while a textile mill or manufacturing plant with the
same revenue as Southern Bell pays a maximum of
$725. The city has advanced no reasonable basis for
the differential treatment. The amendment was not
part of any overall reform of the ordinance. Nor did
the city prove that Southern Bell benefitted more
from city services than did other businesses.
Moreover, since Southern Bell is the highest ad
valorem taxpayer in the city, it contributes greatly to
the cost of city government. Apparently, the sole
consideration in drastically increasing the tax on
Southern Bell was that, since Duke Power had
agreed by contract to pay the city 3% of its gross
revenues, Southern Bell's taxes should be
increased.497
The court further noted that "the record reveals a great disparity between the
tax rate imposed on Southern Bell and the rate imposed on retail businesses,
hospitals, and others."498
ii. Special Tax
A city violates equal protection when it classifies taxpayers without a
rational basis. 499 Over the past 100 years the South Carolina Supreme Court has
defined the controlling principles that compose a rational basis for license tax
purposes. A license tax must (1) be rationally based on the provision of
governmental services (i.e., the benefits derived by the taxpayer and the
burdens imposed on him); and (2) complement the real property tax to equalize
the tax burden to assure that all taxpayers make a fair contribution to
government.5°°
The cities that adopted the Municipal Association ordinances made no
effort to comply with the court's historical standards. They made no study
attempting to show any unusual burdens imposed upon the city by
telecommunications. The cities made no study showing that BellSouth, or the
others in the Municipal Association Telecommunications class that includes

497. Id. at 497-98, 331 S.E.2d at 334 (citation and footnote omitted).
498. Id. at 497, 331 S.E.2d at 335 n.3.
499. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. City ofSpartanburg, 263 S.C. 169, 172,
209 S.E.2d 36,37 (1974).
500. State v. Hayne, 4 S.C. 403,426 (1883).
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BellSouth, pays few real property taxes and should pay a higher license tax so
that it makes a fair contribution to government.
The court's holdings are clear that a large disparity in rates must be based
upon a large disparity in services provided by the city. The city's rendering of
customary services to a taxpayer does not justify a higher license tax.
d. Due ProcessIssues in Aiken and Spartanburg
As a matter of basic constitutional principle, a city cannot tax people,
property, or activities beyond its corporate borders. The Aiken and Spartanburg
cases hold that the Due Process Clause of the South Carolina Constitution
requires that the city have jurisdiction over both the taxpayer and the income
the city seeks to tax."0' Additionally, the Doctrine of Fair Apportionment
requires that a local license tax upon the income earned within and outside the
taxing jurisdiction be apportioned so that the measure of the tax fairly reflects
the proportion of the taxed activity that is actually carried on in the city.502 For
example, a company might be headquartered in Columbia, with warehouses
and places of business throughout the state. Columbia would have to apportion
its tax; it could not tax the gross income earned throughout the state. However,
if a company had only one facility in the state out of which it made deliveries
throughout the state, a city may tax statewide earnings that are not taxed
elsewhere."0 3 For example, the court in Eli Witt Co. v. City of West Columbia
held that the statewide income of the company was fairly attributable to the
company's distribution center business carried on in West Columbia. Similarly,
if a transportation company has its sole facility in Columbia and is in the
business of transporting goods from Columbia to Charleston, Columbia may
be able to tax the entire amount as a kind of rough apportionment, even though
most of the business activity obviously took place outside the city.
Telephone customers in South Carolina annually place over 100 million
intrastate calls. The calling pattern of customers, the volume of calls, and the
number of taxing jurisdictions that toll calls go through make it impossible to
apportion the revenue on a call that instantaneously travels through numerous
taxing jurisdictions. Indeed, depending on traffic patterns, calls between the
same points may be indiscriminately routed in different ways. No reasonable,
rational, or fair way exists to apportion the revenue among the various taxing
jurisdictions that arguably have some claim on it.
At the time of the Aiken and Spartanburgcases, interstate calls were
exempted by the city ordinances. However, section 2 of the Municipal

501. SeeAiken, 279 S.C. 269,306 S.E.2d 220 (1983); Spartanburg,285 S.C. 495,331
S.E.2d 333 (1985).
502. See supra note 290 and accompanying text.
503. See Eli Witt Co. v. City of W. Columbia, 309 S.C. 55, 425 S.E.2d 16 (1992)
(upholding a West Columbia ordinance that allowed a deduction for sales outside the city if a
license tax was paid to another city).
I
1
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AssociationModel ordinance repeals the interstate exemption andprovides that
"[g]ross income from interstate commerce shall be included inthe gross income
for every business subject to a business license tax."" The reasoning of Aiken
and Spartanburgapply to interstate calls afortior.
e. Delegation
Many American jurisdictions use private bill collectors to collect taxes
after the state has determined a tax is due. The practice began with efforts to
collect from out-of-state taxpayers. However, bill collectors can neither bring
judicial actions on behalf of a government nor audit to determine the tax due.
The Municipal Association of South Carolina's sample ordinance, adopted
by 219 cities, goes far beyond the practice of other Americanjurisdictions. The
ordinance authorizes the bill collector association to assess the tax due, audit
the tax, and bring an action "in the name of the Municipality without further
approval by the Municipality." ' The city agrees to pay the bill collector 4%
of taxes collected. Further, the city agrees that it will not accept or compromise
any city taxes. 6

504. MuNIcIPAL AsSOCIATION OF SOUTH CAROLINA, MODEL ORDINANCE MASC-50,

98-002.
505. The Agreement provides:
4.
MASC is hereby designed as the exclusive
agent of the Municipality for assessment
and collection of the said business license
taxes andpenalties utilizing all procedures
and actions authorized by ordinance or
State law, and such procedures and
actions may be invoked in the name of the
Municipality without further approval by
the Municipality. (emphasis added).
506. The Agreement provides:
6.
The Municipality acknowledges that it is
an essential element of the program for all
such taxes to be paid to MASC, and no
such taxes will be accepted, waived or
compromisedby the Municipalitydirectly
from or with an insurer or broker. All
communications from insurance
companies and brokers will be sent to
MASC. Payments accepted by the
Municipality will be included in the
computation of compensation to MASC.
(emphasis added).
8.
The Municipality agrees that MASC shall
retain four percent (4%) of all funds
collected for the Municipality pursuant to
this Agreement, togetherwith any interest
earned on funds held on deposit prior to
disbursement, as compensation for the

Published by Scholar Commons, 2000

77

2000]

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 51, Iss. 2 [2000], Art. 5
BUSINEss IN SOUTH CAROLINA

HISTORY OF THE TELEPHONE

367

The power to tax includes three functions:
1. The legislative act of imposing the tax, usually called the
levy.
2. The act of determining what each citizen owes, usually
called the audit or assessment.
3. The act of collecting the tax once the debt is fixed.
Though states can delegate the third function, they cannot delegate the first and
second functions. The black-letter law is clear that the taxing power exists
exclusively in the legislatureand cannot be delegated:
As a general rule, subject to some exceptions, the power
of taxation, existing exclusively in the legislature, cannot be
delegated. Accordingly, unless otherwise provided by the
constitution, such power cannot be delegated to either of the
other departments of the government, or to any individual,
private corporation, officer, board, or commission. 0 7
However, if the constitution expressly authorizes it, the legislature may
delegate the power to tax to political subdivisions for local purposes:
The legislature may, however, within constitutional
limitations, delegate the power of taxation for local purposes
to political subdivisions of the state, and may create such
agencies as it may deem proper for the purpose; and taxes
levied and collected under such delegated power are regarded
as levied and collected under the authority of the state in the
exercise of its sovereign powers for governmental purposes
of a public nature. Such delegation of power is subject to
strict limitations, and the taxing function may be conferred to
be exercised only within constitutional limitations applicable
to the taxing power generally."'

services rendered. (emphasis added).
The 4% contingent fee contract in Sears,Roebuck & Co. v. Parsons,401 S.E.2d 4 (Ga. 1991),
was held void as against public policy by the Georgia Supreme Court, which noted that
"[flairness and impartiality are threatened where a private organization has a financial stake in
the amount of tax [assessed.]" Id. at 5. The Georgia court found that "[tihe people's entitlement
to fair and impartial tax assessments lies at the heart of our system, and, indeed, was a basic
principle upon which this country was founded." Id.But see In re PhillipMorris U.S.A., 436
S.E.2d 828 (N.C. 1993), in which the North Carolina Supreme court upheld a statute that
authorized a private party to receive a contingent fee of 35% of taxes discovered. The court did
not discuss the delegation of taxing power issue.
507. 84 C.J.S. Taxation § 8 (1954) (footnotes omitted).
508. Id. (footnotes omitted).
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The general law is also clear that the power to tax must be expressly and
distinctly granted to a political subdivision, and must be exercised in strict
conformity with the terms of the grant:
The power of apolitical subdivision to levy taxes must be
expressly and distinctly granted, and must be exercised in
strict conformity with the terms of the grant. A grant by the
legislature of the power of taxation will be strictly construed,
since the reasonable presumption is that the state has granted
5 °9
in clear and unmistakable terms all that it intended to grant.
South Carolina is more strict about the delegation ofthe taxing power than
required by the general rule. For many years, the South Carolina Supreme
Court has struck down delegations of the taxing power to public bodies where
no delegation is conferred by the state constitution.510 In Crow v. McAlpine51'
the court stated, "[t]he people ofthis State, in their sovereign capacity have, by
the Constitution, entrusted the taxing power to the General Assembly and
except by express permission of the sovereign
authority, this power cannot be
512
delegated to any subordinate agency."
In Crow the legislature delegated to a governor-appointed school board the
power to levy and collect the tax millage necessary to meet the school district's
operating budget. The delegation was permissible on its face because the court
recognized that school districts were political subdivisions within the meaning
of the South Carolina Constitution, Article X, Section 6, which expressly
authorizes the delegation of the taxing power to political subdivisions."1 3
However, the court held that the delegation violated an "implied limitation
upon the power of the General Assembly to delegate the taxing power.' 514 The
court held that taxing power must be delegated to a body composed of elected
officials or subject to the supervisory control of such a body.51 5 Consequently,
the court held the delegation unconstitutional, stating:
The taxingpower is one of the highestprerogatives of the
General Assembly. Members of this body are chosen by the
people to exercise the power in a conscientious and deliberate
manner. If this power is abused, the people could, at least,

509. Id. (footnotes omitted).
510. Cf. Gaud v. Walker, 214 S.C. 451,469, 53 S.E.2d 316, 324 (1949) (upholding
the statutory delegation of power to levy taxes to a county based on article X, § 5 of the South
Carolina Constitution).
511. 277 S.C. 240,285 S.E.2d 355 (1981).
512. Id. at 243, 285 S.E.2d at 357 (citing Gaud v. Walker, 214 S.C. 451, 53 S.E.2d
316 (1949)).
513. Id. at 243-44, 285 S.E.2d at 357.
514. Id. at 244, 285 S.E.2d at 358.
515. Id. at 244, 285 S.E.2d at 358.
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prevent a recurrence of the wrong at the polls. However,
where the power is reposed in a body not directly responsible
to the people, the remedy is uncertain, indirect and likely to
be long delayed.516
The court found the "implied limitation" on the General Assembly in Article X,
Section 5 of the constitution, which prohibits taxation without representation:
"No tax, subsidy or charge shall be established, fixed, laid or levied under any
pretext whatsoever, without the consent of the people or their representatives
lawfully assembled."5 7 The court summarized the import of this section as
follows:
Article X, Section 5 recognizes that the power to levy taxes
rests with the people. As such, we believe it constitutes an
implied limitation upon the power of the General Assembly
to delegate the taxing power. Where the power is delegated
to a body composed of persons not assented to by the people
nor subject to the supervisory control ofabody chosenby the
people, this constitutional restriction is violated." 8
Crow was followed in the court's 1997 decision in Weaver v. Recreation
District.519 In 1969 the General Assembly had created the Richland County
Recreation Commission and authorized it to levy upon all taxable property "a
tax of not exceeding five mills per annum."52 The plaintiff in Weaver asserted
the law violated Article X, Section 5 because the commission was an
appointed, not elected, body."' The court found the delegation impermissible
because "it violates Article X § 5 of the South Carolina Constitution and may
not stand."'5
In light of these cases, the Municipal Association's attempted delegation
to a private body through its ordinances would appear to be unconstitutional.
2. FederalCourtJurisdictionin MunicipalLicense Cases
On April 27, 1999 the U.S. District Court for the District of South
Carolina, Anderson Division, held that the Tax Injunction Act did not

516. Id.
517. Id. at 243, 285 S.E.2d at 357 (quoting South Carolina Constitution art. X, § 5).
518. Id. at 244, 285 S.E.2d at 358.

519.
520.
521.
522.
523.

328 S.C. 83, 86, 492 S.E.2d 79, 81 (1997).
Id. at 85, 492 S.E.2d at 80.
Id.
Id. at 87, 492 S.E.2d at 82.
28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994).
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foreclose a federal forum for a challenge to a municipal license tax."2 The
district court decided to allow the taxpayer an opportunity to be heard in the
federal forum because South Carolina fails to provide a "plain, speedy, and
efficient remedy." 5 The court's ruling is significant because (1) it relies on the
United States Supreme Court's McKesson holding, 26 and (2) it provides
telecommunications companies a federal forum in which to challenge
discriminatory city gross receipts taxes.
In 1998 Seneca, South Carolina, amended its Business License Tax
Ordinance (No. 98-4), entitled "An Ordinance Amending the Business License
Tax Levying a Business License Tax on Telecommunications." 27 BellSouth
brought suit to enjoin the enforcement of the ordinance based on the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 and violations of the Equal Protection, Due
Process, Commerce, and Impairment of Contract clauses of the United States
Constitution. 2 ' However, federal subject matter jurisdiction was the sole issue
before the court.
The Tax Injunction Act provides that "[t]he district courts shall not enjoin,
suspend, or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under [s]tate
law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of
such State.""s A sufficient remedy must provide a full hearing and judicial
determination. 30 The district court found that an efficient remedy must also be
clear, certain, and nonspeculative within the meaning of the due process
requirements of McKesson. 3 ' That is, a remedy cannot be plain, speedy, and
efficient if it does not comply with due process. In most states, the Tax
Injunction Act may well prevent federal courts from determining whether state
or local taxes are barriers. However, the court held the Tax Injunction Act did
not divest the district court ofjurisdiction because South Carolina had repealed
the exclusive statutory remedy applicable to municipal license taxpayers in

524. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. City of Seneca, No. 8:98-3451-13 (D.S.C. April
27, 1999).
525. Id., slip op. at 7.
526. Id., slip op. at 3 (citing McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages and
Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 36 (1990)).
527. Id., slip op. at 1. The new tax imposes a 3% rate on the gross receipts of all
telecommunications services billed to customers located in the city on which a business license
tax is not paid to another municipality. The new tax raises the business license tax on BellSouth
by about 2,700/o--from $4,500 (the highest license tax paid to Seneca in 1998) to $120,000 due
December 31, 1998. The new ordinance also imposes a nonpayment penalty of 5% per month
until payment.
528. Id., slip op. at 2.
529. 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994).
530. Seneca, No. 8:98-3451-13, slip op. at 2 (citing Rosewell v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank,
450 U.S. 503, 514 (1990)).
531. Id., slip op. at 1-2 (citing McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages
and Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 36, 39 (1990)). Appendix A provides a detailed comparison of
McKesson's due process requirements with existing South Carolina treatment of the municipal
taxpayer.
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Since 1870 South Carolina taxpayers have not been permitted any
predeprivation remedy. For more than 100 years, the pay-under-protest
statutory remedy was the taxpayer's exclusive post deprivation remedy. 33 In
view ofthe exclusivity statutes, the South Carolina Supreme Court held several
times that a taxpayer could not use any general remedies, such as a declaratory
judgment procedure.5 34
The City of Seneca argued that because the pay-under-protest statute had
been repealed, the exclusivity provisions were no longer applicable, and the
taxpayer could use general remedies despite the earlier Supreme Court holdings
to the contrary. 35 The city cited two cases from other jurisdictions that
536 found
a declaratory judgment to be a "plain, speedy and efficient remedy.
The district court found the out-of-state cases readily distinguishable
because, in both instances, the state courts had a well-established practice of
permitting declaratory judgments in tax cases, whereas South Carolina courts
had specifically ruled to the contrary. 37 The district court noted that the city's
argument "would provide at best, a very uncertain and speculative taxpayer
remedy. 5 38 Given the stiff penalties in the ordinance, the taxpayer "would be
put in the untenable position of bringing a state court action for declaratory
judgment relief with the knowledge that it would be highly unlikely to receive
both trial court and appellate review within a short period of time."' 39 The
district court concluded that "[a] remedy is not plain, speedy, and efficient
where 'there is such uncertainty concerning the ... remedy as to make it
speculative whether the state affords full protection to the federal rights.""'5
For many years, the Tax Injunction Act has required taxpayers to use state
procedures to attempt to secure refunds. To discourage refunds, states typically
establish procedural minefields that are unfair to taxpayers. If the taxpayer
manages to get across alive, she is generally dispatched with a truncated
judicial review. Since 1990 the United States Supreme Court has developed the
McKesson line of authority-with cases such as Newsweek, Inc. v. Florida
Department ofRevenue 4' and Dryden v. Madison County542-as a balance to
state overreaching. No Supreme Court opinion, including the 1999 decision in

532. Id., slip op. at 4.
533. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 12-47-10 to -230 (repealed 1995).
534. Lee v. City of Columbia, 292 S.C. 424, 357 S.E.2d 14 (1987); Elmwood
Cemetery Ass'n v. Wasson, 169 S.C. 148, 169 S.E.2d 148 (1969).
535. Seneca, No. 8:98-3451-13, slip op. at 4-5.
536. Id., slip op. at 5 (citing Folio v. City of Clarksburg, 134 F.3d 1211 (4th Cir.
1998); Tully v. Griffin, Inc., 429 U.S. 68 (1976)).
537. Id., slip op. at 5-6.
538. Id., slip op. at 6.
539. Id.
540. Id., slip op. at 6-7 (quoting Hillsborough Township v. Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620,
625 (1945)).
541. 522 U.S. 442 (1998).
542. 552 U.S. 1145 (1998).
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South Central Bell v. Alabama, 4 a has found prospective application to be
appropriate. McKesson threatens many current state abuses, including requiring
taxpayers to spend years exhausting their so-called administrative remedies.
With Seneca, the district court has merged the Tax Injunction Act and
McKesson lines of authority to provide the South Carolina taxpayer an
opportunity to be heard in a neutral forum. The court's ruling will have a
beneficial impact on future state and local practice. Of course, states can avoid
McKesson problems altogetherbyproviding adequate predeprivation remedies.
D. 1999 South CarolinaLegislation
As discussed above, the Telecommunications Act prohibits discriminatory
state and local taxes on the telecommunications industry. Despite the Act,
South Carolina localities have continued to impose special taxes on
telecommunications companies of3% and 5% of their gross income. 5' In 1999
South Carolina limited-but did not remove-the localities' power to impose
discriminatory taxes.545 Under the new law the city's business license and
franchise taxes are reduced to .3% of gross income until 2003'"and to .75%
thereafter. 47 The new law does not conform to the Telecommunications Act
because it continues the historical discrimination against the industry, albeit at
a reduced rate.
Several other states have enacted similar legislation.548 The draftsman's
theory seems to be that the Telecommunications Act requires municipalities to
tax all telecommunications providers the same, but that a city may freely
discriminate against the industry as a whole. Clearly, however, neither the
language nor the history of the Telecommunications Act supports such a
theory.
E. South CarolinaGrossReceipts Tax
In many states, public utilities are subject to gross receipts taxes and
special property tax rules. Many of these provisions date back to the nineteenth
century. South Carolina Code section 12-20-100 imposes an additional license
tax on utilities.5 49 Section 12-20-50 imposes on corporationsgenerally an

543. 526 U.S. 160 (1999).
544.
545.
546.
547.

See supranote 29 and accompanying text.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 58-9-2220(1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1999).
Id.
Id. § 58-9-2220(2)(a).
548. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-5.5-101(2)(b) (1999); 35 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 635/5-5
(Supp. 1999); Thx. TAX. CODE ANN. § 301.004 (West 1992).
549. S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-20-100 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1999). The full text of the
section is set forth below:
§ 12-20-100. License tax on utilities and electric
cooperatives; tax based on value of property;
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annual license fee of fifteen dollars, plus one dollar for each thousand "of
capital stock and paid-in or capital surplus of the corporation."55 Section 1220-50 would result in a much smaller tax than the special tax on utilities.
Until the United States Supreme Court's 1977 decision in Complete Auto
Transit, Inc. v. Bradyss" state taxation on interstate commerce was
552
unconstitutional. For example, in Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Alabama,
the Supreme Court struck down an Alabama tax on the gross receipts from
messages sent through interstate commerce."5 3 The Court found the company
could be taxed on intrastate income-which the Court described as "receipts
arising from commerce wholly within the State" -- as well as the interstate

additional tax based on gross receipts; payment;
consolidated or combined return; minimum license
fee.
(A) In the place ofthe licensefee imposed
by Section 12-20-50, every express company, street
railway company, navigation company, waterworks
company, power company, electric cooperative, light
company, gas company, telegraph company, and
telephone company shall file an annual report with
the department and pay a licensefee asfollows:
(1) one dollarforeachthousanddollars,or
fraction of a thousand dollars, of fair market value of
property owned and used within this State in the
conduct of business as determined by the department
for property tax purposes for the preceding taxable
year; and
(2)(a) three dollars for each thousand
dollars, or fraction of a thousand dollars, of gross
receipts derived from services rendered from
regulated business within this State during the
preceding taxable year, except that with regard to
electric cooperatives, only distribution electric
cooperatives are subject to the gross receipts portion
of the license fee under this subitem (2)(a).
(b) When a consolidated return is filed
pursuant to section 12-6-5020, the phrase "the gross
receipts derived from services rendered from
regulated business" does not include gross receipts
arising from transactions between the separate
members of the return group;
(B) The minimum license fee under this
section is the same as provided in Section 12-2050(A). When acombined return is filed, the minimum
license fee applies to each corporation in the
combined group.
Id. (emphasis added).
550. S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-20-50(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1999).
551. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).

552. 132 U.S. 472 (1889).
553. Id. at 477-78.
554. Id. at 477.
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income. Similarly, in Pacific Express Co. v. Seibert55 the Supreme Court
explained that the language "within this State" meant "business begun and
ended within the State."'556 The Supreme Court further stated that "'[b]usiness
done within this State cannot be made to mean business done between that
State and other States."' In Seibert the Missouri statute provided that every
express company was taxed on 2% of the "entire receipts for business done
' Pacific Express stated that it would owe $12,000 if the tax
within this State."558
included interstate commerce and $3,000 if it was limited to intrastate
commerce. 59 The company sought a federal injunction against enforcement of
the law on the grounds it was an invalid tax on interstate commerce. 560 The
Court agreed that the state could not tax interstate commerce:
It is well settled that a State cannot lay a tax upon interstate
commerce in any form, whether by way of duties laid on the
transportation of the subjects of that commerce, or the
receipts derived from that transportation, or on the occupation
or business of carrying it on; for the reason that such taxation
is a burden on that commerce and amounts to a regulation of
it which belongs to Congress.5 6'
The Court, however, disagreed with Pacific Express on the proper construction
of the statute:
The question on this point, therefore, is narrowed down to the
single inquiry, whether the tax complained of in any way
bears upon or touches the interstate traffic of the company, or
whether, on the other hand, it is confined to its intra-state
business. We think a proper construction of the statute
confines the tax which it creates to.the intra-statebusiness,
and in no6 way relates to the interstate business of the

company.

2

555. 142 U.S. 339 (1892).
556. Id. at 350.
557. Id.

558. Id. at 344.
559. Id. at 342.
560. Id.
561. Id. at 349 (citations omitted).
562. Id. at 349-50. The Court continued:
The act in question, after defining in its first section
what shall constitute an express company or what
shall be deemed to be such in the sense of the act,
requires such express company to file with the state
auditor an annualreport "showing the entire receipts
for business done within this State of each agent of
such company doing business in this State," etc., and
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Twelve years after Seibert, the South Carolina gross receipts tax on

telephones was enacted to apply to business done "within this State." The 1904
law calculated gross receipts in section II by referencing to the following:
In the case of telegraph and telephone companies, the
entire gross receipts, including all sums earned or charged,
whether actually received or not, for the fiscal year the next
precedingfrom whateversource derived,whether messages,
telephone tolls, rentals, or otherwisefor business done within
this State, at each office within this State, giving the name of
the office and the total receipts of the company for such
period in South Carolina from business done within South
Carolina.63
The law required the State Board of Assessors to ascertain the gross receipts
of telephone companies "for business done within South Carolina."' 64 Finally,
"after ascertaining the gross receipts forbusiness done in South Carolina, orthe
gross earnings from its operation within South Carolina," the State Board of

further provides that the amount which any express
company pays "to the railroads or steamboats within
this State for the transportation of their freight within
this State" may be deducted from the gross receipts of
the company on such business; and the act also
requires the company making a statement of its
receipts to include, as such, all sums earned or
charged "for the business done within this State," etc.
It is manifest that these provisions of the statute, so
far from imposing a tax upon the receipts derived
from the transportation ofgoods between other States
and the State of Missouri, expressly limit the tax to
receipts for the sums earned and charged for the
business done within the State. This positive and oftrepeated limitation to business done within the State,
that is, business begun and ended within the State,
evidently intended to exclude, and the language
employed certainly does exclude, the idea that the tax
is to be imposed upon the interstate business of the
company. "Business donewithin this State" cannotbe
made to mean business done between that State and
other States. We, therefore, concur in the view of the
courtbelow that it was not the legislative intention, in
the enactment of this statute, to impinge upon
interstate commerce, or to interfere with it in any way
whatever; and that the statute, when fairly construed,
does not in any manner interfere with interstate
commerce.
Id. at 350.
563. 1904 S.C. Acts 269 § 1(11) (emphasis added).
564. 1904 S.C. Acts 269 § 7.
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Assessors was directed to assess "an annual license fee of three mills on such
gross income."'565The ordinary license fee on foreign corporations was one-half
of one mill on the value of property "used within this State.",56 The 1904
legislature's repeated use of the phrase "within this state," after the Supreme
Court's construction of that phrase inPacificExpress Co.5 67and Western Union
Telegraph Co., 68 should, of course, be read to incorporate that construction.5 69
The sale of local telephone exchange access is analogous to the facts in
CompleteAuto Transit,Inc., where the taxpayerpicked up General Motors cars
at the railhead at Jackson, Mississippi and delivered them to dealers in
Mississippi. 5 0Mississippi law imposed a 5% tax on the privilege of engaging
in business on every pipeline, railroad, airplane, bus or other transportation
business "between points within this State." ' ' The Supreme Court noted this
language and the history of the statute may indicate a legislative intent "to
reach only intrastate commerce, and that it should be so construed. 5 72
Complete Auto, however, "[did] not make that argument. ' 73 Instead, Complete
Auto argued the transaction was an illegal tax on interstate commerce.5 74 For
the first time, however, the Court held that interstate commerce could be
taxed. 75
The current statutory language---"gross receipts derived from services
rendered from regulatedbusiness within the State"" 6 -originated in 1985 while
Duke PowerCo. v. South CarolinaTax Commission 77 was pending. Before the
change, the tax was imposed on "the entire gross receipts from business within
the State. '78 Duke Power argued unsuccessfully in the litigation that "gross
receipts from business" meant the regular course of business (i.e., the
company's sales to customers).,7 9 Although the court disagreed with Duke
Power, the legislative change in language seems to have adopted Duke's
interpretation.
A selective gross receipts tax, such as section 12-20-100, is a relic of the

565. 1904 S.C. Acts 269 § 9.
566. 1904 S.C. Acts 269 § 5.
567. Pacific Express Co. v. Seibert, 142 U.S. 339, 350 (1892).
568. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Alabama, 132 U.S. 472,476-78 (1889).
569. From 1904 to 1991 the state interpreted the gross receipts tax to apply to
intrastate business and not to a portion of the receipts of interstate business. See Op. Att'y Gen.
2823 (1970).
570. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274,276.
571. Id. at 275.
572. Id. at 276 n.2.
573. Id.
574. Id. at 277.
575. Id. at 289, overruling Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602

(1951).

576. S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-20-100(A)(2)(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1999).
577. 292 S.C. 64, 66,354 S.E.2d 902, 903 (1987) (holding that the sale of a portion
of an unfinished nuclear power plant was a gross receipt for the corporate license tax).
578. Id.
579. Id.
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monopoly days when the Public Utility Commission regulated both rate of
return and service charges.58° Taxes were considered a cost and were simply
rolled directly into utility rates. However, the historical rationale for special
taxes-that they were a quid-pro-quo for special privileges granted by the
state-is simply no longer valid. Moreover, section 12-20-100(A)(1) is
inconsistent with section 253 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996511 and
with Article X of the South Carolina Constitution, which governs property
taxation.582 Hence, there is no apparent justification for special taxes on the
gross receipts or property of phone companies.
1.

Inclusion of IntrastateAccess Charges in the Local Exchange
Company's Tax Base
a. Inclusion by the Long Distance Carrier

Litigation recently brought by AT&T and MCI has established that
intrastate access charges are properly part of the gross receipts base of the long
distance carrier. 83 That is, the long distance carrier may not deduct or exclude
the charge from its gross receipts base. The long distance company, of course,
books the revenue that is charged to the customer.
Courts have found the long distance carrier's payment for intrastate access
to be a norral cost of business for the carrier. The carier's arguments that they
are sharing revenue with, or collecting revenue for, the local company have
been consistently rejected. Specifically, three cases have disallowed attempts
by long distance carriers to deduct intrastate access charges from their gross
receipts tax base.
In the first case, AT&T v. State Departmentof Revenue,M the court held
that AT&T could not deduct intrastateaccess charges paid to a local company
because charges are a cost of business, not a division of revenue."8 The court
found:
Through the system of access charges, the local exchange
carriers involved in a long distance call received an access
charge for that call. Access charges were paid by AT&T to
the local exchange carriers for long distant [sic] calls
regardless of whether AT&T received any revenue from
those calls, e.g., incomplete calls, busy signals, wrong

580. S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-20-100 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1999).
581. 47 U.S.C. § 253 (Supp. M 1997).
582. S.C. CONST. art. X.
583. See AT&T v. State Dep't of Rev., 677 So.2d 272 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996); MCI
Teleconns. Corp. v. Tracy, 616 N.E.2d 1212 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992); MCI Telecomms. Corp. v.
Taylor, 914 S.W.2d 519 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995).
584. 677 So. 2d 772 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996).
585. Id. at 775.
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numbers, etc. Also, AT&T paid the access charge rate set by
the PSC regardless of the rate AT&T charged its customers
for the completed and billable calls.
The access charges in this case were calculated or based
upon usage by AT&T regardless of whether the call was
completed. Unless a call was completed, AT&T did not and
could not charge its customer for that call; consequently, no
revenue was received by AT&T for an incomplete call.
Therefore, AT&T's obligation to pay the access charges was
"dependent on usage of the service, not the revenue
received." '86
In the second case, MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Taylor,"' MCI
argued, on equal protection grounds, that the telephone gross receipts tax (prior
to its 1989 repeal) discriminated against long distance carriers by taxing them
on intrastateaccess charges in contrast to a call between two local operating
companies."' The court disagreed, finding that MCI was not similarly situated
"because the local companies have a shared revenue agreement with their
counterparts within the LATA [local access and transport area] while MCI does
not have a shared revenue agreement." ' 9 On this point the court continued:
[T]he commissioner advances the argument that MCI and the
local exchange companies are indeed differently situated
because the local companies have a shared revenue
agreement with their counterparts within the LATA while
MCI does not have a shared revenue agreement.Under this
view of the relationship of the parties, the local operators are
indeed acting only as the collecting agentsfor each other.
The revenue belongs to both companies according to their
prior agreement and each company may record as a gross
receipt only its share of the long distance toll.
On the other hand, MCI purchases services from the local
operating companies for which it pays a regulated access
charge set by the PSC. In our view the access charge is more
like a merchant's payment for the goods he sells. It is,
therefore, one of the costs of doing business. MCI is not the
collecting agent for the local companies. 9 '

586. Id. at 775 (footnote omitted) (quoting State Dep't. of Revenue v. Teinet Corp.,
595 So.2d 469 (Ala. Civ. App. 1991)).
587. 914 S.W.2d 519 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995).
588. Id. at 520.
589. Id. at 522.
590. Id. at 522 (emphasis added).
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In the third case, MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Tracy,"9 ' MCI sought
to deduct intrastate access charges from its tax base under Ohio's public utility
gross receipts. 92 The court explained the effect of divestiture as follows:
Apparently, before divestiture local companies were not
required to collect for intrastate long distance calls for MCI
and they did not do so. Accountingwise, MCI collected the
entire amount and, after so listing the full amount as receipts,
paid the local companies for the access purchased from them.
After 1983, i.e., after divestiture, all companies operated on
the same basis with respect to payment for or collection of
revenues for intrastate long distance telephone calls. 93
In 1984 Ohio informed "long distance carriers, who are paying access charges
and reporting them as an expense, that a reduction of gross receipts was not
' MCI sought a redetermination
permitted."594
permitting it "to exclude from the
excise tax base of a long distance telephone company amounts paid to local
telephone companies in Ohio for originating or terminating intrastate long
distance telephone calls." ' The court, however, concluded that "absent ajoint
venture or collection agency agreement, there is no basis for 'sharing' revenue.
The payments were indeed costs for the purchase of access. 596 A contractual
arrangement for dividing revenue "would have to be something other than a
debtor-creditor arrangement."' 97
b. Exclusion by the Local Carrier
The three cases discussed above dealing with gross receipts statutes similar
to that of South Carolina establish that a long distance carrier cannot exclude
from its gross receipts base the cost of intrastate access. This principle appears
to be settled. Another justification for not including the intrastate access charge
in the local carrier's base is that the same event-the intrastate access-should
not be taxed twice. Further, the Chesapeake & Potomac litigation discussed
belowholds that payments received by local carriersfrom other carriersshould
not be included in the local bases. Finally, the terms of section 12-20-100 do
not, as discussed above, apply to receiptsfrom other carriers.
In New York the issue has been the subject of specific statutory

591. 616 N.E.2d 1212 (Ohio Ct App. 1992).
592. Id. at 1213-14.
593. Id. at 1213.
594. Id. at 1213.

595. Id. at 1214.
596. Id. at 1215.
597. Id.
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provision.5 9 Before 1990 AT&T reported the intrastate access charge and the
local telephone carriers did not.599 In 1990 the legislature reversed the situation
by requiring the local carriers to report the change while giving AT&T a
deduction. AT&T, however, objected to the method of apportionment because
it provided a preapportionment deduction instead of a postapportionment
deduction.6" AT&T successfully argued to the New York Court of Appeals
that limiting it to the preapportionment deduction was discriminatory against
interstate carriers because long distance intrastate carriers would secure a dollar
for dollar deduction while AT&T would only get about 5%, its 1990
apportionment percentage. 6°"
In District of Columbia v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co.6 2 the
court held that the local access to long distance carriers was nontaxable because
such gross receipts were not from the sale of public utility commodities and
services." The District of Columbia argued that the access charge was6 a4
receipt of Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Company (hereinafter "C&P"). 0
The court outlined the divestiture periods as follows:
[W]hen a C&P customer placed a long distance call in the
District, C&P directly billed that customer. Upon receiving
payment for such long-distance charges, C&P remitted that
amount to an interstate "pool" from which AT&T allocated
the respective shares to the local telephone companies. The
revenues that C&P received under this process were subject
to the gross receipts tax because C&P was providing longdistance service directly to its customers.... '
Describing the post-1974 access service provided to other long distance
carriers, the court wrote that the FCC in 1974 ordered AT&T to provide access
to other long distance carriers-pursuant to complex formulas-in order to
provide other carriers the interconnection needed to access local facilities.0 6
The other carriers (e.g., MCI and Sprint) billed their own customers and were
paid directly by them. In turn, the other carriers paid C&P for use of the local
system. The court noted that the revenues received by C&P from the other

598. AT&T v. New York State Dep't of Taxation & Fin., 637 N.E.2d 257, 258-59
(N.Y. 1994) (discussing a 1990 tax law and holding it violative of the Commerce Clause for
discriminating between interstate and intrastate carriers).
599. Id. at258.
600. Id.
601. Id. at 259.
602. 516 A.2d 181 (D.C. 1986).
603. Id. at 184-85.
604. Id. at 185.
605. Id. at 182.

606. Bell Tel. Co. of Pa. v. FCC, 503 F.2d 1250 (3d Cir. 1974).
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carriers were not taxable. 7
Finally, the court addressed post-divestiture, when C&P ceased providing
long distance service. Like the other long distance carriers, AT&T could and
did use C&P's network. The District of Columbia asserted that amounts
received by C&P from AT&T were subject to the gross receipts tax.6O The
court, however, held that network access revenues were nontaxable because the
services C&P provided other companies were not public utility services as
contemplated by the statute.6 The court cited a 1963 decision of the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, which held that the
revenues received from other carriers for use of local facilities by the other
carriers in serving their customers were not subject to the gross receipts tax:
[W]hen a public service company supplies services or
facilities to another public utility company in the same field
for the sole purpose of enabling the latter company to serve
its customers more efficiently, such services are not "public
utility commodities or services" within the meaning of our
statute, and thus are not subject to the gross receipts tax.6' 0
Before divestiture, telephone companies shared revenues. Divestiture, as
noted previously in this Article, altered the companies' relationship and
transformed shared revenues into a cost of business for independent entities
furnishing services to one another.6 ' The Illinois Message Tax Act imposed on
persons engaged in the business of transmitting intrastate messages a tax of 3%
on the gross receipts of such business. 6 2 In lllinois Bell Telephone Co. v.
Allphin, Illinois sought to charge Illinois Bell the message tax on revenues
billed to the customers by Bell, but paid to and retained by 57 independent
telephone companies for participation in the transmission of intrastate tolls.
These revenues were merely forwarded to the independents by Bell pursuant
to traffic agreements, and the independents had already paid the message tax
on them. Illinois argued that Bell's payments to the independents were a cost
of doing business-a charge by the independents for the use of their

607. Chesapeake& Potomac,516 A.2d at 183.
608. Id. at 183-84.
609. Id. at 182, 184. A similar argument can be made in South Carolina where the
statute refers to "regulated business" and probably means the same thing (i.e., service to
customers in view of the legislative history).
610. Id. at 185 (quoting Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. District of Columbia, 325
F.2d 217,222 (D.C. Cir. 1963)).
611. See, e.g., Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Allphin, 443 N.E.2d 580, 590-91 (Il. 1982)
("When an independent telephone company's service and facilities are utilized in transmitting
a message, it is satisfying its statutory obligation to the public .... The costs and expenses of
participating telephone companies are their costs and expenses .... "); see also Part IV.A.5
(discussing the 1984 divestiture).
612. Allphin, 443 N.E.2d at 582.
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facilities." 3 The court, however, held that the traffic agreements accomplished
a division of revenue that made the gross receipts those of the company whose
facilities contributed to the completion of the call, stating "[u]nder the divisionof-revenues concept, the telephone companies actas collection agentsfor each
other in the functioning of an integrated, interconnected, statewide telephone
network, not as independent contractors furnishing services to each other and
charging compensation for those services. 61 4 Divestiture affected the Aliphin
decision by altering the historical relations exemplified by division of revenues
pursuant to traffic agreements.
Another predivestiture case involving C&P established that revenues
received for services supplied to other carriers to enable the latter to serve their
customers were not gross receipts to the local company. 65 The payments in
question were received by C&P, which served customers in the District of
Columbia, for services provided to companies doing business in Maryland and
Virginia. Because of the geographical proximity of the three areas, the
Washington company performed certain services for the other companies,
including information calls and certain Maryland calls. 6 The District of
Columbia argued the revenues were subject to its 4% gross receipts tax because
they resulted "from the sale of public utility commodities and services within
' However, the court found the receipts were not subject to the
the District."617
District's tax because they constituted reimbursement for assistance rendered
to another utility company in performing its obligations, not a tariffed receipt
from its customers.6 8
In South Carolina sales tax cases the courts consistently avoid a double
tax.69 In Southeastern-Kusan,Inc. v. South CarolinaTax Commission620 Chief
Justice Littlejohn held:
To allow Southeastern to claim this exemption produces no
absurd result. It is consistent with the generalpurposeofthis
exemption, which is to avoid the pyramiding oftaxes on the
same commodity (thereby preventing the increase of sales
price to the ultimate consumer) and to promote new industry
within the State and encourage expansion of present

613. Id. at 589.
614. Id. at 590 (emphasis added).
615. Chesapeake &Potomac Tel. Co. v. District ofolumbia, 325 F.2d 217 (D.C. Cir.
1963).
616. Id. at218.
617. Id. at 217 (quoting D.C. CODE ANN. § 47-1701 (1961)).
618. Id. at 222.
619. Palmettonet, Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n., 318 S.C. 102,456 S.E.2d 385
(1995) (holding thatsales ofservices by the owner offiber-optic linebetween cities were exempt
from sales tax as wholesale sales). Also, to settle 1987 litigation with Southern Bell, the state
removed the access charge for the taxable base.
620. 276 S.C. 487, 280 S.E.2d 57 (1981).
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62
industry. '

2. Inclusion of InterstateAccess Charges in Local Company's Tax
Base
South Carolina is apparently the first state to attempt to include the
interstate access charges in a local company's tax base. The Department's
rationale is Tax Commission Decision 91-41, which holds that interstate access
charges should be included. In Decision 91-41 the taxpayer argued that
interstate access charges should not be included. 622 The Tax Commission
responded:
We disagree with the taxpayer. Our corporate license tax
is a franchise tax imposed on the privilege of doing business
as a corporation in this State. Thus, the focus of our inquiry
is not on the intricacies of the nation's interstate telephone
system. Instead, the question is simply whether the access
charges are received by the taxpayer for services it has
rendered in South Carolina. Any other approach would allow
as a result of
the taxpayer to exclude receipts that are derived
63
exercising its corporate powers in this State. 2
Turning to the facts, it is evident the services rendered by
the taxpayer with respect to the subject access charges all
occurred within South Carolina. The equipment, facilities,
lines, and personnel used by the taxpayer to generate the
access charges are all located here. Simply stated, none of the
activities conducted by the taxpayer with regard to the access
charges occurred out of state. Accordingly, such charges are
properly included in the taxpayer's South Carolina license tax
base.'
Decision 91-41 concludes that "it is evident" the services rendered in
6
connection with the "access charges all occurred within South Carolina." s
As noted, section 12-20-100 applies to "gross receipts derived from

621. Id. at 488, 280 S.E.2d at 59 (emphasis added).
622. A Finding Concerning The License Tax Liability of ABC Telephone Company
For the Tax Years Ending December 31, 1987 Through December 31, 1989, No. 91-41, slip op.
at 3 (South Carolina Tax Commission August 12, 1991) (Modified No. 91-58 (Oct. 4, 1991)).
623. Id., slip op. at 4 n.4 (citations omitted). This view is neither new nor novel. See
Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. District of Columbia, 137 F.2d 6745 (1943), in which a
similar analysis was sustained.
624. FindingConcerningThe License Tax Liability ofABC, No. 91-41, slip op. at 4.
625. Id.
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' With this
services rendered from regulated business within this State."626
section the Tax Commission is attempting to cut off a piece of interstate
commerce and impose an intrastate tax on it. The formal subject of the tax, as
the Commission views it, are the gross receipts from access in South Carolina.
However, the tax is in fact on gross receipts from part of an interstate call. The
interstate phone call is, of course, interstate commerce, and the facilities
employed are obviously instrumentalities of interstate commerce. Any tax on
interstate commerce must comply with CompleteAuto Transit,Inc. v. Brady.627
More particularly, a tax on an interstate phone call must comply with Goldberg
v. Sweet.6" However, the Commission's decision makes no effort to comply
with Supreme Court authorities because it apparently takes the position that it
is taxing a local event. With the Commission's decision, South Carolina
attempts to set up a toll booth to charge those who want to engage in interstate
commerce. Because the South Carolina State tax is in fact on the interstatecall,
it is improper for several reasons:
(1) Section 12-20-100 does not apply because both its language and
established interpretation confine it to intrastate commerce.
(2) If section 12-20-100 is construed to apply to interstate commerce, the
tax will fail because it discriminatorily imposes a tax on the interstate call that
is not paid on the intrastate call.
(3) Section 12-2-100, if construed to apply to interstate commerce, would
also fail because it makes no effort to apportion the call in accord with
Goldberg v. Sweet-that is it fails to tax only those calls that originated or
terminated in the state andwere charged to a service address in the state. To the
contrary, South Carolina is seeking to tax calls originating and terminating in
the state but that may be charged to someone in Illinois. A state tax on
interstate phone calls, that is not designed to follow Goldbergv. Sweet will fail
because of nexus, apportionment, and discrimination problems. For example,
the same call could be taxed by the state of origin and the state of destination,
creating a risk of multiple taxation. Multiple taxation is also possible because,
unlike Illinois, South Carolina does not offer a credit if payment is made to
another state on the same call.
(4) In Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Jefferson Lines, Inc.629 the Supreme
Court held that a "gross receipts tax... [is] simply a variety of tax on income,
which is required to be apportioned to reflect the location of the various
interstate activities by which it was earned." 630 The Jefferson Lines court thus
reaffirmed Central Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Mealey,63' which held

626. S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-20-100(A)(2)(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1999) (emphasis
added); see supra note 577-580 and accompanying text.
627. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
628. 488 U.S. 252 (1989).
629. 514 U.S. 175 (1995).
630. Id. at 190.

631. 334 U.S. 653 (1948).
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unconstitutional an unapportioned gross receipts tax on the full price of a ticket
for interstate trips. South Carolina may argue that it is not taxing interstate
values but only a receipt for the local loop, which is entirely in South Carolina.
The local loop, however, is indivisible with interstate calls, and only has value
as part of the whole long distance call. Under Jefferson Lines, the whole must
be valued and then fairly apportioned-if it can be.
In the monopoly era, state and city gross receipts taxes could be passed on
to customers in the form ofrates. The gross receipts tax is one ofmany special
taxes and fees that state and local governments imposed and built in to the rate
base, along with high personal property taxes, business license taxes, and
franchise fees. The system ofusing the phone company as a tax collector, while
comfortable for the parties, was not transparent. In moderation, it probably did
little harm. But the gross receipts and other special taxes of today-at 3%
(Municipal Association ordinances) or 5% (Orangeburg franchise fee)632 or
some higher number-make the state and city partners in a company's profits
but not its losses, when they should not be partners in either. The industry, as
established by the Telecommunications Act of 1996, is meant to be market
efficient and transparent. The Act requires state and local governments to treat
telecommunications providers as they do other taxpayers.
V. CONCLUSION

Since Southern Bell first entered into a franchise with the City of Aiken in
1890, the telephone business in South Carolina has expanded to include new
information technologies that have revolutionized American life.
The Telecommunications Act defines "telecommunications" to mean "the
transmissions, between or among points specified by the user, of information
of the user's choosing, without change in the form or content of the information
as sent and received. '63 3 "Information" today includes voice, data, image,
graphics, and video. The control and regulation of communication and
information technology is obviously a vital national concern-as such
technology is an integral instrumentality of interstate commerce and military
defense-for which policy is made at the national level.
The Telecommunications Act expressly preempts state and local laws that
burden the entry of telecommunications providers. The special taxes left over
from the monopoly days are consequently outlawed. The business is subject
only to the reasonableexercise of the state's police and taxing powers; the
taxes cannot be discriminatory and the police power cannot be a subterfuge for
interfering with the provision of service. State and local governments, as
Theodore N. Vail said in 1915, "should think of themselves as juries charged
with 'protecting the individual member of the public against corporate
632. See BellSouth Telecomnms., Inc. v. City of Orangeburg, No. 25009, 1999 WL
1037160 (S.C. Nov. 8, 1999).
633. 47 U.S.C. § 153(43) (Supp. 1111997).
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aggression or extortion, and the corporate member of the community against
public extortion and aggression."" M Similarly, the federal government should
assure-eitherby competition or regulation-that Bell's remarkable invention
is available to our citizens at a price close to cost.

634. BROOKs, supranote 4, at 144.
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